Preamble

The House met at half-past Two o'clock

PRAYERS

[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

Oral Answers to Questions — RESTRICTIVE PRACTICES COURT

Mr. du Cann: asked the Attorney-General if he will make a further statement on the progress made towards the establishment of the Restrictive Practices Court.

The Attorney-General (Sir Reginald Manningham-Buller): Proceedings have been started in twenty cases. The work involved in preparing them for trial is very considerable, and it is most unlikely that any of them will be ready for final hearing before the early part of next year.

Mr. du Cann: Would not my right hon. and learned Friend agree that the good intentions of the Government will be judged, in part at any rate, by the determination and vigour with which the Restrictive Trade Practices Act is applied? In view of the fact that the Act received the Royal Assent over twelve months ago, will not my right hon. and learned Friend see whether the proceedings cannot be expedited somewhat?

The Attorney-General: I am quite certain that the proceedings cannot be expedited in view of the close consideration that has to be given to a vast amount of documents. I am sure that my hon. Friend would wish that proper investigation should be made before the cases are presented so that justice and the requirements of the Act are complied with.

Mr. E. Fletcher: While everybody would agree that it is desirable that proper investigation should take place, surely, in view of the great public interest in the matter, it is very regrettable that no decision is anticipated before the beginning of next year? Would not the

right hon. and learned Gentleman agree that it is most desirable that these proceedings should be expedited as much as possible?

The Attorney-General: The answer to that is that they are being expedited as much as possible.

Oral Answers to Questions — MINISTRY OF WORKS

Embassy, Saigon (Working Conditions)

Mrs. Jeger: asked the Minister of Works whether he is aware of the unhealthy and uncomfortable conditions in which members of the British Embassy staff in Saigon have to work; and whether, in view of the special climatic difficulties there, he will expedite the installation of air conditioning.

The Minister of Works (Mr. Hugh Molson): I agree that working conditions in the main Embassy offices are not satisfactory, and following a recent visit to Saigon by my officers an improvement scheme has been prepared. I hope that these improvements, including the provision of additional air-conditioning, will be made later this year.

Mrs. Jeger: While thanking the Minister for that reply, may I ask him whether he is aware that many of the officials in Saigon are working in very hot weather in compartments about the size of horse boxes and whether he will use all his influence to hurry up the improvement?

Mr. Molson: I know that officials of the Foreign Office are working under difficult conditions. Indeed, I said so. There is some doubt about the local electricity supply being adequate for purposes of the air conditioning but we regard the matter as one of urgency and hope to get it done in the course of the present year.

Youth Rally, Hyde Park

Mr. Collins: asked the Minister of Works why he prohibited the carrying of banners and distribution of literature at the Anglo-Scandinavian Youth Rally in Hyde Park, on Saturday, 13th July.

Mr. Molson: My Department's longstanding policy is to prohibit the free distribution of literature and to limit severely the display of banners in the Royal Parks


Experience has shown that this is necessary in order to safeguard users of the park from disturbance.

Mr. Collins: Is the Minister aware that on this occasion the distribution of literature and the exhibition of banners were entirely prohibited and that this gathering of young people from Sweden and Germany were quite shocked to find that this was the case in the modern home of democracy? Will the right hon. Gentleman, therefore, look into the question again, because it is extraordinary that we should give this impression to people from abroad? Will he also give an assurance that under no circumstances will he interfere with the carrying of banners on May Day and similar traditional occasions?

Mr. Molson: The hon. Gentleman will have noticed that there is a certain inconsistency in the practice of my Department. Whereas banners are not allowed on normal occasions, on May Day banners are allowed. I have tried in vain to ascertain the reason for this inconsistency. I can only assume that it is due to an unwillingness to interere with the jamboree of the party opposite on May Day.

New Palace Yard (Covered Way)

Mr. Leavey: asked the Minister of Works what is the purpose of the penthouse being constructed in New Palace Yard; how much it will cost; and for how long it is estimated that it will be in use.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Works (Mr. Harmar Nicholls): A temporary covered way is being provided whilst the first section of the New Palace Yard Arcade is being rebuilt. It is intended as a protection from dust and chips of stone. It will cost about £90 and will be required in its present position for at least a year.

Mr. Leavey: I am much obliged to my hon. Friend for that information. Does that mean that the general work on the Arcade itself will be completed within that twelve months' period?

Mr. Nicholls: No, the work on the whole of the Arcade may take up to three years, but this section will take from twelve to eighteen months.

Earl Lloyd George (Memorial)

Mr. Walter Elliot: asked the Minister of Works what progress has been made with the arrangements for the memorial to the late Earl Lloyd George.

Mr. Molson: I have now received a letter from my right hon. Friend containing the recommendations of the Committee, of which he was chairman, appointed to advise on the memorial. The Committee has unanimously recommended that the memorial statue should be of stone and should be erected on a pedestal adjoining the Churchill Arch in the Inner Lobby. It further recommended the appointment of Sir Jacob Epstein as the sculptor. The Government have decided to accept these recommendations. I should like to take this opportunity to thank the Committee for the care with which it has carried out its task.

Mr. Woodburn: On what principle are the statues for the Central Lobby selected? Is it because of the historic nature of the person represented?

Mr. Molson: The procedure is that a Motion about the general policy of putting up a statue is moved in the House, and then it is the custom to appoint a special committee to recommend on the detailed arrangements.

Sir A. Gomme-Duncan: Is my right hon. Friend aware that many of us are alarmed about the choice of artist? If the statue is to be anything like the Field Marshal Smuts Memorial, we shall not want any more.

Mr. G. Brown: In view of the horrible example of the Smuts Memorial, will the Minister have any preview of what Sir Jacob Epstein has in view?

Mr. Molson: I deprecate the way in which the supplementary questions about this artist have been put. The works of Sir Jacob Epstein, as is the case I suppose with all artists, vary in their artistic excellence. In six months' time we shall have an indication from the sculptor of what he intends to do.

Mr. Anthony Greenwood: As political or party considerations are not involved in this matter, is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the choice of Sir Jacob Epstein will enjoy the confidence and


support of many hon. Members on both sides of the House?

Ornamental Fountain, Hyde Park

Mr. J. Rodgers: asked the Minister of Works whether he will put a new ornamental fountain in Hyde Park.

Mr. Molson: I have accepted an offer by the Constance Fund to provide a fountain in the form of a major work of sculpture. The Constance Fund was set up in 1944 through the generosity of the late Mrs. Constance Goetze. Its principal object is to improve public parks by the erection of works of ornamental sculpture, and the Fund has already presented two fountains to the Royal Parks. I should like to express my great appreciation of the Fund's latest gift to these Parks.
I propose that the new fountain should be placed in Hyde Park near the East Carriage Drive where the Dolphin Fountain now stands. This attractive gift is made at an appropriate moment in view of the changes which will be brought about by the new Park Lane Scheme. I shall use the Dolphin Fountain to replace the Swan Fountain in Regent's Park, which is in a very bad condition.
The Constance Fund proposes to hold an open competition for the design of the new fountain and will advertise its intention during the next few days.

Mr. Rodgers: Does not my right hon. Friend agree that, apart from the fountains in Trafalgar Square, London is very deficient in fountains compared with other capital cities, and especially of good pieces of sculpture? Does he realise that the answer he has given today will give enormous satisfaction to thousands of Londoners?

Mr. Molson: I entirely agree with my hon. Friend. When one compares London with Rome, one realises that there is a great need for additional beautiful fountains.

Ancient Monuments (Drawings)

Mr. Anthony Greenwood: asked the Minister of Works whether he will arrange for drawings of ancient monuments as they might have appeared in use to be displayed at the monuments in his care.

Mr. Molson: Yes, Sir. I recently arranged for Mr. Alan Sorrell to make drawings showing conjectural reconstructions of some of the monuments in my care. A copy of the drawing is or will be displayed at each of the monuments concerned, and postcard reproductions put on sale. The original drawings will be shown on suitable occasions. If, as I expect, these drawings prove popular, I shall commission others. The drawings will be displayed in the Tea Room tomorrow.

National Library Building, Bloomsbury

Mrs. L. Jeger: asked the Minister of Works the total estimated cost at current prices of the proposed new National Library building in Bloomsbury, including compensation payments; and when and where he proposes to start building.

Mr. Molson: On the question of cost, I cannot add to the reply which my predecessor gave the hon. Member on 20th April, 1956. Nor are the plans sufficiently advanced to enable me to forecast when building work will start.

Mrs. Jeger: Is the Minister saying that the general rise in prices since April, 1956, is not to be reflected in this estimate? Is he aware that uncertainty about this scheme is having a very bad effect on the property in the neighbourhood and that people are unwilling to do anything to buildings because of uncertainty about his plans?

Mr. Molson: There is very little uncertainty about it. All that is uncertain is when we shall begin building. It is the fixed intention of the Government to acquire the whole of this area which will be required for the extension of the British Museum.

Requisitioned Buildings

Mr. Hay: asked the Minister of Works how the number of buildings held under requisition by his Department on 1st October, 1951, compares with the position at the latest convenient date.

Mr. Molson: The number of buildings held on requisition by my Department on 1st October, 1951, was 2,599. At 30th June, 1957, the number was 80.

Mr. Hay: Is my right hon. Friend aware that those figures will give widespread satisfaction? Can he give the House an assurance that he will not weary of well-doing in this respect?

Mr. Molson: We are continuing to de-requisition as and when we can. In a number of cases, we shall either take leases of these properties or purchase them. There is likely to be some delay in their acquisition, but we shall speed up matters as much as we can.

Oral Answers to Questions — SCOTLAND

Heltnsdale—Melvich Road, Sutherland

Sir D. Robertson: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he is aware that the Helmsdale-Melvich road has been closed by the Sutherland County Council following damage and in some parts destruction by excessive weights carried by the main contractors' lorries and others employed by the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority and the British Transport Commission; and what action he intends taking to repair and reopen this Class I road.

The Joint Under-Secretary of State for Scotland (Mr. Niall Macpherson): My right hon. Friend understands that Sutherland County Council, as the responsible highway authority, has decided to carry out repairs which will enable this road to be reopened to vehicles of up to 8 tons weight.

Sir D. Robertson: Is it not the case that the county council is to spend about £500 on filling in craters? As this is only a patching operation, will my hon. Friend ask his right hon. Friend to consider whether the Government should reconstruct the road immediately, calling upon the nationalised bodies to pay their share in due course?

Mr. Macpherson: This is a Class 1 road and, therefore, the responsibility of the local authority. My right hon. Friend will do his best to assist in arranging for any assistance to be given by the British Transport Commission and the Atomic Energy Authority for the reconstruction of the road.

Sir D. Robertson: is it not the case that 1d. rate in the County of Sutherland will produce only £200? Is it not useless to expect a county so impoverished to bear the cost of this road?

Mr. John MacLeod: Is the Minister not aware that the whole road system connecting Dounreay with the South is breaking down? Ought not these things to be examined at a very high level, because complete reconstruction is needed?

Mr. Macpherson: The A.9 main trunk road is the responsibility of my right hon. Friend, and any question of dealing with that would be a matter for him.

Mr. T. Fraser: Does not the hon. Gentleman appreciate that these roads are being very badly damaged by the vehicular traffic occasioned by this project in the far North which has been put there by Her Majesty's Government? Her Majesty's Government must be concerned to maintain the state of the highways and cannot merely pass the buck to the local authorities.

Mr. Macpherson: My right hon. Friend and the local authorities concerned have done everything possible to ensure that the heavy vehicles running up to Dounreay use the A.9 road, and the A.9 road is being made fit for that purpose.

Unclassified Roads, Caithness and Sutherland

Sir D. Robertson: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he is aware of the state of unclassified roads in Caithness and Sutherland; and if he will authorise grants under the Congested Districts (Scotland)Act, 1897, to enable one-fifth of these roads to be properly repaired this year and similar grants for repairs in each of the next four years.

The Joint Under-Secretary of State for Scotland (Lord John Hope): My right hon. Friend has invited Caithness County Council to submit priority schemes for consideration for grant-aid, but he cannot at this stage undertake to authorise grant for a complete programme of such works.

Sir D. Robertson: What confidence can the local authorities of Caithness and Sutherland have in putting forward any more priorities? They did this for two


years and every scheme they put forward has been turned down. Is it not the case that the roads in the Highlands are completely breaking down and disintegrating into the bog from which they were wrought and that something has to be done about it?

Lord John Hope: My hon. Friend is not quite correct in his denunciation, because Caithness County did press for a grant for one unclassified road after the imposition of capital restrictions in February, 1956, and that was approved in June last.

Radiographers

Miss Herbison: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland the extent of the shortage of radiographers in Scottish hospitals; and what representations have been made to him on this matter.

The Joint Under-Secretary of State for Scotland (Mr. J. N. Browne): A survey made in May this year showed that the overall shortage of radiographers in Scottish hospitals was 5 per cent. My right hon. Friend has received letters on the matter from several hon. Members.

Miss Herbison: Since there is this overall shortage of 5 per cent., what steps is the Secretary of State going to take to ensure that that shortage will disappear? Is he aware that modern medical treatment and surgery is dependent to a great extent on the work of these radiographers? If this shortage continues and, indeed, becomes worse, will not the position be very serious for patients in Scotland?

Mr. Browne: I agree that the shortage of 5 per cent. is troublesome, but it is not alarming. The greatest percentage of deficiency is in the Eastern Region, and there the new training school at Dundee was opened in 1954 which, it is hoped, will improve the position.

Miss Herbison: Is not "troublesome" a strange word for the hon. Gentleman to use when referring to this shortage of 5 per cent.? Is he not aware that many medical people in Scotland regard it not as troublesome but as very serious indeed? Does the Secretary of State intend to do anything more than the Under-Secretary of State has mentioned?

Mr. Browne: I think the hon. Lady's fears are exaggerated. In any case, the shortage in Scotland is 5 per cent., whereas in England it is 16 per cent.

Deer

Sir D. Robertson: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he has yet considered the agreed plan for deer conservation and control which was submitted to him in October, 1956, by the Nature Conservancy and other interested parties; and if he will introduce a comprehensive Bill which will not only protect red deer in Scotland but will also protect agriculture.

Lord John Hope: I would refer my hon. Friend to the reply which my right hon. Friend gave on 16th July to my hon. Friend the Member for Fife, East (Sir J. Henderson-Stewart). I am sending him a copy.

Sir D. Robertson: Is it not the case that the reply indicates that nine precious months have been wasted, that all the different divergent views have been agreed upon and that the meeting referred to is to take place during the long Recess? When will Parliament have an opportunity of getting down to this matter, because the slaughter of the hinds and their calves still goes on?

Lord John Hope: I think the main point that the answer of my right hon. Friend revealed was that this meeting is to take place as soon as 7th August.

Strontium 90

Mr. G. M. Thomson: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland whether he will now make a statement on the incidence of Strontium 90 on Scottish sites where observations are being conducted as a result of recent thermo-nuclear bomb tests.

Lord John Hope: As I informed the hon. Member on 14th May, measurements are being taken at Scottish sites. It may, however, be some time before the results are available.

Mr. Thomson: Is the Minister aware that since that answer a number of hydrogen bomb tests have taken place and there is anxiety in Scotland to know as quickly as possible what effect this is having on the atmosphere in Scotland?

Lord John Hope: I am aware of that, but it must take some time before the results of these tests can be in any way assessed.

Local Government Finance

Mr. Hamilton: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland what representations he has received from the Educational Institute of Scotland concerning the proposals for the reform of local government finance.

Mr. N. Macpherson: The Institute has represented that the proposed general grant system would restrict essential educational development and has urged the retention of the percentage grant system for educational expenditure.

Mr. Hamilton: Can the hon. Gentleman say what the reply will be to that particular representation? Is he aware that almost all educational organisations, not only in Scotland but throughout the United Kingdom, are opposed to these proposals, and are the Government quite determined, despite these protestations from all these organisations, to go on with them?

Mr. Macpherson: My right hon. Friend has carefully considered the representations made but cannot share the view that the general grant will prejudice educational development in Scotland. Indeed, paragraphs 7 and 9 of the Scottish White Paper indicated clearly that adequate provision will be made in the general grant for the maintenance of the educational service.

Mr. Hoy: Is the hon. Gentleman not aware that his right hon. Friend, in reply to a Question which I put down a fortnight ago, said that he would have a meeting with the Educational Institute of Scotland to discuss this very important matter? Is he now telling us that his right hon. Friend has pre-judged the decision by making a decision before the meeting is held?

Mr. Macpherson: It was my noble Friend the Minister of State who met representatives of the Institute on 15th July, and I have been asked what reply was given to them. My noble Friend listened to their representations and, as I said, my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State is considering their representations.

Mr. McInnes: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he has yet discussed with the local authority associations the findings of the departmental committee appointed to review all aspects of local government finance; and with what result.

Mr. J. N. Browne: My right hon. Friend and my noble Friend the Minister of State had three meetings with the principal Scottish local authority associations to discuss the Government's proposals between the announcement in Parliament on 12th February and the publication of the White Paper on 10th July. There have also been meetings between officials of my Department and local authority officials. All these meetings were confidential. My right hon. Friend has since asked the associations for their views on the White Paper, and he waits their replies.

Mr. McInnes: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that Scottish local authorities are disturbed by the fact that no committee has ever reviewed the problem of Scottish local authority finance and that all that happened was that one or two officials were sent to Whitehall to be shown the English formula with a view to adapting it to Scotland with one or two minor adjustments?

Mr. Browne: I cannot agree with the hon. Gentleman that the Scottish local authorities had not just the same treatment in this matter as the English local authorities.

Mr. T. Fraser: Has there been any review of local government finance in Scotland by a responsible committee?

Mr. Browne: If by "responsible committee" the hon. Gentleman means a committee of local officials—

Mr. Fraser: Not necessarily officials, but any other responsible persons. Was there a review of the relationship between the Government and local authorities in Scotland by any committee?

Mr. Browne: Of course; by my right hon. Friend and his officials.

Dunfermline and West Fife Hospital (Staff)

Mr. Hamilton: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he is aware that hospital wards are in danger of being


closed in West Fife as a result of staff shortages; and what steps he intends to take to avoid such closures.

Mr. J. N. Browne: My right hon. Friend presumes the hon. Member refers to the Dunfermline and West Fife Hospital where there is a temporary shortage of medical staff. Prompt action has been taken to overcome the difficulties and my right hon. Friend assures the hon. Member there is no question of wards being closed.

Mr. Hamilton: Does that mean that this problem is troublesome, too? Has the hon. Gentleman completed the review of the staff position in the West Fife Hospital, which he undertook to make some little while ago? Is he quite satisfied that the position will not get worse in the immediate future?

Mr. Browne: I am satisfied that the position will not get worse in the immediate future. As regards the first part of the hon. Gentleman's supplementary question, I would ask him to put down a separate Question.

Lung Cancer and Smoking

Mr. Hamilton: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland what steps have been taken to call the attention of all personnel in educational establishments to the relationship between lung cancer and smoking.

Mr. Rankin: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland what advice he is giving to education authorities on methods for reducing the amount of cigarette smoking among schoolchildren.

Mr. Woodburn: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland what arrangements are being made to bring home to schoolchildren the dangerous possibilities of cigarette smoking.

Mr. N. Macpherson: Copies of the statement made in the House on 27th June by my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Health and of the special Report of the Medical Research Council have been sent to all education authorities and other school managers with a request that they should ensure that the risks attached to smoking, and especially to the heavy smoking of cigarettes, are stressed in the course of

health instruction. I have no doubt that before the schools reopen all concerned will consider how these risks can most effectively be brought home to pupils.

Mr. Hamilton: Is the Minister not prepared to take additional steps, apart from the ones he mentioned, and would he not be prepared that the Department itself should be responsible for the financing of some of the additional propaganda which ought to be undertaken on this very important subject?

Mr. Macpherson: With regard to the second part of the supplementary question, we will consider that. It has been decided that it should be left to education authorities to decide how to persuade children of the reality of the danger and to the local health authorities to make the danger known to the general public. With regard to the special measures used, I would inform the hon. Gentleman that a film on lung cancer has been shown to senior pupils of at least one secondary school.

Mr. Rankin: I thank the Minister for what he has done. But, in view of the admitted growth of cigarette smoking among school children, would he say what steps he is taking to direct the attention of the appropriate authorities to the need for a more vigorous enforcement of the law regarding the sale of cigarettes to young persons?

Mr. Macpherson: This is one of the matters that will be considered.

Mr. Woodburn: The Minister referred to the film shown to one secondary school class. Are the Government going to make this available throughout Scotland? That film, I understand, was very successful in Edinburgh. It would seem that the most effective way of bringing to the notice of children the danger of lung cancer is by letting them see some of the effects. The French have adopted this kind of education for children with considerable success, and I think that the Government might stimulate it a little more, because some local authorities may be backward in this matter.

Mr. Macpherson: I share the right hon. Gentleman's view, and I hope that my answer will stimulate local authorities to ask for this film.

Litter Byelaws

Mr. McInnes: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland the number of county councils which have introduced byelaws under Section 300 of the Local Government (Scotland)Act, 1947, to deal with prohibition of litter in public places.

Mr. J. N. Browne: Thirteen.

Mr. McInnes: In view of the fact that only thirteen counties out of thirty-three have adopted anti-litter byelaws under the Local Government (Scotland)Act, will not the Joint Parliamentary Secretary encourage the remaining twenty to do so in order to improve local conditions?

Mr. Browne: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his Question and for his supplementary question. Last year the number increased from ten to thirteen, and I hope that his Question will be given sufficient publicity to stimulate action among the remaining counties.

Mr. McInnes: I want the Secretary of State to take action by impressing on the local authorities the desirability of introducing byelaws under Section 300 of the Act.

Mr. Browne: I will bring that request to the notice of my right hon. Friend.

Accidents in Institutions

Mrs. Mann: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland the number of accidents in Scotland from falls in institutions in 1956 and the percentages of these to the total home accidents from falls in that year.

Mr. J. N. Browne: I regret that the information is not available.

Mrs. Mann: Will the Under-Secretary of State take steps to make it available, because highly polished floors in institutions are said to lead to a great number of accidents ending in death?

Mr. Browne: As the hon. Lady knows, we are just beginning to get to grips with this important problem. The circular which we have just sent to local authorities will, I hope, provide valuable information of this type in due course. I will try to do what the hon. Lady suggests.

Public Cleansing (Capital Expenditure)

Mr. Ross: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland by how much and as what percentage of the sums for which authorisation was sought local authority expenditure on public cleansing was curtailed by him in 1956 on account of the restriction on capital expenditure.

Mr. J. N. Browne: Applications to incur expenditure on capital works in connection with public cleansing amounting to £163,585, or 35 per cent. of the total, were refused in 1956, but of these. applications amounting to £75,790 were authorised in 1957, so reducing the percentage of refusals from 35 to 19.

Mr. Ross: Does the Joint Under-Secretary appreciate that we need a little more than byelaws in relation to public health, but that if authorisation is forthcoming for that expenditure we might see some improvement? If the Secretary of State walked around in our large towns and seaside resorts, he would find there was very great need for improvement.

Arts Council (Appointment)

Mr. G. M. Thomson: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland how far he is consulted about appointments from Scotland to the Arts Council.

Mr. N. Macpherson: The Royal Charter incorporating the Arts Council of Great Britain provides that all members of the Council are to be appointed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer after consultation with the Minister of Education and the Secretary of State for Scotland. My right hon. Friend is fully consulted, therefore, about all appointments to the Arts Council, including those from Scotland.

Mr. Thomson: Is the Joint Under-Secretary aware of the dissatisfaction in Scotland about the composition of the Scottish Committee of the Arts Council, and that complaints have been made both by Equity, which is the actors' association, and the Scottish T.U.C.? Is he further aware that my information is that the Scottish Committee of the Arts Council is not fully utilising the funds made available to it by Parliament?

Mr. Macpherson: The second part of that supplementary question is another


question. On the first part, the Committee is appointed by the Arts Council, with the consent of the Secretary of State for Scotland.

Living Theatre

Mr. G. M. Thomson: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will appoint a committee to inquire into the state of the living theatre in Scotland, with a view to determining the extent to which its maintenance should be assisted from public funds.

Mr. N. Macpherson: No, Sir.

Mr. Thomson: Is the Joint Under-Secretary aware that a thriving repertory movement throughout Scotland is very important to the vitality of our national culture? Is he aware that in Dundee we are doing our best to keep the repertory theatre alive and under our own control? Would he talk to the Scottish Committee of the Arts Council to see if it could make a special grant to enable us to do so?

Mr. Macpherson: My right hon. Friend has every sympathy with the repertory movement in Scotland. The Scottish Committee of the Arts Council has this problem of theatres very much in mind.

Tuberculosis

Mr. Woodburn: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland whether the scientific investigation, set up in 1948, into the causes of Scotland's high tuberculosis incidence is still pursuing its investigations; and when he expects further reports.

Mr. J. N. Browne: The task of the Committee on Tuberculosis, set up by the Scottish Health Services Council in 1948, was completed on the publication of its Report in 1951.

Mr. Woodburn: Would not the Minister agree that the problem of tuberculosis in Scotland is not yet eliminated and that the committee should pursue its investigations to learn the lessons of the steps taken in 1948?

Mr. Browne: We have examined this matter. The truth is that every possible agency is now actively engaged in fighting T.B. and the results speak for themselves. In 1948, when the right hon. Gentleman set up the committee, there

were 3,415 deaths from T.B.; the provisional figure for 1956 is 714. I assure the right hon. Gentleman that if there is anything else we can do we shall do it.

Dr. Dickson Mabon: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland how many persons have been X-rayed in the present community survey campaigns in Scotland.

Mr. J. N. Browne: About 883,000.

Dr. Dickson Mabon: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland (1)how many persons have been found to be suffering from active pulmonary tuberculosis in the recent community survey campaigns; and how many were found to be in need of continued observation and assessment;
(2)how many persons have been admitted to hospital for treatment for active pulmonary tuberculosis as a result of the recent community surveys; and how many are receiving domiciliary treatment.

Mr. J. N. Browne: Information available so far shows that in the five areas for which figures have been received 2,297 active cases were found, and 1,173 have been admitted to hospital. Particulars of the number in need of further observation and the number receiving domiciliary treatment are not yet available.

Dr. Mabon: Will the Minister agree that it is very important to have those figures for the assessment of future progress of the campaign? Can he give an indication of what proportion of the 1,124 so far unclassified are carriers? Is it not true that not all the T.B. allowances and social welfare facilities are being made available to those people?

Mr. Browne: I would ask the hon. Member to put that down as a separate Question. I am not at all sure that he is right in suggesting that any person in Scotland is being denied facilities.

Mr. Rankin: Is the Minister aware that in my constituency a carrier has been refused any treatment whatsoever and that no provision is made for him in the form of a new house?

Mr. Browne: I would ask the hon. Member to bring that to my notice immediately.

Isle of Rhum (Public Access)

Mr. Woodburn: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland what arrangements are being made by the Nature Conservancy Trust to enable the public to land and visit the Island of Rhum.

Mr. N. Macpherson: My right hon. Friend understands that the Nature Conservancy are issuing a statement about public access to the Island of Rhum, and he has asked the Conservancy to send a copy to the right hon. Member.

Mr. Woodburn: Is not this matter of more public interest than just to send me a copy? Is the Nature Conservancy now going to allow, under some sort of regulations, access to the Island of Rhum? Will it be made known to the public generally how they may visit this island and under what conditions?

Mr. Macpherson: I do not think it would be right for me to anticipate the issue of a statement which will be given to the Press. In view of the public interest in this matter, I am certain it will be given very full publicity.

Mr. John MacLeod: Are we to understand that shepherds are to be removed from this island? A whole lot of public money is to be spent, and I understand that a thousand breeding ewes and cattle are to be removed. If so, is that not quite scandalous?

Mr. Macpherson: If my hon. Friend wants information on that point, which is quite a different one, perhaps he will put down a Question.

Lettuces and Tomatoes (Prices)

Mrs. Mann: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland the average retail price of lettuces and tomatoes, to date, for this year; and the average price of these for the same period of last year.

Lord John Hope: My right hon. Friend regrets that information is not available from which average retail prices for these commodities could be deduced.

Mrs. Mann: Will the Joint Undersecretary tell his right hon. Friend that the prices are far too high, very much higher than they are in London'? Is he aware that before these lettuces were nationalised they used to be sold for Id. and now they are still not nationalised they have gone up by 1,400 per cent?

Lord John Hope: I am obliged to the hon. Lady for her information.

Mr. Bence: Is the Joint Under-Secretary aware that when the country was overrun by rabbits lettuces used to be sold for about 3d. a time but that now we have got rid of the rabbits which used to eat lettuces they are 1s. each?

Lord John Hope: Perhaps they ate only the bad lettuce; I do not know.

Ambulance Services

Mr. Lawson: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland what arrangements are operated by the Scottish Ambulance Service to ensure that where stretcher cases are dealt with it is never necessary for the ambulance driver to knock up neighbours of the patient in order to find the additional stretcher bearer.

Mr. J. N. Browne: Where is can be arranged an attendant accompanies the driver for stretcher cases, but it is sometimes necessary to depend on the good will of neighbours, which is, I am glad to say, traditionally forthcoming.

Mr. Lawson: Is the Joint Under-Secretary aware that, except in some of the larger towns of Scotland—not all of them—there is no ambulance attendant and that when a vehicle goes out the driver must therefore seek assistance if someone has to be carried? Is he aware that in the recent accident at Blackford in Perthshire, when the ambulance arrived 1 hour and 10 minutes after it was asked for, two persons had been killed and two injured and the ambulance had only one driver and no attendant?

Mr. Browne: I am aware of the position, but we must spend our money the best way we can in the National Health Service. The cost of providing double manning in all cases would be prohibitive and out of all proportion to the benefit.

Mr. Lawson: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that there is no question of double manning being provided in all cases, but that there are instances in which attendants are required? In most parts of the country there are no attendants, and I am making an appeal that attendants should become a regular part of the service.

Mr. Browne: The Joint Committee responsible for all the ambulance services


in Scotland has looked at this matter most carefully, and I really believe the present policy is the best in the light of all the circumstances.

Mr. Ross: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that very often the need is obvious to hospital committees, but that when it becomes necessary to spare people who really should be working in the hospitals to go out with ambulances it is casting a burden on the hospitals?

Mr. Lawson: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland what first-aid qualifications are considered desirable among Scottish ambulance crews; and what proportion of existing crews already have those qualifications.

Mr. J. N. Browne: Drivers and attendants in the employment of the Joint Central Committee are expected to hold a recognised first-aid certificate. They are those granted by—the St. Andrew's Ambulance Association, the British Red Cross Society, the St. John Ambulance Association, London County Council and Her Majesty's Forces. All but 25 of the present strength of 445 have such a qualification.

Mr. Lawson: Is the Joint Under-Secretary aware that he has spoken of those who are in the direct employment of the ambulance service, but that the great bulk of ambulance work in the country districts is contracted out, in which case there is no such obligation? Is he aware that those services send out an ambulance with a single driver to an accident, a driver who may have no first-aid qualifications whatever?

Mr. Browne: The firms contracting with the Joint Central Committee are expected to encourage their ambulance drivers and attendants to qualify in first-aid. Most of those drivers are understood to be qualified. I regret that I cannot give the hon. Member any figures because his Question does not refer to figures, but this is a matter at which I undertake to look most carefully.

School Leaving Examination

Mr. Lawson: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland whether, in view of the fact that 85 per cent. of Scottish pupils leave school before reaching their

sixteenth year, he will consider introducing some form of external school leaving examination for which those children may be submitted.

Mr. N. Macpherson: No, Sir. My right hon. Friend considers that the arguments on which the Advisory Council based its recommendation in its Report on Secondary Education that no such examination should be introduced are still valid.

Mr. Lawson: Does not the Under-Secretary agree that with 85 per cent. of the children leaving school before reaching the age of 16, there is no such thing as an educational aim towards which either they or their teachers can direct their energies? Does he agree that there are far too many alarming reports of children wasting their last year at school marking time until they leave school?

Mr. Macpherson: We debated this matter on Scottish Estimates upstairs, but I would remind the hon. Member that that Report suggested that such an examination as he recommends would tend to a sterile uniformity.

Health Clinics, Glasgow

Mrs. Cullen: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland when a start is likely to be made in the building of the first health clinic in Glasgow.

Mr. J. N. Browne: The first post-war comprehensive health clinic in Glasgow was completed in 1955 at Pollok. I understand that Glasgow Corporation propose shortly to invite tenders for a similar clinic at Drumchapel.

Mrs. Cullen: Is the Joint Under-Secretary of State aware that it is over twelve months since his Department asked which of these clinics was required first and was told Drumchapel? Is he aware that nothing further has been done since?

Mr. Browne: I can assure the hon. Lady that Glasgow Corporation is moving ahead in this matter as fast as it possibly can.

School Meals

Mrs. Cullen: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland what has been the reduction in the number of schoolchildren in Glasgow taking school meals since the recent increase in the cost of school meals.

Mr. N. Macpherson: The increase of 2d. per meal took effect from 1st April, 1957. In May, 1957, the number of school children in Glasgow taking school meals was 49,373. This represented a decrease of 9,158, or 15·6 per cent., on the numbers taking meals in September, 1956.

Mrs. Cullen: Does not the Minister think that this decrease is clue to the increase in the cost?

Mr. Macpherson: These school meals still represent extremely good value for money, and the vast majority of parents recognise that. Moreover, the percentage of those taking school meals in Glasgow who get them free, comparing September, 1956 with May, 1957, shows an increase from 19·1 per cent, to 24·7 per cent.

Hon. Members: Why is that?

Mr. T. Fraser: Will the hon. Member pay attention to the 9,000 who are not now taking these school meals? Has he any reason to believe that they are getting a decent meal at home, or does he think, as some of us think, that they are more likely to be taking a midday meal of bread and jam? Are the Government proud of that?

Mr. Macpherson: No. The experience after a previous increase under both Governments was that there was a decline in the numbers taking the school meals but that after a certain lapse of time the numbers again recovered to near their previous level.

Lyon King-of-Arms

Mr. Rankin: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland the present functions of the office of Lord Lyon King-of-Arms.

Mr. N. Macpherson: Lyon King-of-Arms is Her Majesty's principal officer of arms in Scotland. His duties relate to the granting and recording of arms and the investigation and decision of a wide range of questions relating to heraldry, genealogy and precedence. He is concerned with royal and public ceremonial in Scotland and advises the Secretary of State on heraldic, ceremonial and cognate matters. He is also Secretary of the Order of the Thistle.

Mr. Rankin: In view of the seemingly important ceremonial duties of this

officer, could the Minister say whether his salary is in keeping with the duties which he has to perform? Is he aware that according to reports this officer is beginning to interfere with local authorities? Does that come within his duties?

Mr. Macpherson: This is a part-time office and the salary attached to it is £1,200. Answering the second part of the question, on the matter which I think the hon. Member has in mind, I understand that the Lord Lyon is writing to the Convention of Royal Burghs.

Glasgow (General Grant)

Mr. Rankin: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland by how much the estimated general grant for Glasgow provided for in the new arrangements for financing local government will vary from the total of grants paid in 1956–57.

Mr. J. N. Browne: It is estimated that the hypothetical figure of general grant for Glasgow quoted in the White Paper is about £540,000 less than the amount of the specific grants which it is proposed to absorb in the general grant. This loss will, however, be off-set by the proceeds of re-rating, from which I estimate that, on 1956–57 rate poundages, Glasgow will benefit by about £520,000. Other factors also enter into the comparison.

Mr. Rankin: I take it that the answer means that Glasgow will lose to the extent of £20,000. Is that the outcome of this new arrangement? What consultations were held with the Corporation of Glasgow before these new arrangements were announced, which are to be brought into force? Can the Minister give us the Corporation's view in the matter?

Mr. Browne: I cannot give the hon. Member the Corporation's view. The arrangements have not yet been brought into force. The calculations which I have given the hon. Member show a loss of £20,000 on an amount of nearly £8 million, but there are other factors which enter into the comparison, such as the fact that the general grant is paid 100 per cent. each year while the present grants are paid 90 per cent. each year. It would be unwise to make the assumption that Glasgow will lose anything at all from the transaction.

Cancer Registration

Mr. Hannan: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland what progress has been made in establishing a system of cancer registration in each of the hospital regions; what are the remaining difficulties; and what proposals the Health Services Council have made to him to overcome them.

Mr. J. N. Browne: A system of cancer registration continues to operate effectively in two of the five regions. The difficulties in other Regions relate mainly to the methods of collecting data. The Cancer Committee of the Scottish Health Services Council have recommended a detailed organisation for cancer services including ways of securing accurate registration in all regions, and a memorandum based on these recommendations will be issued very shortly. My right hon. Friend will send a copy to the hon. Member.

Mr. Hannan: Is the Joint Under-Secretary of State not aware that this is substantially the same answer as that which he gave me a year ago? Can he not cut out some of the memoranda and get on with the job?

Mr. Browne: Is the hon. Member aware that his supplementary is the same as that which he asked me nearly a year ago? This is a difficult problem, as he knows, and that is why the Scottish Health Services Council was asked to report.

Factories, Cumbernauld

Mr. Hannan: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland how many firms, up to date, have agreed to establish units of industry at the new town of Cumbernauld; and if he will make a statement of future prospects.

Mr. J. N. Browne: A factory for one firm, with an employment potential of over 3,000, is already being built in the new town and the development corporation is in touch with a number of other interested firms. Cumbernauld offers many advantages to industry and should prove attractive in particular, to firms to be displaced from redevelopment areas in Glasgow. The development Corporation is fully alive to to its opportunities in this

field and will shortly be having discussions with Glasgow Corporation about the reception of such firms.

Mental Illness

Mr. Hannan: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he has now received the views of all the interested organisations in respect of Command Paper No. 9623 relating to mental illness and mental deficiency in Scotland; and whether he has now decided to amend the law.

Mr. J. N. Browne: My right hon. Friend has not yet received the views of all the interested organisations. He has just asked them, however, to let him have their views at an early date not only on this Command Paper but also on the application to Scotland of the Report of the Royal Commission on Mental Health and Mental Deficiency in England and Wales.

"Dumfries and Galloway Standard" (Directors' Meeting)

Mr. T. Fraser: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland what official instructions he gave one of the Under-Secretaries of State for his meeting with the directors of the Dumfries and Galloway Standard.

The Secretary of State for Scotland (Mr. John Maclay): None, Sir.

Mr. T. Fraser: But is not the Secretary of State aware that one of his Under-Secretaries had a meeting with the directors of the Dumfries and Galloway Standard, at which he made it clear that the editor had been writing editorials criticising Her Majesty's Government, and that, as a result of that meeting, he editor was sacked? [HON. MEMBERS: "Shame."] Is the Secretary of State saying that an Under-Secretary of State, a Minister in Her Majesty's Government, complained to a board of directors, as a result of which complaint the editor was sacked, yet the Under-Secretary got no instructions about the meeting with the board of directors?

Mr. Maclay: I do not accept the implications of what the hon. Gen leman has been saying, but I am satisfied that the meeting referred to was not fended by my hon. Friend in his capacity as a


Minister. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] It would not, therefore, be proper for me to make any comment on what took place.

Mr. Gaitskell: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that his answer is entirely unsatisfactory? How can he possibly claim that his Under-Secretary can divest himself, on a hotly political issue, of his position as Minister? Does the Secretary of State deny the facts in this case, namely, that the Under-Secretary did, in fact, go to this meeting of directors that he did protest against the editorials written by the editor of this paper; that, in consequence of his protest, the editor was sacked? How can he possibly defend ac ion of this kind, which is entirely contrary to the precedents and traditions of the responsibility of Ministers in such issues?

Mr. Maclay: Really, Mr. Speaker, we all go to our constituencies and conduct our own operations as Members of Parliament. I would not begin to think that a Secretary of State can have a proper knowledge of what an hon. Member does in his own constituency—[Interruption.] I am not responsible—I may have knowledge, but I am not responsible for it, and I have nothing to add to what I have said.

Mr. Gaitskell: If the right hon. Gentleman divests himself of responsibility, may I ask the Prime Minister? I am sure that he will appreciate that the behaviour of Ministers in a matter of this kind is something which concerns the whole Government, and himself as Prime Minister. May I ask the Prime Minister to look into this and report to the House in due course?

Hon. Members: Answer.

The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Macmillan): The right hon. Gentleman asks me to look into the matter, and I will, of course, inform the House.

Several Hon. Members: rose——

Mr. Speaker: It is past time.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: In view of the unsatisfactory nature of the reply, I beg to gave notice that I will raise it on the Adjournment.

Oral Answers to Questions — HOUSING, SCOTLAND

Loan Charges

Mr. McInnes: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland if, for the purposes of comparison, he will state as on the latest convenient date, the annual charges debited to the housing revenue account of a local authority in respect of a four-apartment house built and provided with money borrowed from the Public Works Loan Board for 60 years, and similar loan charges in respect of a similar house as on the corresponding date in each year since, and including, 1951.

Mr. J. N. Browne: Since the Answer contains a number of figures, I shall, with permission, circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.

Mr. McInnes: Is the Joint Under-Secretary aware that I assume that the figures he will circulate in the OFFICIAL REPORT will reveal that the annual cost has doubled since 1951? Will he now agree that this is perhaps the main element which has caused the chaotic condition of local-government finance?

Mr. Browne: The cost has not quite doubled, and I do not agree with the hon. Gentleman. If local authorities were to pool their housing charges and repayments and charge reasonable rents, they would find that today's high cost is no deterrent to their finances.

Following are the figures:


FOUR-APARTMENT COUNCIL HOUSE


Year



Interest and repayment charges on construction, land, services and fees






£
s.
d.


1951
…
…
…
54
19
2


1952
…
…
…
75
14
5


1953
…
…
…
84
4
10


1954
…
…
…
76
5
0


1955
…
…
…
77
6
2


1956
…
…
…
98
4
6


1957
…
…
…
101
13
3

Note.—The table above is based upon the average tender costs for each year, including the average costs for land, services and fees.

Scottish Special Housing Association (Rents)

Mr. Ross: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will make a statement on the future rent policy of the Scottish Special Housing Association.

Mr. J. N. Browne: My right hon. Friend is now considering proposals for revision of the rents of houses belonging to the Scottish Special Housing Association which the association has submitted to him. My right hon. Friend will advise the Association of his decision as soon as possible.

Mr. Ross: Will the hon. Gentleman inform the Secretary of State that we are in no great hurry to deal with these proposals? Might I make the suggestion that we discuss them here before he attempts to implement them?

Mr. Speaker: rose—

Mr. Ross: Can I not get an answer from the Joint Under-Secretary, Mr. Speaker?s

Mr. Browne: I could not commit my hon. Friend on the subject of how this matter will be discussed. The hon. Member should bear in mind that variations in the rents of Scottish Special Housing Association houses do not require the approval of this House.

Local Authority Programmes (Approved Tenders)

Mr. Ross: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland the number of local authority houses for which authorisation has been sought this year, to the latest available date, and the corresponding figures for 1955 and 1956.

Mr. J. N. Browne: Tenders for 8,474 houses were approved between 1st January and 31st May, 1957. The corresponding figures for 1956 and 1955 were 12,431 and 9,484, respectively.

Mr. Ross: Does the Joint Under-Secretary of State think that the decrease is troublesome, or alarming?

Mr. Browne: In our view, this decrease is entirely normal as local authorities come to the end of their housing programmes.

Mr. Ross: May I then take it that the reduction of nearly 4,000, or nearly 33 per cent., in the tenders as compared with two years ago causes satisfaction to the Scottish Office?

Sir T. Moore: What about ten years ago?

Mr. Browne: I cannot blame the hon. Member for Kilmarnock (Mr. Ross), having just been given the figures, for not seeing their real implication. The real comparison is between 1955 and 1957, which shows a drop of only 1,000. In 1956, local authorities were jumping the gun to get the higher rates of subsidy. That is the reason for the unusually high number.

Leith Fort

Mr. Hoy: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland when he expects house building will start at Leith Fort.

Mr. J. N. Browne: My right hon. Friend is informed that the Corporation of Edinburgh has invited competitive designs for the development of this important site, which are to be submitted not later than 30th November next. At this stage, my right hon. Friend is afraid that no firm forecast can be made of the date when house building work will start.

Mr. Hoy: Is the Minister aware of the very urgent need of housing in this area? Will he urge upon the Corporation the necessity to expedite the decision in this matter and to get on with building the houses?

Mr. Browne: I am aware of the hon. Member's deep interest in this matter. He knows that it is an important site. Edinburgh Corporation wants to make a good job of the development, and I am convinced that there will be no avoidable delay.

Oral Answers to Questions — FRANCE (RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS)

Mr. Spence: asked the Prime Minister whether he will arrange for joint consultations between the Treasury, the Board of Trade and the Scottish Office as to what action may be required in the light of the recent cuts imposed by France on the importation of British manufactures.

The Prime Minister: The usual close consultation has been maintained between all interested Departments in considering this situation. If my hon. Friend has any particular point in mind, my right hon.


Friend the President of the Board of Trade will be happy to consider it.

Mr. Spence: Will the Prime Minister bear in mind the urgency of this matter? Would he consider recommending to the Ministers concerned the situation which has arisen over Scotch whisky? As the exports to France have been cut by 80 per cent., will he consider recommending a similar reduction of imports to this country of French brandy?

The Prime Minister: As regards the general question, as my hon. Friend no doubt knows, the recent deterioration in the French balance of payments has led them to make a decision to deliberalise a number of imports. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] That is the technical O.E.E.C. expression. We have asked the French to produce the programme as soon as possible, and we hope they will do so in a few days.

Oral Answers to Questions — SECRET SERVICE VOTE

Mr. Emrys Hughes: asked the Prime Minister if he will consider transferring his responsibility for the Secret Service to the Minister of Defence.

The Prime Minister: The Secret Service Vote is accounted for by the Treasury.

Mr. Hughes: Does not the Prime Minister think that the Minister of Defence should have the same powers to reduce Secret Service expenditure as he has been given to reduce other defence expenditure, because if he had those powers we should succeed in reducing the swollen figure of £5 million to £3 million, which was the figure before the Tories took office?

The Prime Minister: The sum has been constant for some years, and I think it would be right for the practice under which this sum is managed—it has been the same now for 80 years—to remain as it is.

Oral Answers to Questions — NATIONALISED INDUSTRIES (APPOINTMENTS)

Mr. Dance: asked the Prime Minister what changes he has in view for filling the posts in the nationalised industries in cases where appointments are made by

Her Majesty's Government now that the remuneration for the posts has been increased.

The Prime Minister: None, Sir. The Minister responsible for the board concerned will continue to appoint the person who in his view is best fitted for the post to be filled.

Mr. Dance: Whilst thanking the Prime Minister for that reply, may I ask if he is aware that, as some of the heads of departments are failing to run the nationalised industries either efficiently or economically, there is a strong feeling that some of those heads should be replaced by sound businessmen with experience of business? Can we have some assurance that something on those lines may take place?

The Prime Minister: This matter, of course, is always under the consideration of the Ministers concerned, and every effort is made to obtain the direction of these industries by the best available men.

Oral Answers to Questions — DEFENCE (REORGANISATION)

Commander Maitland: asked the Prime Minister whether he will make a statement on defence reorganisation.

The Prime Minister: As the answer is rather long, I will, with your permission, Mr. Speaker, answer this Question at the end of Questions.

Oral Answers to Questions — GILT-EDGED SECURITIES

Mr. Lewis: asked the Prime Minister whether he is aware that, since October, 1951, the market value of gilt-edged securities has fallen by more than £2,000 millions, that the cost of living has been continuously rising, and that the £ sterling is now worth less in purchasing value than at any previous time; and whether he will make a radio and television broadcast making a factual statement as to the causes and the remedies which the Government propose to take to restore the value of the £ sterling, restore the value of the gilt-edged securities to their pre-1951 level, and reduce the cost of living.

The Prime Minister: As I explained in reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Louth (Mr. Osborne)on 21st


February, 1956, it is impossible to give any reliable estimate of the change in the total market value of all Government securities, owing to the changes in the volume and composition of the National Debt. The answer to the second part of the Question is, "No, Sir."

Mr. Lewis: A lot of water has flowed under Waterloo Bridge since then. Is the Prime Minister aware that the Chancellor of the Exchequer made a bloodcurdling statement a few weeks ago about the dangers facing the people of this country and that a few days afterwards the Prime Minister made a statement completely in contradiction? Can he tell us whether we are to believe the Chancellor or the Prime Minister and whether there is any unity of purpose between them at all?

The Prime Minister: All statements made by Ministers—myself and my colleagues—are well-balanced and sound. I understand that we are to have an opportunity in a day or two of debating all these and cognate matters, and I hope that the hon. Member will be successful, Mr. Speaker, in catching your eye.

DEFENCE (REORGANISATION)

The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Macmillan): With your permission, Mr. Speaker, and that of the House, I will now answer Question No. 48.
Yes, Sir. In the first place, I should like to make it clear that the Government have no intention of merging the three fighting Services into a single defence force. The development of new weapons and new techniques of warfare will call for even closer co-operation between the Services in training and in the field; and measures for more effective co-ordination are being studied both in the command structure and also in the central administrative organisation. But each of the three Services will continue to have its separate rôle and function and each will continue to maintain its separate identity and traditions.
Within each Service, however, far-reaching reorganisation will be required in order to give effect to the reduction in total strengths which has been announced. The Army faces a specially difficult problem because of its structure of separate

corps and regiments. But my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War has devised plans which are designed to preserve the regimental traditions on which the strength of the Army is founded. These plans are based on the principle of amalgamation of regiments, rather than disbandment. Details will be given in a White Paper to be presented tomorrow.
In all the Services, the large reduction in numbers which is to be carried out over the next five years must mean for many officers and men, a premature end of their chosen career. For them the Government have undertaken to provide fair compensation which will take account not only of the curtailment of their service, but also of their loss of prospects. The terms of compensation will be announced in a White Paper which is to be presented tomorrow by my right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence.
The Government also have a special obligation to assist these men to find employment in civilian life. For this purpose the existing agencies are being linked in a Regular Forces Resettlement Service. My right hon. Friend the Minister of Labour is appointing a board, including representatives of industry and commerce under the chairmanship of Sir Frederic Hooper, to advise on the development of this Service. The details of the resettlement organisation will be made known separately.
The radical reorganisation of our defence forces on which we have embarked involves, inevitably, a widespread disturbance of existing patterns—both for the Services themselves and for many individuals in them. We shall do our utmost to see that those who suffer by these changes are treated fairly and honourably. But let us not forget that the purpose of the new defence policy is to reshape the forces so as to enable them to discharge their task effectively.
None of the Services will be able to maintain its high traditions unless its officers and men are confident of its capacity to adapt itself to changing conditions. I believe that the new pattern of the forces—smaller, but better organised and equipped for their new tasks—will contiuue to afford fine opportunities for service for those who seek their career in the Armed Forces of the Crown.

Commander Maitland: Is the Prime Minister aware that there has been very considerable uneasiness in the Services as to their future, and that his very clear statement that they are not to be merged will be met with considerable satisfaction?

Mr. Strachey: We shall have to await the promised White Papers before we can question the Prime Minister on the details of these proposals but, meanwhile, I should like to ask him three questions. First, is he aware that its opening passage, while recognising, as we all do, that we cannot at this moment merge the three Services, does seem to set its face against any early and further integration of the Services, and that, in that respect, it seems to us to be decidedly over-conservative, if I may so express it?
Secondly, on the question of Army reorganisation, is the right hon. Gentleman aware that, while we recognise, of course, that it is inevitable that certain regimental changes should be made, and that these will be painful, we trust that he will see that they are kept to the very minimum, and that regimental feelings—which are very important in this—are regarded to the maximum possible degree?
Thirdly, is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the whole of the Government's defence scheme depends on voluntary recruiting, and that nothing could so depress voluntary recruiting than that the Government's arrangements should give the impression that men were no longer wanted in the Armed Forces? In fact, they are wanted more than ever. Therefore, will he see, both by the terms of compensation and by keeping the axing of both officers and non-commissioned officers to the very minimum, that that impression is not given?

The Prime Minister: Yes, Sir. I realise that detailed criticisms cannot be made on either side of the House until the White Papers are published, but I thought that it would be convenient for the House to have this general statement, and to publish the White Papers tomorrow. After that, all the details will be open for discussion.
In reply to the three questions which the right hon. Gentleman has asked, perhaps I might answer the last two, because I think that, in a sense, the answer

to them is the answer to the first. It is just because of the importance of maintaining the regimental tradition, of the Army in particular—where it plays such a tremendous rôle—that we have tried, and, I hope, successfully, to overcome the difficulties while maintaining the long-standing traditions to the best of our ability.
As to the right hon. Gentleman's third question, it is because we want young men—and their fathers—to feel that the Services are a good career—that, in their new shape and form, they will make a fine career for young men—that we hope that we have made terms of compensation that will be regarded as honourable.
I think that the importance of the last two questions is really my answer to the first, because if I were to suggest that there is to be a complete merger of soldiers, sailors and airmen, all to be clothed in some vague uniform, all operating in a joint service and with nothing to do with each other, we should never be able to maintain the high traditions of the separate Services, which are important.
What I hope the House will feel is that in the statement which I have made we have tried to keep a balance. There must, in our view, be three fighting Services—Army, Navy and Air Force. But, as I have said, we have already taken, and are studying, further measures of coordination both in the command structure and in the central administrative organisation, especially at Whitehall. I think that thereby we ought to be able to get some of the advantages of integration while maintaining the fighting and the other long traditions of our separate Services.

Mr. Langford-Holt: Will my right hon. Friend bear in mind that while everybody will agree that compensation is a very important matter, possibly resettlement is even more important and that his right hon. Friend the Minister of Labour has already got organisations such as the Appointments Bureaux which have suffered not from the fact that the Minister of Labour does not support them, but because employers generally have not sought the help of these employment bureaux? Will my right hon. Friend seek, above all else, the help of industry and of employers generally?

The Prime Minister: I hope that the new board will be able to improve the situation. I regard it, as I am sure every Member of the House does, as of the utmost importance that we should take advantage of what is, after all, a period of high employment when it is easier than it might be in other times to see that all these officers and men are properly placed in civil life.

Mr. Shinwell: Does the right hon. Gentleman realise that, apart from the reference to two White Papers, one dealing with the modest reorganisation of the regimental position affecting the Army, and the other dealing with compensation, he has said nothing at all about the content of the new pattern of the three Services? He has referred to co-ordination without giving any indication of what kind of co-ordination he has in mind. He has said nothing at all about the actual rôle of the three Services within the needs of the defence forces of the country, and in particular he has made no reference at all to the need for reorganisation in the Admiralty, which—

Mr. Pickthorn: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. May I ask what Motion is before the House?

Mr. Speaker: I think that the right hon. Gentleman was about to conclude his supplementary.

Mr. Shinwell: Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. In view of the very long statement made by the right hon. Gentleman—and it was a very long statement, about which I make no complain t—[An HON. MEMBER: "Come off it."] Mr. Speaker, I am in your hands and not in the hands of the mob on the other side of the House. I have known them for a long time. In view of the Prime Minister's very long statement, surely it is advisable that, to elucidate what the right hon. Gentleman actually meant, questions should be put. Therefore, I will refrain from arguing the point of order further, and I will conclude my question.
I was dealing with the Admiralty. In view of the absence of any information affecting the reorganisation of the Admiralty, may we have an assurance from the right hon. Gentleman that very shortly, in addition to the White Papers to which be has referred, we shall have a White

Paper or, at any rate, a statement from the Minister of Defence of his intentions about the reorganisation of the Admiralty?

The Prime Minister: I understand and welcome the deep interest which the right hon. Gentleman has in these matters, of which he has great experience. But he thought that my statement was already a little too long. Had it gone into these very large issues which he has raised, it would have been intolerably long. They are very great issues which, of course, have to be discussed on appropriate occasions.
It was represented to me—and I think it will be helpful to the House if I deal with this—that there were three major points which we must clear up if we are to start the recruiting campaign and the movement towards building up the Regular forces which we all want to see.
The first was a statement that, broadly speaking, there will be three Services for men to join. The second, with which I hope to deal in the White Paper, was what will be the compensation for those men for whom there is no future career; and the third was the question of the Army and regimental reorganisation. I think that if we can get those three questions out of the way we shall have made some advance towards dealing with the very big tasks which the right hon. Gentleman knows lie ahead of us.

Sir I. Fraser: May I ask three brief questions? Apart from inviting ordinary employers to give special consideration to the talents of these men, mostly young, who will be displaced, could my right hon. Friend ensure that in the Services which are directly or indirectly under Ministerial control—namely, the Departments, the nationalised industries and local authorities—some preference in employment is given to ex-officers and other ranks? Secondly, does the Prime Minister not think that these men deserve some preference from a grateful country? Thirdly, on this resettlement board representing both sides of industry and others, would my right hon. Friend include representatives of ex-Service men?

The Prime Minister: In answer to the first question, I think that the best machinery is that which the Minister of Labour has devised—that is, to have the existing agencies, to link them together in


the Regular Forces Resettlement Service and to find a capable chairman who can help to direct the work. I will see that note is taken of the suggestions which my hon. Friend has made.
I am not informed whether it is proposed to have direct representatives of ex-Service men, but I will also take note of that point.

Mr. Wigg: Would the Prime Minister provide time between now and the Recess to enable the House to have an opportunity of debating the two White Papers? Everyone will wish the Government's reorganisation well, because a great deal rests on it. Will the Prime Minister give the House an assurance that he is satisfied, after careful examination of the facts, that the existing terms of Service rates of pay and rate of recruitment will be sufficient to provide enough men when the reorganisation has been completed?

The Prime Minister: No doubt the question of a debate will be discussed through the usual channels. Whether time can be found is a matter to be settled. They will have to be debated at some time, of course.
With regard to the second question, that is another, although a very important, aspect of it. What I was anxious to do was to clear up these three points which must be got out of the way first. I thought that it would be valuable to do so before the end of this part of the Session.

Mr. Sharples: Can my right hon. Friend give an assurance that those who are to be declared redundant will be told of their fate as soon as possible, instead of being left in doubt a moment longer than necessary?

The Prime Minister: I am sure that the Service Departments will do everything they can to expedite these rearrangements, but, of course, my hon. Friend will recognise that there are a good many problems involved.

Mr. de Freitas: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that those who seek the closer integration of the Services on grounds of efficiency and economy will be extremely disappointed at the way in which the Prime Minister caricatured this by his reference to vague and indeterminate uniforms? That is not the point.

The Prime Minister: I still maintain—and I hope that when the hon. Gentleman, who takes a great interest in these matters, reads it he will agree—that this is a fairly balanced statement. There must be for all the time that we can see ahead three Services. But I did say there was a great deal of work that could be done in the integration of the command structure, administrative arrangements and all the rest.
But from the point of view of the men—and we are now thinking of the officers and men who are to join these Services—their great interest is in knowing whether they are joining the Army, the Navy or the Air Force. The other problems of centralised administration and the rest are more for us. I want to make it clear to them what kind of a Service they will be asked to join.

Mr. Chetwynd: In view of reports of resistance from individual Services to reductions in their particular arm, is the Prime Minister satisfied that the powers of the Minister of Defence are adequate to impose the overall pattern which he wishes?

The Prime Minister: I do not know the purpose of that question, nor its relevance.

Several Hon. Members: Several Hon. Members rose——

Mr. Speaker: Order.

CENTRAL OMAN (SITUATION)

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Selwyn Lloyd): With your permission, Mr. Speaker, and that of the House, I wish to make a statement on the situation in Central Oman.
I undertook yesterday to inform the House of any further developments in the situation there. I have received little further information about the situation on the ground, but the military preparations to which I have referred have continued.
It will, perhaps, help the House to form a judgment on these matters if I remind the House about the nature of the area in which the disturbances have taken place. The Central Oman is a mountainous area, the highest mountains rising to 9,000 feet. It is surrounded by desert where the present temperatures


are up to 120 degrees. There is no front line, but rather a constantly shifting pattern of tribal allegiances and defections, with minor armed skirmishes. There is no question, therefore, of large-scale operations by British troops on the ground.
As I said yesterday, discretion has been given to our local military authorities to take any necessary action on their own initiative within certain limits. So far as the Royal Air Force is concerned, this includes leaflet dropping on behalf of the Sultan together with action against certain forts in the area held by dissident tribesmen. These forts, manned by tribesmen equipped with modern arms smuggled in from outside the country, are capable of intimidating both loyal and wavering tribes. I would emphasise that action has only been authorised against certain military targets.
The real issue is not the scale of the military operations, but the fact that Her Majesty's Government intend to give full support to the Sultan.

Mr. Bevan: I could not help thinking, when listening to the right hon. and learned Gentleman, that in some of his language he was describing the Parliamentary situation—when he said that the present temperatures were up to 120 degrees, that there was "no front line but rather a constantly shifting pattern of tribal allegiances and defections, with minor armed skirmishes."
Can the right hon. and learned Gentleman say whether outside intervention has yet been formally established and, if so, from where? For example, Saudi Arabia has been suggested. If it is from Saudi Arabia, what steps has the right hon. and learned Gentleman taken to approach the American Government with a view to bringing pressure to bear on Saudi Arabia, as Saudi Arabia recently received supplies of arms from the United States? Is it not, therefore, necessary to take all the steps we possibly can, with the forces over which we have some diplomatic control and influence, before we ourselves take too strong a line with our own armed forces?

Mr. Lloyd: We know that certain arms must have been smuggled into the country from outside, because modern arms have been found in the possession

of the dissidents. From where those arms come, we do not know. We have certain suspicions. The most effective method of dealing with the situation is to see that the means of entry for further arms are closed off, and that we propose to do. I am not yet in a position to say anything about allegations against a particular foreign country. As for discussions with the United States Government, they have been kept in close touch with the situation.

Mr. Bevan: Would it not be desirable, even if no more could be done, for the American Government to prevail upon the Government of Saudi Arabia themselves to make a statement deprecating violence in this matter? Is it too much to ask of the United States that they approach Saudi Arabia with a view to that end? As these incidents arising in the Middle East from time to time give rise to anxiety and to interventions by this or that Government, has not the time arrived for us to take the situation more firmly in hand with a view to having arrangements among ourselves, the United States and other countries so that we may avoid these collisions, which are becoming increasingly dangerous?

Mr. Lloyd: We are in touch with the United States Government about these matters. I do not think that any useful purpose is served by making allegations against particular Governments at this moment. I agree that we have to seek to stop the movement of further arms into this area and to induce other Governments or individuals not to supply those arms. The right hon. Gentleman suggested that we should take firm action about the matter. We have taken and propose to take firm action in the case of Muscat.

Mr. A. Henderson: Is it not true that the Government of Saudi Arabia have been supplying arms to the dissident elements in Oman and is not that in contravention of their obligations under the Charter? If so, would it not be desirable to send United Nations observers into the area to investigate and report?

Mr. Lloyd: That is obviously an aspect of the matter which we have to discuss with our allies. It has been discussed with our allies, but I certainly have no further statement to make upon it.


We are continuing to do our best to see that the area is sealed off and that no further arms get in. I do not think that United Nations observers will serve a useful purpose in this case.

Mr. Grimond: The Foreign Secretary said yesterday that he would consider setting out in a White Paper, or in another way, our obligations under the treaties. Has he considered that matter any further and, if so, is he proposing to make a statement on our obligations under existing treaties? Will he consider clarifying our obligations to various Rulers around the Gulf and possibly negotiating new treaties which define them more clearly?

Mr. Lloyd: I will certainly consider that matter further, but I would point out to the House that the action Her Majesty's Government have taken in this ease is not novel. There are precedents for it. In 1930, when there was a Labour Government, British naval vessels were authorised to bombard the Northern Muscat coast where the Sheik of Khassab had defied the Sultan's authority. That action took place and the Sheik submitted to the Sultan's authority. Similar action was taken under another Government, in 1932. So there are precedents for action in support of one who has been throughout a firm and loyal ally of this country.

Mr. Benn: What is the position of British airmen who may be shot down on reconnaissance flights, or leaflet dropping flights, or strafing flights by Royal Air Force aircraft? Why did the right hon. and learned Gentleman not inform the House yesterday that armed reconnaissance flights had taken place, when his noble Friend the Joint Under-Secretary was courteous enough to inform noble Lords in another place? It would have totally altered the character of our discussion yesterday had we known that British airmen had been flying over foreign territory on reconnaissance raids.

Mr. Lloyd: I said that certain authority had been given within limits to the military authorities on the spot. I very much hope that airmen will not be shot down. I do not understand the purpose of the question. Such airmen are acting in the armed service of the Crown. If, through misfortune or hostile action, they become casualties, that is a matter which all

quarters of the House will profoundly regret.

Mr. Paget: The right hon. and learned Gentleman has told us that we are giving all assistance to the Sultan and then says that it is apparently too hot to do anything. Can the right hon. and learned Gentleman give us an assurance that assistance to the Sultan is likely to be effective? Is he aware that our prestige in that part of the world will hardly stand another exhibition of the Government's military futility?

Mr. Lloyd: It would be an example of military futility to seek to employ ground forces in those temperatures in desert areas. What has to be done is to seal off this area of disaffection—[HON. MEMBERS: "How?"] By blocking the means of entry into it.

Mr. Paget: Where from?

Mr. Lloyd: The hon. and learned Member is getting very excited. If he would look at the map, he would sec the means of entry into this place, the way in which the roads run and where blocking action could take place. That is one side of the operation, to seal off the area of the disaffection. The second side of the operation is the air action which has been authorised.

Mr. Peart: Is the Foreign Secretary aware that it is not a question of making serious allegations against other Governments but rather that we must bear in mind that this happened before in the Buraimi Oasis and that it is important to know what Aramco, an American oil company, is doing there, because it was said on a previous occasion that it gave support against British interests? That must be borne in mind. It is vital, therefore, that there should be consultation with the United States Government on this issue.

Mr. Lloyd: Those consultations are taking place.

Several Hon. Members: Several Hon. Members rose——

Mr. Speaker: Order. This matter can be pursued further in the debate that is to follow in Committee of Supply.

Mr. Benn: On a point of order. Yesterday, Mr. Speaker, I sought to move the Adjournment of the House under


Standing Order No. 9 to raise what I thought to be a definite matter of urgent public importance, which was the statement made by the Foreign Secretary in which he said that British troops had been given permission to go into action. You, Mr. Speaker, decided that this did not fall within the provisions of the Standing Order and you invited one of my hon. Friends to take what action he thought necessary to criticise your action and to do so in the normal way.
I beg to give notice, Mr. Speaker, that, after further consideration, one of my hon. Friends and myself have decided to pursue this matter in the way that you quite correctly directed us to do: that is to say, to table a Motion regretting the Ruling that you gave yesterday.

Mr. Speaker: I have no objection to that at all.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

Ordered,
That this day Business other than the Business of Supply may be taken before Ten o'clock.—[The Prime Minister.]

Proceedings on the Affiliation Proceedings Bill [Lords] and the Housing Bill [Lords] exempted, at this day's Sitting, from the provisions of Standing Order No. 1 (Sittings of the House).—[The Prime Minister.]

Orders of the Day — SUPPLY

[24TH ALLOTTED DAY]

Considered in Committee.

[Sir GORDON TOUCHE in the Chair]

Orders of the Day — CIVIL ESTIMATES AND ESTIMATES FOR REVENUE DEPARTMENTS, 1957–58, AND MINISTRY OF DEFENCE ESTIMATE, 1957–58.

Motion made, and Question proposed,
That a further sum, not exceeding £20, be granted to Her Majesty, towards defraying the charges for the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1958, for services connected with the following Departments, namely:—


CIVIL ESTIMATES, 1957–58 AND MINISTRY OF DEFENCE ESTIMATE, 1957–58




£


Class II, Vote 1 (Foreign Service)
…
10


Ministry of Defence
…
10


Total
…
£20

Orders of the Day — DISARMAMENT

4.3 p.m.

Mr. Philip Noel-Baker: The Foreign Secretary, in his White Paper, for which we thank him, confined himself to a survey of the efforts now being made in the Disarmament Sub-Committee of the United Nations to reach agreement on certain partial measures of disarmament. I know that the right hon. and learned Gentleman realises what a shock it is to outside opinion to learn that these rather meagre objectives are all that the Government are at present hoping to obtain and I am sure he regrets, as we do, how very partial these partial measures are.
I will discuss those measures a little later. I want, first, to put them against a wider background, against the very dangerous developments in armaments since 1952 and against the facts—the very gloomy facts—of the disarmament discussions since the United Nations set up its present Disarmament Commission in that year.
I start from several propositions with which, I hope, the whole Committee agrees: that no nation has a greater interest in international—not unilateral—


disarmament than the people of our vulnerable and overcrowded island; that such disarmament ought now to be the major object of our policy, both in foreign affairs and in defence, and that Britain, with her Commonwealth partners, could wield an enormous influence in reaching a practical result. I shall ask how far the Government have used their influence in the last six years; and I shall say some things that express my doubts and my regret. But it is not my purpose to make a party speech. If our Government are to blame, so are many others.
For ten full years, right up to 1955, Russia was, as I think, guilty of obstruction and sabotage. Her delegates went on saying, "Ban the A-bomb" while she was herself feverishly making A-bombs and cynically rejecting, alone against the world, Dr. Oppenheimer's United Nations scheme for the abolition of those frightful weapons. Russia accused the United States of America of the race in H-bombs, although she herself had started to make the H-bomb before the U.S.A. Up to May. 1955, a date of which I will speak again, Russia, in my view, was overwhelmingly to blame.
Since then, the Western Governments, our own amongst them, have made some lamentable mistakes. And so have the smaller Powers. They have just as great an interest in disarmament as their larger neighbours, but they have been indifferent, spineless and defeatist. They have been content to shuffle off their responsibility on to the five-Power Sub-Committee, which we are now discussing.
That Sub-Committee, judged by its minutes and its results, is itself a most inadequate instrument for serious work. It has no chairman, no rules of procedure and no agenda. It meets in private, but none of the purposes of privacy—not even privacy—is obtained. Its records are an absolute nightmare, and not least the way in which, at long last, they reach the light of day. At the end of each series of Sub-Committee meetings, in practice once a year—this is how we have to find out about what is going on in disarmament—an immense pile of roneo-ed minutes is published, hundreds, if not thousands, of pages at a time. They contain the verbatim transcript of what was said many weeks or many months before. They do not contain the texts of the document discussed.
The Foreign Secretary admitted the grave defects of this system not long ago and the difficulties that they cause to hon. Members; but he added to those difficulties when he refused to print the records of the 1956 session as a Command Paper. He said that he could not do it: it would cost £700.
In the same week in which the Foreign Secretary gave me that reply. I chanced to see a Press report:
U.K. publishes esoteric books. The Government Stationery Office announced today a list of new official publications, including:

Measurement of Small Holes, translated from the Russian.
Horseflies of the Ethiopian Region.
Scats for Female Shop Assistants.
Sex Life of the Elephant Seal."

The records of the Disarmament Sub-Committee are not less important than those esoteric works.
The implications of the new White Paper cannot be made intelligible without the minutes of 1956, and what is being said this year in the Sub-Committee is literally of vital importance to us all.
The present system has another serious defect. We get the text of Mr. Zorin's speeches in the Soviet News, but we have to rely on the Press for short and perhaps garbled reports of what the other delegates answer in reply. I hone that the Government will recognise that this is a matter of great importance, and that it is necessary that the public should be properly informed. I hope that at the forthcoming Assembly they will press that this business, and, indeed, the whole composition and work of the Sub-Committee, should be considered afresh.
It is high time that the Assembly had a grand inquest, reviewed its disarmament efforts over recent years, contrasted those efforts with the facts of the arms race and asked the brutal questions; "Do the Governments in the Sub-Committee really want to disarm? Have they begun to think of armaments reduction as a practical reality? Or are their proposals, their speeches and their pledges simply empty humbug, weapons of political warfare in the cold war of East and West?"
I think that right hon. and hon. Members must ask themselves these questions about our own country and Government; indeed, that is the true purpose of this debate. We must recall what our Ministers have said, consider what efforts they


have made, and what the failure of the policy of disarmament would mean to us. Two years ago, when he was Minister of Defence, the Prime Minister said, at Harrow:
The purpose of our defence policy is simple—to get disarmament. That is the only ultimate hope for world peace.
He said in April of this year:
…we must strive for full disarmament covering unconventional and conventional weapons alike."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 17th April, 1957; Vol. 568, c. 2047.]
The Foreign Secretary told the United Nations Assembly:
An armaments race is not only economically unsound, but in itself is a grave danger to peace.
The Minister of Defence told us that modern weapons would obliterate Britain, and that there is at present no defence. He added:
There will be no real safety in the world until there is disarmament.
Do I misrepresent the right hon. Gentleman when I say that the real meaning of his words is that there is no defence for Britain except international disarmament today?
Several times since Christmas, the Minister of Defence has asked us to face the military realities of the present time. The most important and the least observed of these military realities are the vast sums now being spent on military research. I wonder how many hon. Members realise how our own research expenditure has recently increased. It was £6 million a year in 1938 on the eve of Hitler's war. It was £80 million in 1951; £100 million in 1953; and close on £200 million last year. These are fantastic sums, but the United States is spending ten times as much—£1,900 million this year, more than our total defence budget, and an increase of £500 million on 1956. Russia, no doubt is spending much the same.
These vast resources of human genius and research equipment are given to the making of weapons more deadly, more powerful, and more certain to penetrate defence. We are all getting what we pay for. There is hardly a weapon that was used in the Second World War that would be used for training a raw recruit today. Lancasters and Flying Fortresses carried 10 tons of bombs 1,000 miles; they are now outmoded by the Vulcan

and the 200-ton B.52, which will carry a 15-megaton bomb to any target in the world and return to its base in the United States under cover of night.
The Schnorkel submarine was a great advance; it is outmoded by the atomic Nautilus, which has done 60,000 miles without refuelling, which can go round the world under water, which can cruise at 25 knots, faster than any convoy, and which soon will launch nuclear guided missiles without even coming to the surface at all.
The other day, the United States Government published a new Handbook on the Effects of Nuclear Weapons, and they took as their yardstick, or measuring factor, the casualties caused and the damage done by the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima, in 1945. On 6th August, a fortnight from today, the people of Hiroshima will hold a day of mourning to remind the world of what occurred—100,000 people killed in an instant of time, another 100,000 wounded, hideously burned, struck by radiation sickness, many of them dying after weeks or months of agonising pain. Even now the bomb's work is not ended. About 90,000 of the survivors are still under medical supervision, 6,000 must have constant clinical treatment all their lives, and some are still dying of cancer, leukæmia and other delayed effects.
The Minister of Defence told the House the other day that "atomic weapons of the power of the Hiroshima bomb are now regarded as primarily suitable for tactical use by troops in the field." If that is true, the general staffs must have lost all contact with reality. I wish the Minister would go to Hiroshima on 6th August. Consider his use of the word "tactical", in the light of the simple facts of 1945. The casualties were three times the total number of our Army of the Rhine; a mighty empire brought to instant and unconditional surrender; two bombs the substitute for a planned campaign, which was expected to last 18 months, conducted by millions of men by land and sea and air.
When I was at the Air Ministry, ten years ago, the experts told me that as few as 30 Hiroshima bombs might end Britain's ability to wage war. Last year, the United States Air Force and Army conducted a joint exercise in Louisiana and tried out Hiroshima bombs in tactical


support of troops in the field. They decided how many were required to knock out the tactical enemy targets they were given. It came to a total of 70. Louisiana is 48,000 square miles in area, which is a little less than England and Wales. When the exercise was over, the referees decided that all life in the whole State was extinct.
Hon. Members will recall the words used by Lord Tedder, not long ago:
To believe that there will be tactical atomic weapons which could be used without leading to the use of the so-called strategic weapon is to live in a fool's paradise.
Of course, the Hiroshima bomb cannot be tactical; it destroys so much too much. The Minister's experts simply misapply the word, because they now have other weapons, so much more powerful, at their command, which they like to call strategic.
By 1952, atomic fission bombs had already been made ten times as powerful as the first, and some people believe that now they are twenty times as powerful. In that year, a rudimentary hydrogen device blew an island out of the Pacific; we called it a "low yield" weapon. Two years later, there was the 15-megaton explosion, 750 Hiroshimas in one, with the deadly fall-out which covered 10,000 square miles of open sea. It had an outer sheath of uranium 238, which made the poisonous fall-out, which is so dangerously cheap, and which, besides the fall-out, gives a megaton, a million tons of blast and fire for £5,000.
Now, we are getting rid of the uranium sheath, and we are getting "clean" hydrogen bombs instead. I wonder whether that is not the most sinister development of all. A "clean" 10-megaton bomb, so a Home Office manual informs us, would finish London, where in an inner circle seven miles across, everything would be pulverised to dust, and in an outer circle, 20 miles across, everything and everybody would be inexorably consumed in flames. "Clean" bombs are weapons of indiscriminate mass destruction which an aggressor could use without the risk of radioactive fall-out on his own territory or his own troops.
Vast stocks of nuclear weapons now exist. Dr. Lapp, an ex-member of the Atomic Energy Commission of the United

States, said in 1955 that the United States stockpile was equivalent to several tons of T.N.T. for every inhabitant of the globe. Most of Hitler's bombs on London carried less than a single ton.
Some experts—and I mean experts—believe that gas and bacteria are as dangerous as nuclear weapons, and more likely to be used. In the First World War the primitive gases then employed caused, ton for ton, four times as many casualties as high explosive. Now we have the nerve gases, which the Nazis called Tabun. One cannot see Tabun. One cannot feel it. One cannot smell it. It penetrates the clothing. Three drops on the nose or throat, or skin will drive one mad before one dies.
Major-General Chisholm, the very able and, indeed, famous chief of the Canadian R.A.M.C. throughout the Second World War, himself then in charge of bacterial weapons, said in 1949 that "one bacterial weapon developed late in that war could wipe out all human life in a given area within six hours and yet leave the area habitable afterwards." He added:
Hundreds of millions of human beings could be killed in a few hours.
Do hon. Members think that the progress of invention will be less in the next five years than it has been in the past? Let them contemplate the guided missile. The development costs of guided missiles in the United States will be just double those of the atomic bomb. The major purpose is the I.C.B.M., Atlas and Thor, intercontinental missiles which are projected hundreds of miles—600, 800 miles—into the stratosphere, which travel 5,000 miles in 20 minutes, and which are guided to their targets at 20 times the speed of sound. One Atlas test that failed cost a million dollars. One launching site will cost £30 million.
What kind of war is it we are preparing for today? What has happened to the moral standards of mankind? We all remember the storm of indignation that was aroused when the Communists accused the United Nations forces of using bacteria in Korea in 1951. But in 1955 the United States Secretary for War approved the report of an advisory committee of eminent civilians who urged that
gas and germ weapons are inherently less horrifying than nuclear weapons


and that
new and uninhibited research should be undertaken to develop a complete family of chemical, biological and radiological weapons for actual use.
The Committee pointed to
the advantages of these weapons in subduing an enemy without destroying property which the victor might wish to save.
The report was approved, the commands appointed and the money voted. These "special purpose weapons"—note the phrase—are no longer listed in "the mass destruction category."
Of course, Russia and other nations are doing the same. I do not blame the United States Secretary for War. That is how the arms race works. But, remembering our anger at the stories of "infected spiders" in Korea a few years ago. I find it hard to stomach when bacteria and gas are described as "special purpose weapons." It fills me with resentment and despair when Government handbooks describe the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima as the "nominal" bomb—"nominal" of all the words in the world to choose—and when they call a bomb that equals 200,000 of the 10-ton block busters which devastated Berlin a "low yield thermo-nuclear device". The man who thought up these nauseating euphemisms ought to be made President of the Escapers' Club. He is a very master of the semantics of hypocrisy and self-deception.
The public are being fed with terrible ideas. The day after the first Christmas Island test a London daily newspaper printed an article—I have it here—by a general who was Controller of Atomic Weapons until last year. He said that our H-bomb would be useless unless we were resolved to use it first. He said:
People must be made to realise this about the hydrogen bomb: if we are not the first to use it we shall never use it at all.
I wonder what the Russians made of that.
There have been these immense developments in weapons in the last few years, and weapons now matter far more than men. And yet, even after the recent reductions, there are probably about three times as many armed men in the world today as ever before in time of peace. The world expenditure on armaments is perhaps four or five times that of 1938.
Let hon. Members contrast this immense machinery of war, with its almost limitless resources, with so much of human genius at its command, with its remorseless drive year after year for greater and ever greater military power—let them contrast that with the efforts to disarm made by the Governments since 1952. The Governments admit that against these modern weapons there is no defence. The Minister of Defence admits it. The Kremlin admits it. President Eisenhower says it every day. In 1952, the Governments pledged themselves to a disarmament programme founded on that fact.
The United Nations Assembly adopted a Resolution, for which both Sir Anthony Eden and the Foreign Secretary claimed a share of credit, which they deserve. It set up a new Disarmament Commission and it gave the Commission an urgent mandate in precise and comprehensive terms. The Commission was instructed to prepare
proposals embodied in a Draft Treaty for the balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments; for the elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction; and for the international control of atomic energy.
The drafting of treaty clauses, the making of the technical framework of an armament reduction system, was the essence of the Commission's task. It is only when one drafts, as the Foreign Secretary and Minister of State are finding now, that the real difficulties of reaching agreement first appear.
How have the Government sought to carry out the mandate of that Resolution? In 1952, the Commission agreed unanimously, except for Russia, to some admirable principles which set out as the Governments' purpose the genuine demilitarisation of the world. It agreed, except for Russia, that in the first disarmament treaty the manpower of the major nations should be reduced to—these were the British delegate's words—
1 million or at most 1·5 million men"—
750,000 for Britain and France, 1 per cent. of population for the rest. It agreed, except for Russia, that conventional arms should be reduced in proportion with manpower cuts. The other weapons were to be abolished.
But, alas, they never began to draft these plans in detailed clauses. They left them as headlines and nothing more.


After six months, with various discussions pending, the Commission was prorogued. A few weeks later, the first H-bomb exploded, A few months after that, a Russian test showed that they had got it, too. That was a frightful new development in the arms race, a hundred times more serious than the first atomic bomb in 1945. Hon. Members remember what happened after that first atomic bomb fell—how Lord Attlee went to Washington to propose a scheme of international abolition and control, how the leading statesmen and the greatest scientists gave their minds for years to working out what ultimately became Dr. Oppenheimer's United Nations plan.
What happened after these first H-bombs were exploded, with the infinitely greater menace that they held? Just nothing at all. The Disarmament Commission did not even meet for 18 months. When the 15-megaton Bikini bomb exploded in 1954, the practical action that resulted was the decision to base the whole of N.A.T.O. strategy on nuclear defence.
I shall now say something which the Foreign Secretary will think unfair; and I add that I admired and still admire the work on disarmament which he did in 1954 when the Sub-Committee first began. The right hon. and learned Gentleman is finding out now that what I am going to say is all too true. I want to show how little effort and attention, how little drive and thought, the Government have given to the practical problems of disarmament since that 15-megaton explosion in 1954.
At the first session of the United Nations Sub-Committee three years ago, the Foreign Secretary helped to draft the so-called Anglo-French memorandum, a sound though modest document, for which we on this side of the Committee gave him our support. This year, three years later, he and the Prime Minister have told us, not once but often, that
the Anglo-French plan for disarmament, put forward in June, 1954, was the best disarmament plan which has yet been put forward."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 1st April, 1957; Vol. 568, c. 162–3.]
Those are very revealing words.
The memorandum consisted of nine short paragraphs, 61 lines, 1¼ pages of Government print. How can anyone set out a plan for reducing armies, navies

and air forces, manpower, weapons and military budgets, for international inspection and control, within the space of 1¼ pages of a White Paper? Of course, it was not a disarmament plan at all. It reproduced the broad objectives—which I will read later—given to the Commission by the United Nations Assembly and then it set out a kind of timetable of the steps or stages by which these objectives might be obtained. It dealt with none of the practical problems—how to define manpower, how to relate manpower to the reduction of conventional weapons, and the rest, with which even the present proposals about "partial" disarmament must deal. The fact that still, in 1957, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary call it a disarmament plan simply shows that for these three years they have never given their minds to these practical problems at all.
But, most unfortunate of all, the Western Governments in the Sub-Committee have thrown over the objectives of the United Nations Assembly Resolution by which the Sub-Committee was set up and to which they had pledged themselves again in the Anglo-French memorandum of 1954. They threw them over just when the Russians, for the first time, looked like doing serious business.
On 10th May, 1955—and I wish that hon. Members would read that volume of the Sub-Committee's records, which is in print—the Russians suddenly accepted seven points on which, for many weeks, the Western delegates had been exerting sustained and very heavy pressure: the manpower level of 1 million to 1·5 million men; the proportionate reduction of conventional arms; the Western formula on the ban on the use of nuclear weapons; the Western plan for starting to convert all nuclear stocks to peaceful uses when 75 per cent. of the conventional reductions have been made; a single international organ of inspection and control with expanding powers, instead of the two which Russia had proposed; and on the powers and functions of the control organ the Russians went very far.
For the first time it looked like business. Then, alas, what happened? Instead of settling down to write a treaty, the Sub-Committee was immediately dismissed. When it met again, three months later, the Western proposals—the manpower levels, the conventional reductions,


the conversion of nuclear stocks, and the formula for the ban—were all withdrawn. At the very moment the Russians became serious we ran away. If we are faced today with these inadequate, partial proposals for disarmament, that is really why. I must, in candour, say that we on this side of the Committee still bitterly regret what seems to us the grave mistake that the Western Governments then made.
I add that that past history, while it is vital to an understanding of Russian thinking and Russian speeches, will not affect our attitude towards the new proposals which the White Paper now explains. We will support "partial" disarmament measures, if they are genuine, with all our power. We want anything that will check the arms race and make the next step easier to take. But, as the White Paper tells us, there are still difficulties ahead. With "partial" measures it may be harder, not easier as it seems at first, to reach a fair balance of reduction, than it would be with a more comprehensive plan. Partial disarmament—the White Paper admits it—will be harder to control; and if control is ineffective, real confidence will not grow.
And partial disarmament will be extremely fragile unless it is strictly followed by a comprehensive plan. We had far more disarmament between the wars than the Governments are proposing now. There were the big reductions of the Washington and London Naval Treaties, the disarmament of Germany and her allies, the treaty pledge that other Governments would similarly disarm, and the tacit world-wide truce, not in weapon development, but in manpower and in budgets, which lasted fifteen years until the Geneva Conference broke down. It was a considerable measure of partial disarmament, but it was swept away, and very swiftly, when Hitler came to power, because the general treaty covering all armaments had not been made.
As the White Paper fairly points out, there are still great difficulties to be overcome even about these partial measures. There is agreement that the manpower levels, at the first reduction, shall be 2·5 million for the United States and Russia, and 750,000 for France and Britain. But, says paragraph 16 of the White Paper, the "Report on the Disarmament Talks—1957":

The definition of 'manpower' for this purpose is still to be agreed.
That is because, after five years of headline arguments about manpower levels, the Sub-Committee has never faced the practical problem of what manpower means.
It is not easy. Does manpower include civilians employed by the Armed Forces? The United States forces employ million. Does it include armed security police? The Russians have hundreds of thousands. What do you do about other para-military forces? How do you balance conscript armies against armies of long-term volunteers? How do you limit trained reserves? Until these questions have been answered, the figure of 2½ million has literally no meaning.
The same is true about conventional weapons. Under the proposal each Government is to submit a list of weapons which it is prepared to scrap—tanks, aircraft, artillery, warships and the rest. The lists must be
…fair in relation to each other and to the manpower reductions of the party concerned.
But:
the procedure for submitting and agreeing the lists has still to be worked out.
In plain language, this, again, is a pious aspiration and nothing more. Inevitably, it must mean—and this is the point I am making—a long and very difficult negotiation.
The paragraph on budgetary reductions is even vaguer. Everybody wants to do something, no one has suggested what. But military budgetary systems vary so greatly from country to country that without a common system of presentation, a common system of accountancy and control, limitation might mean lust nothing at all.
The Sub-Committee is not yet agreed about the system of control posts for the suspension of nuclear tests, about the system of control for the "cut-off" of new fissionable material for military use, about the aerial survey and ground observation to prevent surprise attacks. All this being so, we warmly support the proposal of the Foreign Secretary that working groups should be set up to draft. We think that the Russians are quite wrong to oppose it. The Sub-Committee will never pass the stage of headlines until it starts on concrete detailed texts.
If the Russians go on opposing, there is a simple way around it which the Government could adopt. They say in the White Paper that on the question of conventional armament ceilings,
the United Kingdom has tabled a working paper for dealing with this technical problem.
I am very glad. Why do they not table working papers, draft schemes and clauses on the definition of manpower, on budgetary limitation, on the nuclear "cutoff" and on nuclear tests. Nothing could do so much to promote the chances of success.
We think that this is of particular importance over nuclear tests. I believe that in a week our scientists could make a plan for the control posts needed to police the suspension of the tests. It would only be a basis of discussion, but it might lead to a quick agreement on this vital point. I must add this about the tests: we still think very firmly that the tests should he dealt with in a separate agreement, not tied to other measures, hut made the first and opening stage of whatever "partial" disarmament may be done.
There are three reasons why we think that. There is the undoubted risk to human health, whatever the Government may say, if the tests go on. Secondly, tests are held to improve the nuclear weapons and to adapt them to new kinds of military use. They are the nuclear arms race in its most dangerous form: and we want that to stop. Thirdly, the stopping of the tests, the setting up of U.N. control posts on the territory of the nuclear Powers, would be a positive step forward, a visible and concrete sign, that could hardly fail to make it easier to get agreement on the second stage.
If, however, we tie, as the Government now propose, the stopping of the tests to the long negotiations about manpower, conventional arms and budgetary reductions which have still to be carried through, the Sub-Committee will inevitably separate again with nothing done. It will be a major victory for the opponents of disarmament, with all the public disillusionment that this will mean.
Of course, suspension would be provisional until the other "partial" measures entered into force. On those "partial" measures we support the proposals of the Western Governments which, we think, should constitute a very

early second stage, namely, the reduction of manpower to 2·5 million for Russia and the United States and 750,000 for France and ourselves, and the "cut-off" of new nuclear production, to be followed by what Mr. Stassen called "progressive transfers" from nuclear stocks to peaceful use.
I only make these comments. The manpower levels of 2·5 million and 750,000 must be compared to Hitler's 1·1 million in his forces in 1938 and to our 620,000 now. As disarmament, they do not amount to much. The "cut-off" of new nuclear production will only be accepted, not by Russia only, but by France, Sweden and other countries, if we make a firm commitment that Mr. Stassen's "progressive transfers" are to lead to the ultimate elimination of all our nuclear weapon stocks. That is, as we believe, the absolute condition of stopping a general world-wide nuclear race.

Viscount Hinchingbrooke: May I interrupt the right hon. Gentleman? I think that he has made a statement of some significance which seems to be in fundamental conflict with the policy of his party, as recently announced, to support the manufacture and testing of the hydrogen bomb.

Mr. Noel-Baker: Not at all, we have never believed in unilateral disarmament. We want to get rid of the nuclear stocks by a world-wide agreement to which all subscribe and which is placed under rigid international control.
When we come to the later stages of the Government's plans we think that something more ambitious than the White Paper proposals is required. No one will attach much importance to the partial measures unless the Government show that for later on a real disarmament is being planned.
On manpower, we think that "1 million, or, at most, 1·5 million" should be the target and not the 1·7 million which is the ultimate reduction now proposed. We think it wholly wrong that further reductions below 2·5 million should be made dependent on future "political conditions", and we think it quite fantastic that when the Russians ask us, "What political settlements do you mean?" we simply answer, "We really cannot say." Of course, we want political settlements as much as anyone;


of course, parallel political and disarmament negotiations could go on; of course, a real European security system is very much to be desired. But disarmament in itself, as the Foreign Secretary has said, will help to get the political settlements we want.
I would summarise our answers to the arguments which the Government have used about "political conditions" by saying this. Suppose we had agreed with Russia in May,1955; suppose the Russian forces had been reduced, under international control, to 1 million men, would any Western interest have been imperilled? Would not N.A.T.O. have become far stronger relatively to Russia than it is today? Would not the prospects for German unity and for the freedom of the satellites have been enormously improved?
More important in the later stages even than the manpower reduction are the plans proposed for weapons and armaments by land and sea and air. There we are resolutely convinced that the British Government—any British Government—must steadfastly adhere to the programme of objectives which, so short a time ago, our Government helped to draft. The Anglo-French memorandum of 1954 said that the draft disarmament Treaty must include
The total prohibition of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons, and weapons of mass destruction of every type, together with the conversion of existing stocks of nuclear weapons for peaceful purposes.
The memorandum followed a United Nations Assembly Resolution which the Foreign Secretary had also helped to draft. That resolution enjoined
…the elimination and prohibition of atomic, hydrogen bacterial. chemical and all such weapons of war and mass destruction.
We believe that nothing but the execution of that programme in a measurable future can save mankind.
Perhaps the Foreign Secretary will urge the danger that some disloyal State, harbouring designs of an aggressive war, will try to keep a secret stock of nuclear weapons. It is a risk, of which we have always been aware. Dr. Oppenheimer warned us of it years before the Foreign Secretary's two documents which I quoted had been drawn up. It is a risk, but a lesser risk, as I believe, than that of living indefinitely with the fearful stocks that

now exist and with the certainty that many other nations will insist on having nuclear weapons too.
It is a risk against which precautions could be taken. I understand from the Press that experiments at Harwell and elsewhere are showing that the margin of error in calculating past production may be 10 per cent. In other words, we might hope to be able to abolish 90 per cent. of even a disloyal Government's stock. To deal with the 10 per cent., could we not make an international stock to be used, if need be, by the defending nations against an aggressive nuclear attack? Could we not deal, as the Prime Minister tentatively suggested to the Foreign Ministers in Geneva, two years ago, with the means of delivering nuclear bombs? Could we not abolish guided missiles and bombing aircraft, forbid their manufacture and all training in their use? There is no defence for Britain against guided missiles except their abolition under international control.
Will anyone boggle at abolishing bombers? Mass destruction did not start with the Hiroshima bomb. Earlier in 1945 piston-engined aircraft, with conventional bombs, had burnt 83,000 people to death in Tokyo in a single night, 20,000 of them children.
As the Prime Minister has said, we need full disarmament, both nuclear and conventional as well. We may start with modest measures, but we must do so intending later to abolish the offensive weapons of both the next war and the last. It will not happen, we know, unless we get real inspection and control, and we hope that the Foreign Secretary will assure us that Britain, for her part, from the first day onwards will open her doors to inspection of every kind. It will not all happen tomorrow. It may take us long years still. But unless we fix our eyes upon these later measures we may never take the first.
Remembering what has happened in the arms race in the last six years—larger and larger A-bombs, multi-megaton H-bombs, chemical and bacterial weapons, supersonic long-range bombers, guided missiles, great and small—remembering that swift advance in the mechanism of destruction, we ask the Government to found their policy on what they themselves declare, that only in international disarmament does Britain's


safety lie. We ask them to make that their major purpose, both in foreign affairs and in defence. We ask them to match their efforts with the urgent dangers that military science is piling up. If they do so, we believe the nation and a united Commonwealth will give them unwavering support.

4.55 p.m.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Selwyn Lloyd): I tried to set out in the White Paper, Command 228, the present position with regard to the current disarmament talks. I think the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Derby, South (Mr. P. Noel-Baker)has acknowledged, as far as it is possible for him to judge, that it was a fair record, although the Committee will realise the difficulties inherent in producing such a document before the reports of the Sub-Committee's deliberations are available.
I am very conscious of the criticisms which the right hon. Gentleman made about the way the Sub-Committee works. The idea of the Sub-Committee arose after there had been discussions in Paris in the 1951 Assembly between Mr. Vyshinsky, M. Moch, Mr. Jessop and myself under the presidency of Mr. Padilla Nervo. Some useful negotiations took place in about ten days. The idea of the Sub-Committee was that we might have meetings of such a sort over a comparatively short time which would advance the discussions on disarmament. Now we have a situation in which the Sub-Committee is almost in permanent session.
I would remind the Committee that there are, of course, the periodic reports to the Disarmament Commission, of which twelve countries are members; there are debates on the matter there; and in the first committee meeting of the United Nations each year there is a further debate on disarmament. Therefore, it is not as though the existence of the Sub-Committee were preventing either the Disarmament Commission or the United Nations from having debates upon disarmament from time to time. Nevertheless, I think the whole question of the future of the Sub-Committee and its procedures requires examination.
Paragraph 24 of the White Paper is the crux of the Report. We say:
The above picture is necessarily incomplete, both because the negotiations are still

in progress and because it is impossible to publish proposals that are the subject of informal consultation between delegations but which have not yet been tabled in definite form. Nevertheless, it is true to say that substantial advances have been made in the present series of discussions. The prospects of a partial agreement have materially improved since March.
I think it is wrong to belittle the importance of that assessment. It is, and continues to be, the policy of Her Majesty's Government to work for a sound, properly controlled, comprehensive disarmament agreement. We should, of course, prefer a comprehensive disarmament agreement—I did not think there was much disagreement between the two sides of the Committee on this matter—but, it being obviously impossible at the moment to get a comprehensive agreement, I thought that we should be wise to seek to achieve a partial one.
The right hon. Gentleman referred a good deal to the question of nuclear weapons. He referred to their horrors and their startling development, and I think we all share that view of them. But there are, I submit, certain other considerations also to be taken into account. It is well to remember that the nuclear deterrent has been of great benefit to this country. Lord Attlee said on 2nd March. 1955:
Deterrents by possession of thermo-nuclear weapons are the best way of preventing another war.
I must also quote the remarks which the right hon. Gentleman himself made on 6th March, 1955:
We all revolt against the horrors of nuclear war, but nuclear war will never happen unless some nation is guilty of aggression. No one need fear our H bomb unless he commits that crime.
Later the right hon. Gentleman said:
Why should we now increase the risk by throwing this deterrent power away?
We in Britain have derived substantial benefit from that conception; and the fact that nuclear weapons have existed in the hands of the West is the reason, I believe, why Western Europe has survived in freedom during a critical phase. The knowledge that N.A.T.O. is backed by the strategic air forces of the West with their nuclear weapons is the supreme deterrent. It is obvious why nuclear weapons are so great a deterrent to war. The right hon. Gentleman confirmed that in the course of his


speech today. The destruction which would ensue from nuclear war is, of course, terrible to contemplate. However, there is a second reason, apart from the terrible nature of the consequences, why nuclear weapons have been a deterrent. It is that they are a deterrent for the big country just as much as for the small. The large sub-continent ultimately has as much to fear as the small island. In the past the Soviets have been able to use their vast land mass for defence in depth. In a nuclear war that depth would avail them little—

Mr. Aneurin Bevan: Mr. Aneurin Bevan (Ebbw Vale)rose—

Mr. Lloyd: —please allow me to finish my sentence—and their huge country is put in a position of relative equality with the smaller countries of Western Europe. I think that is one reason why they dislike nuclear weapons so much.

Mr. Bevan: Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

Mr. Lloyd: I am going to deal with the wider question of nuclear arms later in my speech. The right hon. Member for Derby, South spoke for nearly an hour without interruption. I have a carefully prepared speech to make and I shall try to deal with all these points, if the right hon. Gentleman will allow me to continue.
I cannot accept the view that nuclear weapons should be outlawed while conventional arms remain in existence in large quantities. I understand, although I do not agree, with the view of those who say that arms of all sorts should be eliminated. That is the pacifist view. I believe that the only difference between nuclear weapons and conventional weapons is the degree of their lethality. I do not accept that there is a moral difference between sending a thousand bombers to bomb a town and destroying that town with high explosive bombs, and sending one bomber with a hydrogen bomb. I maintain that it is not nuclear weapons that are the enemy, it is global war, whatever weapons are used. From the way some people talk, one would think that a global war fought with conventional weapons was somehow allowable.

Mr. Harold Davies: No.

Mr. Lloyd: There were 360,000 casualties at Passchendaele, and we all know the sum of the casualties from the bombing which took place on the scale it did during the last war. I believe that a global war fought to a finish would destroy organised society as we know it with the same certainty whether fought with so-called conventional weapons or with nuclear weapons.
The Soviet Union place in the forefront of their programme a ban on the use of nuclear weapons and the elimination of those weapons. They maintain that nuclear weapons are illegal. This is, however, a contention which must be regarded against the background of realism. It is shrewd political manœuvring on the part of the Soviet Union in the interests of strengthening the security of the Soviet Union. I do not blame them for that. They are looking after their own interests but I do not think that it has anything to do with legality or morality.
Nevertheless, the fact that we have drawn some military benefit from the existence of the nuclear weapon as a deterrent does not mean that we are complacent about the development of nuclear arms. We want disarmament, but we have to insist that nuclear and conventional disarmament should be tied up with one another. Just as it is unreasonable to expect the Soviet Union to accept a radical measure of properly controlled conventional disarmament without anything being done about nuclear disarmament, so I think it unreasonable for us to be asked to accept nuclear disarmament without anything being done about conventional disarmament. I think that position is both honourable and logical.
I do not say that the right hon. Member for Derby, South accepted the opposite view this afternoon. It is one of the views which have been expressed—that we should accept straight away the ban on the use of nuclear weapons without anything else being done. I did not detect that as being the position of the right hon. Gentleman this afternoon; that is one of the propaganda criticisms made against us in the world today.
With regard to the last five years of disarmament discussions, I should like very much to have gone into all the points which the right hon. Gentleman


made against me personally. I admit that they have been protracted and complicated and in many instances frustrating. I agree that, owing to the procedure we have adopted, it has been difficult, even for those connected with the discussions, to follow the various negotiations and to keep up with the positions taken. The right hon. Gentleman should remember that we have a negotiating difficulty which is not shared by the Soviet Union. Representatives of the Soviet Union speak for one Government whose policy can be changed overnight. We are dealing with the views and interests of a large number of independent countries, and time is taken for consultations and discussions in order to seek to achieve a common position; and by reason of that, each of us must share the blame when there is an apparent failure to make progress on any particular point.
Despite all that can be said about the last five years, I think that certain realities have emerged. I would point out this fact; that when in 1951 I began work on disarmament, I did not receive any inheritance at all. At that time there were no worth-while discussions taking place with regard to disarmament. There was the greatest difficulty in having any realistic discussions with the Soviet Union at all at that time. Disarmament debates were simply used as propaganda exercises. I maintain that in the last five years certain broad propositions have emerged.
First of all, with regard to control, I would say to the right hon. Gentleman that one of the difficulties, or the uncertainties, about the Soviet proposals of 10th May, 1955, was the extent to which they would accept realistic control. Another point, another comment of the right hon. Gentleman, which I think was a fairer point, was when he said that one of the difficulties was with regard to the force level on which the West appeared to retreat.
We have always believed—I think that it is a belief which is without opposition—that control is the essence of any disarmament plan. I have heard one Soviet representative after another say that as soon as the word "control" was used he felt the possibility of a disarmament agreement receding. Throughout the years that has been one of the main differences between us. We do not believe

in obligations which cannot be enforced or, at least, with regard to which it cannot be known whether they are being honoured or not; and that applies to the question of the immediate ban on the use of nuclear weapons.
All the time the Soviet Union are asking us to agree to such a ban. That means an agreement on paper that nuclear weapons will not be used. Our reply has been that such an agreement would not be worth the paper it was written on, because neither side would really believe that, in the ultimate recourse, the other would not use nuclear weapons. The position is, therefore, that such an agreement on paper would simply add to suspicion and insecurity instead of diminishing them.
I think it has emerged from all these discussions that the scope of a disarmament agreement must be confined to measures which can either be controlled in an acceptable manner or are of such a limited character that a certain looseness of control can be accepted. I think this is illustrated by the position on nuclear weapons. That has become clarified in the last five years. With regard to tests, it is now generally believed that, so far as nuclear tests are concerned, an inspection system can be devised which will make it impossible for any country to have any significant nuclear tests without both the fact that they have taken place and, broadly speaking, their nature becoming known.
Secondly, I think it is accepted that it could be possible to have a system of control capable of detecting when nuclear material was being manufactured for weapons purposes. Thirdly, but on the other hand, I think it is agreed—certainly it is conceded by the Soviet Union—that it is impossible to determine scientifically whether existing weapons and materials already manufactured for weapons purposes have been destroyed or disclosed.
Therefore, the conclusion from these facts, it would seem to me, is that the possibilities of realistic control in the nuclear field are at the present time limited to the suspension of tests and the cessation of the manufacture of fissionable material for weapons purposes. That is a guide as to how far it is realistic to seek to go with regard to nuclear weapons in a first-stage agreement. That


does not affect at all the view of the ultimate objective. Of course, ultimately, we wish in the final stages of a disarmament plan that nuclear weapons should be eliminated. I do not withdraw at all from the Anglo-French plan of 1954 where, towards the end of the final stages, nuclear weapons would be eliminated. But we have to face the fact that under that plan, by that time, there would be such a degree of control throughout the world that, in my view, it must almost amount to world government. In those circumstances, it would be possible to take the risk, and it may be that before that time science may have advanced to such an extent that there may be means of detecting the quality and extent of materials not disclosed or revealed.
The fact remains that, for the present, I believe that the realistic thing to do is to try to get agreement on the suspension of tests and the cut-off in the manufacture of fissionable material, both of which we believe can be properly controlled. That is the first stage; and there has been very much argument about this during the last five years. I think that now we are achieving all these three points, and, what is more, that there is now common ground between all the countries concerned.
Then we come to the question of force levels, which is one of the easier problems to solve. By "force levels" I mean the number of men serving in the armed forces of the various countries, and I do not think it has been suggested that civilians should be included. I think that the right hon. Member for Derby, South (Mr. P. Noel-Baker)was a little unjust because we have had considerable discussions about what is the definition of manpower. We, in fact, suggested some time ago that a working group should be set up to get that definition agreed, but, even so, there has been a certain amount of discussion. I do not think that it would cause much delay. I believe that the question of force levels is one of the easier matters to solve, and after a good deal of argument we have, I believe, established agreement on three stages for reductions in numbers of men.
At the end of the first stage the ceiling would be 2½ million men each for the Soviet Union and the United States and 750,000 men each for Britain and France.

At the end of the second stage the ceiling would be 2·1 million each for the Soviet Union and the United States and 700,000 each for Britain and France; and at the end of the third stage 1·7 million each for the Soviet Union and the United States and 650,000 each for Britain and France.
The right hon. Gentleman says that that is not enough; that is not low enough. At all events, I think that there appears to be agreement on those ceilings. Certainly the United States have put them forward and I do not gather that the Soviet Union disagrees with them. I hope that they will be followed later by further reductions, but after all the arguments there have been for the last five years about the question of force levels—as the right hon. Gentleman indicated, not always with complete consistency on both sides—I think it is something to have got agreement on these three stages and these three ceilings.

Mr. E. Shinwell: When is the first stage to be reached, because the United Kingdom has already decided to reduce its armed Forces to a figure much below 650,000? When is the first stage to be reached?

Mr. Lloyd: I think the proposal was that the ceiling should be obtained within twelve months of the signing of the agreement. The right hon. Gentleman is perfectly right in saying that, as far as we in the United Kingdom are concerned, that ceiling for manpower is only a ceiling. We shall be below it. As far as the Soviet Union and the United States are concerned, it is a very different matter. We are disarming to such an extent that we shall be below it.

Mr. Frank Beswick: In the earlier part of his speech, when he was speaking about nuclear disarmament, the right hon. and learned Gentleman suggested that it was not possible for this country or the Western Powers to go in for real nuclear disarmament beyond the suspension of tests until there was some reduction in conventional armaments. He rather suggested that we could not agree to nuclear disarmament because we had failed to get agreement on conventional disarmament. Is the right hon. and learned Gentleman now saying that these agreed force levels constitute the measure of conventional disarmament


which would justify us in accepting the proposal; for nuclear disarmament?

Mr. Lloyd: If the hon. Gentleman will allow me to make my speech I will cover exactly the question he poses.
At the moment I am on the matter of force levels. On that, I think, the United States proposition has been put forward in these terms. The Western countries have accepted it and I have not heard it challenged by the Soviet Union. As far as we are concerned, we shall be subject to the terrible accusation that we are already below the ceiling prescribed.
I think there is much more difficulty over the limitation of armaments in the conventional field. Agreement has been reached—particulars are set out in paragraph 17 of the White Paper—as to a method of dealing with the limitation of conventional armaments in a first stage agreement. I think that the agreement set out in paragraph 17 of the White Paper, though welcome, only touches the fringe of the problem. It is a problem which absorbed years of discussion and argument in the period between the wars.
I have repeatedly asked the Soviet Union to enter into discussions on the details of this matter—I did it again and again in 1954 and it has been done since—and we have always been told that it would be a waste of time to consider the matter until there is a wider agreement. I think it obvious that the agreement on force levels is meaningless unless there is also agreement on levels of armaments.
The failure to get down to technical proposals on the matter is, I think, one of the most worrying aspects of the discussions we have had. It is all very well for the right hon. Gentleman to say. "You ought to have discussions among yourselves and produce working papers." I do not think that there would be much reality in the discussions unless the Soviet Union was a party to them. For the moment, I think that we may derive satisfaction from the fact that there is agreement as to a method of tackling the problem in the first stage.
I am dealing with the matters which have come out as a result of these lengthy discussions and I think this last one is one where there is perhaps reason for more satisfaction than over the ques-

tion of armaments or force levels and that is this business of what are called the "anti-surprise attack measures." I think that considerable progress has been made towards agreement and towards possible measures to increase international confidence. I believe that the plan for aerial inspection put forward by Mr. Eisenhower and the plan for ground control posts put forward by the Soviet Union, having been accepted in principle by both sides, are a fairly solid advance.
Of course, I believe that if there is a degree of inspection both from the air and on the ground which will satisfy both sides that there is no real danger of a surprise attack it should be a contribution to the lessening of tension. Agreement has been reached in principle that there should be aerial inspection and that there should be control posts on the ground.
Having said that, the last thing I wish to attempt to conceal from the Committee is the fact that there is no agreement on the areas to be inspected, where the control posts are to be placed, or what powers they are to possess. Nor is there agreement upon how to handle the limitation of armaments in the further stages nor agreement with regard to the conditions under which the second and third ceilings for manpower come into effect. There is not agreement, nor in my view can there be yet, on how to proceed to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, I think that there is sufficient agreement on these other matters for us to believe it to be possible to achieve this limited or partial agreement, an agreement on measures for partial disarmament subject to the necessary control.
As I say, if I may repeat what I have already said, I still believe that the Anglo-French plan was the best comprehensive blue print for disarmament. I agree that it was not a detailed scheme, but there were certain principles in it which made it the most comprehensive plan yet put forward. But we have to face the fact that the two most powerful countries, the United States and the Soviet Union, are not at this stage prepared to bind themselves to a comprehensive scheme which will carry disarmament through all its stages. That is one of the facts of the present situation.
I do not think that detracts from the value of the partial agreement, and if a partial agreement is soundly based I think it will be a contribution to a reduction of tension and the creation of an atmosphere in which the political settlement of outstanding difficulties will be the more easily obtained and in which the way will be clearer for further stages towards disarmament.
If I may, I should like to take up one point to which the right hon. Gentleman referred. I mentioned the political settlement of outstanding difficulties. We are sometimes pressed to define them precisely, and he rather indicated in his speech that he thought we ought to define them precisely. I think that it would be most unwise to do so; it would be most unwise to establish a series of sine qua nons for further progress, and to say that we cannot go on from stage one to stage two or on to stage three unless this, that or the other has been done. At this point, when we are seeking only a first stage agreement, it would be unwise to specify precisely what the political settlements should be or where they ought to be achieved before we continue.
The reason I say that is that I have always believed that a first stage agreement may produce a more relaxed atmosphere, and in that more relaxed atmosphere some of the matters which are regarded by people other than ourselves as particularly difficult at the present time may, indeed, resolve themselves. If one specifies a list of the things which must be settled before one can go from a partial agreement to the next stage, one would be defeating the purpose which some hon. Members have in mind.

Mr. Bevan: As this is probably the most important issue which divides the Committee at the moment, will the right hon. Gentleman explain what relationship there can be between the armed forces possessed by the major Powers and political agreements, if we have pledged ourselves not to use armed force to reach agreements?

Mr. Lloyd: There is the matter of self-defence. We have not pledged ourselves not to use armed forces in self-defence, and the whole point of getting a political settlement of a certain prob-

lem is that it would make less likely a resort to arms by one party or another. Because there is tension arising from a political disagreement is precisely why people may not be willing to reduce further the levels of their forces of self-defence.

Mr. Bevan: May I press this point? With a great deal of what the right hon. and learned Gentleman has said, we agree, but if the trouble is that we are all of different sizes, and then we agree to a series of disarmament measures which reduce the size of each by the same proportion, how does the relationship between one and another then prevent us reaching political agreements? We are still in the same condition of relative strength at the end, although we have not got such a heavy arms burden to carry.

Mr. Lloyd: I think that the answer to the right hon. Gentleman's question is that there is not always geographical equality between us. One may have to have one's forces at the end of what is called a very long pipe-line. We found that ourselves in connection with our detachment in Korea; there was only a small number of men, but in order to keep that small number of men there, we required a great many more behind them. It all depends. One of the issues is the question of United States forces remaining in Europe and other places. The Soviet Union operates on interior lines.
The point I made is not, I submit, a matter of opinion, but a matter of fact. Certain countries are not going to agree to further reductions in their armed forces until particular settlements have taken place. What I say is that we should be most unwise to specify those settlements now. My purpose in my speech is really to try to unite opinion in the Committee for the first stage agreement, and the one thing which is agreed by everybody, so far as a first stage agreement is concerned, is that no political settlements of any sort are conditions precedent to that. Therefore, I think that I am on common ground in saying that we should leave the question of political settlements to the second stage, because, as I say, that matter does not prevent a partial agreement.
Having given the Committee the five broad conclusions which have, I think, arisen from these five years of talks, I will come now to the present position in the current talks. As regards weapon tests, we acknowledge that there are legitimate anxieties about the effect on human health if indiscriminate tests of nuclear weapons continue uncontrolled, without limitation. This is a matter of argument between some of us. Her Majesty's Government do not accept that the tests which have already taken place have yet produced a dangerous situation. Nevertheless, we have never denied that, if continued and extended, they might produce such a situation in the future. That is why our view, for some two years now at least, has been that the sooner tests could be limited and controlled the better.
The attitude of the United States Government until comparatively recent times was that such a limitation was not necessary, but they were perfectly prepared to consider it when there was a prospect of danger to health. The Soviet Union has consistently refused to consider limitation at all. The Russian Government have never regarded that as relevant.
Our present position, I think, can be stated quite simply. If there is a desire to take the problem of nuclear tests in isolation, we stand by our proposals of 6th May. Some people, have been rather scornful about them, but they represented, at least in the first part, the effect of a resolution of Canada, Norway and Japan in the last General Assembly meeting. That plan, as the Committee will remember, was in three stages. If it had been accepted, I believe that the first two stages could already have been in operation. The Committee will remember that we proposed, in the first stage, the registration of tests with the United Nations, and a measure of international supervision. That could have been put into operation in a matter of days. The second stage was a meeting of experts to work out a system of qualitative and quantitative limitation, and I believe that such a system could have been agreed upon and now be operative. The third stage, the abolition of tests altogether, was to be within the framework of a comprehensive disarmament agreement and after cessation of production of fissile material for military purposes. That stage, we acknowledge, would be more remote.
Our proposals of 6th May were summarily rejected by the Soviet Union. One ground which the Soviet Union persistently advanced against the limitation of tests is that it would, so it was said, imply the legalisation of nuclear weapons. We maintain that that argument is quite irrelevant, because nuclear weapons are just as legal as any other weapons. We maintain that there is a legal right of self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter. The Soviet reply to that always is that that Article 51 was drafted before it was known that nuclear weapons existed. However that may be in fact, the Soviet Union did not ratify its acceptance of the Charter until October, 1945, some considerable time after Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
For a long time, the Soviet Union demanded cessation of tests by agreement, and without inspection. In June, the Soviet Union accepted our condition that suspension or prohibition of tests, whenever they came into effect, would have to be subject to effective inspection. The Soviet Union has now conceded that point, which is a welcome step forward.
If tests are to be taken in isolation, I have stated our position. What we want to do with regard to the suspension of tests is this. We want to accept the suspension, provided it is linked with a cutoff in the production of fissile material for weapons purposes and with the other provisions of a first stage disarmament agreement. That is the view of the other Western members of the Disarmament Sub-Committee. The reason why we wish the suspension of tests to be linked to a cut-off in production is that that is the only way, as we say, to stop the nuclear arms race. The suspension of tests by itself is not a measure of disarmament. It does not prevent countries continuing to develop and produce nuclear weapons. It would not prevent countries beyond the three which now have the knowledge from doing it even if they accepted a temporary suspension of tests in other words, they could agree to a suspension until they were ready to make their tests.
It is the linking of the suspension of tests with the cut-off in the manufacture of fissionable material for warlike purposes which is the great prize to be attained. We are advised that the countries now contemplating military nuclear programmes would be willing to


adhere to such an agreement, that is, to agree to suspension and also cessation of manufacture for military purposes. In my view, the universal cessation of the production of fissile material for weapons purposes would be a tremendous step forward. As I say, that is a very big prize, which we are seeking now to attain. I very much hope that the Soviet Union will reconsider its position with regard to the cut-off.
The reason why we say that the suspension of tests should also be linked with measures for a partial agreement about conventional disarmament is partly because we think that conventional and nuclear disarmament should go ahead pari passu, but also because we believe that we are within sight of agreement on a certain number of matters, and if there is a real urge to get agreement on suspension of tests, that should carry us through to agreement on these other matters to which I have already referred.
But that is not the whole of our position with regard to the suspension of tests. We realise the urgency which public opinion attaches to the solution of these problems and therefore, in our statement of 2nd July, when linking suspension with a future cut-off in production and the other parts of a first-stage disarmament agreement we said that we were prepared there and then to set up a committee of experts to devise the system of inspection that would be needed to control the suspension of tests. We did that in order to avoid any suggestion that our purpose was to lose time or to see that time was wasted. Unfortunately, for reasons that are not clear to me, that proposal too was categorically rejected by the Soviet Union.
I do not think, however—I will certainly consider the right hon. Gentleman's suggestion—that we can have a worthwhile discussion on the technical details unless they are on the five-Power basis. I am glad that the right hon. Gentleman approved of what I said last Wednesday. I could not refer in the White Paper to my suggestions because I made them after that document had gone to press. I asked that in addition to this working party on nuclear tests we should also set up working groups of experts to consider certain other technical matters which at some time or another must be considered.
I proposed that the following question should be considered: First of all, that of the reduction of force levels. What is to be the definition of manpower and what are to be the methods of control, including the exchange of the necessary documents, I said that I thought that that was a fairly easy technical study upon which the experts should be able to reach agreement rapidly. Secondly, I said that, with regard to conventional armaments, examination was needed of the technical details relating to the methods of drawing up and exchanging the lists of armaments, referred to in paragraph 17, the methods of relating the lists to each other, and to manpower reductions, the types of armaments to be controlled and the methods of controlling the depots. All this relates to the plan in paragraph 17.
I suggested that the working group might also be able to pass on to discussion of the system for the relation of the armaments ceilings to manpower ceilings in the second and third stage reductions. Thirdly, I suggested with regard to aerial inspection that some technical examination was required not only of the areas to be covered but also of the modus operandi, the question of over-flying rights, the safeguards of the countries overflown and the methods of dealing with alleged breaches of whatever regulations might be made.
With regard to the ground control posts, I suggested that somebody at some time would have to produce a detailed plan for their siting, their composition, their powers and their methods of communication. Those proposals also received a cold welcome from the representative of the Soviet Union, although he has not yet categorically rejected them. Here again, I hope that second thoughts will prevail and that we shall be able to get on with some detailed work.
I know that there are some people—perhaps some hon. Members of this House—who think that working groups of experts are simply a means of delay, a device to waste time. But this work has to be done at some stage. I want to make it clear to the Committee on behalf of the Government that we are not going to enter into vague and woolly undertakings which we would honour in the spirit as such, but which might be disregarded by other countries because


they were too imprecise. Let me illustrate what I mean by considering the inspection system for the suspension of nuclear tests.
The following questions present themselves and must be determined at some stage. The composition, the powers and the voting procedures of the International Commission, which I understand is what the Soviet Union suggests should be set up to supervise the fulfilment of any agreement. The relationship of that body to the United Nations, the relationship of the control teams to the Commission, the number and the location of the inspection posts, the composition of the teams at the posts, their powers, their rights, questions affecting the equipment they are to have, their mobility and their communications. All these are matters of technical detail and I do not believe that they will present insoluble difficulties, but it is work with which progress has to be made if there is to be any reality about the agreements which we have been discussing.
My proposal was that while these working groups were meeting we should continue in the Sub-Committee to discuss the other matters of principle still outstanding. With regard to the suspension of tests, one of the most important matters in that connection is the procedure by which other countries would adhere to any agreements made. I repeat that until these questions are answered and a definite plan is drawn up, we are not going to prejudice the security of this country. The same consideration applies to the system under which control posts will be set up, the aerial inspection, the limitations and other matters, and I cannot understand the reluctance to enter into discussion of the practical details involved. To put it in another way, what I want to do is to get into Committee all matters on which there is agreement in principle while leaving the Second Reading debate to proceed on all matters in which there is no agreement in principle. I think that agreement has been achieved in a sufficient area to enable this work to go on. That is where we are at the present time in the work of the Sub-Committee. I hope for less negative answers on some of the points which I have detailed, and we shall, I promise the Committee, still continue to try to press on with the work of the Sub-Committee.
In spite of what the right hon. Gentleman has said, I contend that we have tried to play our full part in making progress in disarmament. I think that we have correctly assessed the present possibility as being that of a partial agreement. I think that in the matters to which I have referred there is scope for a useful agreement which will lessen tension and pave the way therefore for political settlements and other stages in disarmament. I repeat my belief that with the progress that has been made the prospects of a partial agreement have materially improved. We have made concrete suggestions designed to speed the work. I promise hon. Members in all quarters of the Committee that this is an endeavour to which we attach and shall continue to attach the highest importance. We shall persevere, knowing how much is at stake for us and for all humanity.

5.37 p.m.

Mr. Arthur Henderson: The Foreign Secretary, at the beginning of his speech, misrepresented, perhaps unwittingly, the position of those of us on this side of the Committee on the question of nuclear disarmament. It is not our position that conventional war should be tolerated while nuclear war is on a different footing. We want to get rid of all types of modern arms, just as we want to get rid of war with all its diabolical consequences. Nor do we stand for a ban on nuclear weapons, as he suggested, without waiting for a reduction of conventional weapons. What we would like to see is progress being made in both those spheres.
What we are expressing today—and believe that this is the view of the people in every country in the world—is disappointment at the lack of progress after ten years of negotiations. In recent months there appeared to be an increasing prospect of reaching a limited agreement. The gaps between the East and West points of view appeared to be narrowing and indeed, as was said in the White Paper itself,
substantial advances have been made.
But, once again, a virtual state of deadlock has been reached. From the mass of documents and statements which have appeared in the Press, it is very difficult to appreciate clearly the main obstacles even to a partial agreement.
For example, we are told in the White Paper that agreement has been reached in principle on four issues: first, level of forces; secondly, limitation of arms; thirdly, measures to guard against surprise attack; and fourthly, suspension of nuclear tests. I agree with my right hon. Friend the Member for Derby, South (Mr. P. Noel-Baker)that working groups should be set up to think out details under those heads. Those working groups offer a positive and practical method for getting results, and it is to be hoped that the Soviet Government will accept them. The sooner these working groups get to work the sooner we are likely to make progress.
In this connection, I would ask the Foreign Secretary whether the Sub-Committee has considered the international traffic in arms that is being carried on. We were told yesterday that the dissident forces in Oman had received arms from a foreign source, although the Foreign Secretary was not prepared today to say from which country. We do know that many Governments, including our own, supply arms to countries like those in the Middle East. Is it not essential to recognise that this international traffic in arms should be considered in the Disarmament Sub-Commitee with a view to reaching agreement upon international regulation of the supply of arms?
With regard to the Foreign Secretary's defence of the position of the Government on nuclear tests, I regret very much that the Western Governments did not accept unconditionally the Soviet offer of 14th June for a two or three-year moratorium on tests. It is true they accepted the proposal in principle, but they linked it up with a cut-off in nuclear production and the initial reduction in armed forces and armaments. The difference between the two or three years proposed by the Soviet Government and the ten months proposed by the Western Governments is obviously capable of adjustment and compromise. The Western Governments should have accepted the Soviet offer and negotiated a moratorium on tests, not necessarily for two or three years, but for one, two or three, under appropriate international supervision, as a preliminary step towards a partial disarmament agreement.
During that agreed period of suspension, the Sub-Committee could have entered into negotiation on the proposal for a cut-off of production of fissile materials for war purposes. I cannot see why such an agreement should not have been achieved. I hope, however, that the Soviet Government will not now refuse to enter into a partial agreement on that ground, because if partial agreement could be achieved it could include a provision for a temporary ban on tests for the agreed period.
A more serious obstacle is the Russian proposal that each Government should undertake to renounce the use of nuclear weapons. In the Russian view, this is indispensable in reaching a partial agreement, but such an obligation already exists under Article 2 of the Charter, by which all members are obliged to refrain from the use of force against one another. This obligation must now preclude the use of nuclear weapons. One exception to the use of force, as the right hon. and learned Gentleman mentioned in his speech, is in self-defence against aggression, as provided in Article 51. I do not believe that any country would be prepared to surrender its right to defend itself against aggression, if necessary by using nuclear weapons, until international means exist which guarantee its security.
Moreover, nations have not forgotten the Kellogg Peace Pact, signed in 1928, under which most nations solemnly renounced war as an instrument of national policy, yet within a few years came the Second World War. The fact is the declarations, however solemn and well-intentioned, are not a substitute for an international agreement for the abolition of nuclear weapons under effective international control. It is quite unrealistic to suppose that a declaration which depends for its moral value on mutual confidence will have any value when mutual confidence does not exist. Steps have to be taken to create the necessary mutual confidence before such declarations can have any real value.
I turn to the question of "clean" as against "dirty" bombs. The question of the amount of radioactive fall-out is undoubtedly important in relation to tests and to the well-being of the human race, but for use in war there is no difference between them. Death and destruction


from either type of bomb would be catastrophic. Both East and West know this, and there is little point in arguing the technical superiority of one bomb as against the other. What is needed is to get rid of the hydrogen bomb and to prohibit its manufacture, and to divert fissionable materials to peaceful purposes.
The Western proposal for a ban on future production for war purposes is of great importance and would be a step forward in ending the manufacture of nuclear weapons, but, as Mr. Zorin pointed out, the Western proposals leave the existing stockpile of fissionable materials still available for war purposes. He seems, however, to have overlooked the other Western proposal for the progressive transfer of past production of fissionable material to peaceful uses. The fact that past production cannot be accounted for, as was stated by the Prime Minister, constitutes a risk—and here again, I agree with my right hon. Friend the Member for Derby, South, very strongly—that hidden stockpiles of nuclear weapons may be retained. Both East and West must face this risk until greater progress has been made towards disarmament. I suggest that the West should propose an absolute ban on all future production of nuclear weapons.
The real truth is that, lying behind all the efforts of Governments to reach agreement, is the background of mistrust and suspicion which has bedevilled disarmament negotiations since they were first initiated in 1946. Continued deadlock is no excuse for breaking off negotiations. The five Governments must persist in their task of getting a disarmament agreement. It is a duty they owe to the ordinary men and women of every country who are bewildered by the failure of Governments to give practical effect to the aims which they have declared they hold in common. Statesmen of all countries have continually said that disarmament is the major key to world peace, but if it is to be balanced disarmament must cover both nuclear and conventional weapons.
My right hon. Friend quoted the experience of Hiroshima, which suffered atomic bombing, and Tokio, which suffered high explosive bombing. I agree with what he said. Death and destruction brought, for example, to Hamburg

by 1,000 bombers in 1940 dropping conventional and H.E. bombs, was just as terrible in its consequences to the population of Hamburg as was the dropping of two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but that is not to say that nothing can be done short of a comprehensive and general disarmament agreement.
I believe that the road to disarmament lies through a series of limited, but interrelated, agreements constituting stepping stones to eventual complete disarmament. Each Government must make their contribution to the removal of that mutual mistrust and suspicion which, today, are corroding all efforts to achieve disarmament. Both sides have recognised the importance of creating conditions of greater confidence and trust. The Foreign Secretary has rightly said this afternoon that there does seem now to be common agreement with regard to aerial inspection and the establishment of ground control posts. At any rate, both proposals have been accepted in principle.
A number of proposals were also made by Sir Anthony Eden, at the "summit" conference in July, 1955, with these objects in view. They were three: first, that there should be a security pact of which a united Germany should be a member secondly, discussion should take place as to the total forces and armaments on each side in Germany and the countries neighbouring Germany; thirdly, Britain would be ready to examine the possibility of a demilitarised zone between East and West. Mr. Bulganin, in his letter of 20th April last, referring to Sir Anthony Eden's proposals, stated that the Soviet Government
would be willing to resume discussion on these proposals in order to try to come to terms on temporary and transitional measures.
I hope that the Foreign Secretary will have regard to that reference to Sir Anthony Eden's proposals, because I think he will agree that it has a considerable bearing on the building up of trust and confidence, certainly in Europe. The Prime Minister did not respond in his reply of 17th June to Marshal Bulganin's letter. He simply pointed out—what we all know to be true—that those proposals were intended to provide concurrently for the re-unification of Germany and for the establishment of a security system in


Europe, but two years have passed since Sir Anthony Eden's statement was made and no progress has been achieved. Surely the important thing is to break this deadlock. In my opinion, the Prime Minister should have accepted this offer to resume discussions. I hope the Minister who is to reply to the debate this evening will take the opportunity to announce that the West is ready to enter into such discussions.
In my view, the creation of a demilitarised zone involving the phased withdrawal of forces and armaments from East and West Germany and the neighbouring countries—on the basis, of course, or reciprocal control—would he of the greatest value. It could well pave the way to German reunification and the liberation of the occupied territories. Moreover, the fact that forces and armaments were to be withdrawn under reciprocal control would offer a valuable opportunity for gaining experience in the working of a system of international control and inspection.
There is, however, another aspect of the disarmament problem to which the Russians attach great importance. That is the question of foreign bases. The Soviet Government have proposed that the question of abolishing foreign military bases be considered and agreements be reached as to which of those bases should be abolished within one or two years. These bases—most of them American air bases—are regarded by the Soviet Government as a threat to their security. They are also regarded by the West as the linchpin of their security. Russia feels encircled by their existence. Western Europe would feel encircled by Russia and satellite air bases if they did not exist. Without disarmament and political solutions in Europe I see little prospect of their liquidation.
The Soviet Government have also proposed that Soviet forces should be withdrawn from the Warsaw Pact countries and American, British and French forces from N.A.T.O. countries. In present circumstances that is virtually a demand for the breakup of the N.A.T.O. defence system, but Mr. Bulganin, in his letter of 20th April, recognised that it was difficult immediately to abolish the Warsaw and N.A.T.O. military groupings and

replace them by a European collective security system. It seems to me, therefore, that at this stage neither side could be expected to get rid of their existing bases or to dismantle their defence organisations.
There are other prior steps that have to be taken and it is on those prior steps that the Disarmament Sub-Committee and the Governments themselves should be concentrating. Among those prior steps I would include a first stage partial disarmament agreement and the establishment of a demilitarised zone in Europe, together with the phased withdrawal of armed forces as suggested by Sir Anthony Eden. In my judgment, those are essential steps towards a European settlement.
The main essentials of a first stage agreement, therefore, would be: first, cessation of nuclear tests; secondly, a ban on future production of nuclear weapons; thirdly, the reduction of conventional forces to agreed levels; and, fourthly, an effective inspection and control system. All those elements should be included in any permanent provision, but progress on any one of them should be accepted as a first step. In my view, the time has now come for another Foreign Ministers' conference with a view to breaking the present deadlock. Indeed, provided the ground is properly prepared, there is a strong case for a further "summit" conference of heads of Governments. It is only through the medium of these high-level conferences that progress can be made towards achieving agreement on any of the vital international problems that confront us today, particularly German reunification and European security.
In spite of ten years of effort firm agreement has not yet been reached. Meanwhile, massive armaments constitute a fearful threat and a crippling economic burden. The people of the world have become perplexed and impatient at the continuing delay in removing these threats to their welfare and happiness. They are not impressed by the charges and counter charges of responsibility for the delay; they want results. They believe there is the possibility of a partial agreement now. They believe, and we believe, that it is the first duty of the five Governments sitting at the Disarmament Sub-Committee not to allow the present opportunity to pass, but to ensure


that the first steps towards the goal of disarmament are now taken.

5.59 p.m.

Sir Hamilton Kerr: All three right hon. Gentlemen who have so far addressed the Committee, whilst differing over suggested remedies, have, I think, agreed on one point—the desire to avoid the horrors of a new world war. All of us who have lived in this century have drunk to the dregs a very bitter draught. In fifty years we have seen more human life destroyed—often the best the planet can produce—and more wealth destroyed than in any previous century. Worst of all, we recall the reproach of my right hon. Friend the Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill)who called the last war "the unnecessary war."
How can we learn from experience to avoid the possibility of another war? When I came to the House as a young Member I was one of those who placed immense hope in the League of Nations. We hoped then that it would extend its healing hand over the world and solve the problems which secret diplomacy and a policy of the balance of power had failed to solve. We placed great hope from the Kellogg Pact, to which the right hon. Member for Derby, South (Mr. P. Noel-Baker)referred; we hoped that it would abolish war as an instrument of policy. We placed great hope in the Locarno Treaty which, we trusted, would remove the danger of a German-French war.
We placed great hope at the time in the discussions at Geneva on disarmament, which attempted to limit the power of so-called offensive weapons. We believed—and I made several speeches in the House advocating this belief—that if offensive weapons, such as the 6-in. gun, the tank, the bomber aeroplane and the long-range submarine were eliminated by international agreement, the danger of war would recede. At the time we believed the advice given by military experts who emphasised the immense power of defensive weapons. We recalled the horrors of Passchendaele and the battle of the Somme where the machine gun scythed down thousands of advancing attackers. We believed that if these weapons were eliminated a nation might live like an armadillo safe inside its shell, and we were further reinforced by the description of the Maginot Line, described by certain writers as possessing

such fire power that even a grasshopper could not live in certain areas.
Nevertheless, this unnecessary war started. I believe that it occurred because we had forgotten the essential principle of the balance of power. Hitler calculated that because the United States was not committed to the defence of Europe the chance existed of a lightning blow to knock out France, to persuade England to come to terms and, more important still, to persuade the United States that it would be quite useless for her to intervene. He calculated that even if she tried to intervene, later, she would find it militarily impossible against the submarine and air bases of a Continent dominated by Germany.
That unnecessary war was therefore brought about because the forces of democracy were not aligned in sufficient strength to balance the forces of aggression. Since the end of the war we have found ourselves, in Mr. Walter Lippmann's words, not in one world but in three. Previously we thought that we all lived in a world where the sentiments of Liberal democracy would gradually cause people to develop democratic institutions and the ideas which go with them. We thought that the ideas urged by Burke in England and Lincoln in the United States would be accepted all over Asia and, indeed, Africa. Now we find ourselves in three worlds. The first world is the world of democracy and its allies, comprising the United States, Europe up to the Elbe, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Japan. The second is the Communist world comprising Russia and, we must not forget, Communist China, ever growing in strength. The third and last world is the uncommitted world of neutrals, the powerful nations of Asia and the Middle East.
If we are to preserve peace and achieve agreement at these disarmament talks, we must try to maintain the balance of power between these two worlds, with their neutral onlookers. It has been pointed out that after the war a virtual stalemate existed for a time between the atom bomb and the ability of the United States Strategic Air Force to deliver it, on one side, and the immense land power of Russia, on the other side. When the hydrogen bomb was exploded the so-called atomic stalemate developed, with the belief that such a destructive weapon


had been evolved that no nation would dare to use it. Alas, all nations have continued to manufacture these dangerous instruments.
How can we find a practical solution? I believe, briefly, that the solution falls under two headings. The first is that of unlimited atomic war, which would mean world-wide destruction, and the second, perhaps the more dangerous because the more likely, is the development from a cold war into a local shooting war with conventional ground forces.
I believe that the only practical solution to the atomic problem is atomic control with efficient international supervision. If the Russians really want agreement, I think they must accept that. It would benefit them as much as it would benefit us, particularly as my right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary has said that it is now possible to devise a system of international control which would readily detect not only an explosion of the bomb but the preparation of fissionable material for warlike uses.
Secondly, we must consider the limitation of a shooting war arising from a cold war. I believe, first and foremost, that we could achieve something by stating clearly that when such a war started we should outline our war aims. I think that the danger of a limited war spreading arises from the fear, as was the case in Korea, that the forces might extend their activities beyond a certain limit. The Chinese claimed that the advance of the American forces up to the Yalu River damaged their interests. Looking back, we might have avoided Chinese intervention had we undertaken to stop at a certain point.
Secondly, I think that if we could reduce forces in the world to a lower level but still maintain the balance of power we should give a sense of security and yet spend less on our forces. We should have scaled down the resources being devoted to armed elements and, at the same time, should maintain the essential balance of power. Once these agreements had been reached, just as when armistice talks have been initiated, it is far harder to return either to open warfare or to an arms race. By international agreement on the inspection of atomic weapons; by declaring that,

when involved in conflict, we should strictly limit our war objectives; and by scaling down the money spent on conventional weapons while still maintaining the balance of power we should take a practical step towards the avoidance of a third unnecessary war.

6.8 p.m.

Lady Megan Lloyd George: I cannot claim the indulgence of the Committee for a maiden speech. All I can ask for and all I can reasonably expect, from past experience, is the recognition of belligerent rights.
The Foreign Secretary spoke of the frustration and delays which have been taking place in the Disarmament Sub-Committee, and I do not think that anyone on either side of this Committee would be prepared to claim that it has been working under any great sense of urgency. Disarmament Commissions have been sitting for over ten years. The Sub-Committee has been sitting for three years, and not one single agreement has been signed. All this time, the weapons of destruction have been increasing in number and in power a hundred and a thousand-fold.
The hon. Member for Cambridge (Sir H. Kerr)spoke of debates before the war. I well remember the warnings which were given about the horrors and the dangers to civilisation which the next war would bring, and in all conscience they were merciless enough. The Hiroshima bomb which shocked the world with its 200,000 casualties, why, that was only a 20-kiloton fission bomb! It is now out-dated. We have moved on. The United States tell us that she has sufficient nuclear weapons for the complete destruction of the Soviet Union and they admit that the Soviet Union either has now, or soon will have, the capability of doing the same thing to the United States. There is no defence against the hydrogen bomb. In fact, the great deterrent has become—let us be quite honest—the greatest argument in the world for disarmament. There are other compelling reasons for a sense of urgency in this matter. One is the need for cutting down military budgets in all countries. The problem of inflation occupies the centre of the stage not only in this country, but in others. We are told that it is more important even than disarmament but, in point of fact, it is inseparable


from it. The one problem cannot be solved without the other.
Every country is spending astronomical sums upon the arms race. We ourselves have been spending over the last five years 10 per cent. of our national income; the United States—12 per cent., and Russia—nobody knows. The Russians, very conveniently, have a separate budget, which remains one of the unsolved mysteries of the Kremlin which the Disarmament Sub-Committee will he very hard put to penetrate.
What are the prospects for a cut in military budgets? Mr. Dulles said yesterday that we all had to plan on the assumption that the nations now possessing nuclear weapons would use them in war. But that does not mean that we can think only in terms of nuclear weapons. We cannot rule out the possibility of a war fought with conventional weapons so, until we have had a measure of disarmament in conventional weapons, we shall have to continue to bear, in addition to the expenditure on nuclear weapons, a very high expenditure on conventional arms.
Even if it is possible to produce a poor country's hydrogen bomb, the burden will still pile up. The cost of conventional weapons has risen enormously since the war. This matter has a very special significance for us—as indeed, it has for all countries. The Government based our defence mainly on nuclear weapons, but the danger to this country is not so much the Red Army as the Red Fleet. Russia has a fleet of 500 submarines. By 1960, she will probably have 700. She has built, in a year, more submarines than the United States has built since the war, and that in spite of the fact that she is short of iron and electronic equipment.
Why is Russia building this large fleet? That is a question that we, of all people, cannot ignore. The submarine has held a very special menace for us in two world wars. It would still threaten our life-line, whether in a war in which every weapon was used up to the megaton bomb, or in a major war between the great powers without the use of nuclear weapons. Therefore, this is a vital and practical problem that we have to consider. How long can we stand the

race in both nuclear and in conventional weapons?
The Disarmament Sub-Committee has had many meetings in the last few months. How near has it come to an agreement? The right hon. and learned Gentleman the Foreign Secretary said the other day that he thought that the delegations were now closer than when the present session began in March. They could scarcely be further apart. Today, he said again that he was optimistic about partial disarmament. How close are the delegations to agreement, even in principle?
On the first stage, cuts in manpower, there is agreement in principle—in principle; 2·5 million men for the United States and for Russia, and 750,000 for Great Britain and France. Of course, the United States has already cut her forces unilaterally by 100,000, and this will only mean a total reduction for her of an additional 200,000. For the Russians, there is no doubt that it will mean a far greater proportionate cut. For us, the figure of 750,000 is meaningless, because in any case our manpower will he cut down to 350,000 by 1956.
The Foreign Secretary this afternoon commended to the Committee the Anglo-French proposals. He said what a tragedy it was that they had not been accepted. The figures for manpower cuts in the Anglo-French proposals were lower than those now made. They were rejected by the Russians, but later—I think it was in 1955—they were accepted by the Russians. They were then rejected by France and ourselves. We rejected the very proposals that we ourselves had made. I only hope that these latest proposals will not meet with the same fate.
Secondly, there is the proposal of the United States—upon which, as I understand, there is agreement in principle—for the reduction of conventional arms, the exchanging of lists of armaments to be kept in depots under international control. That looks all right on paper, but its effectiveness will, of course, depend not only on the number but on the nature of the weapons that are likely to be included in that list. I very much hope that we will have a little more information about that on these matters when the Minister of Defence replies to the debate.
These proposals that have been made are tentative. The Foreign Secretary can


point to the further suggestions he himself made last week for setting up working parties to look into the level of forces and of armaments. Of course, we welcome them. The experts will have to be called in at some stage or other to get down to the complex business of working out details, and of drawing up a draft treaty. As the right hon. and learned Gentleman also said, no Government in this country would be prepared to agree to woolly proposals—that were not specifically defined—I should like to ask two questions of the Minister of Defence.
First, what, in this context, is to be the definition of an expert? Are the experts to be Service men—are they to be chiefs of staff? If they are, their labours are likely to be prolonged and inconclusive. Secondly, is a time limit to be set for their discussions? Are they to be asked to report back to the Sub-Committee, which, presumably, will report back again to the Disarmament Commission? Unless there is a time limit, the discussions will drag on as interminably as those of the Sub-Committee itself.
Of course, we would all like to have a comprehensive agreement covering conventional and non-conventional weapons, the manufacture of nuclear weapons and the elimination of stockpiles, and we must go on making every conceivable effort, and put a little more dynamism into it, to secure such an agreement. We all recognise that during the great part of these negotiations Russia has been stonewalling. We cannot acquit her of making some proposals in a cynical spirit.
Nevertheless, here we have at least a proposal made by Russia which is an advance, at any rate. She is now prepared to accept the suspension of tests with inspection and control as an immediate measure, independent of a partial disarmament agreement. The Government say that they are not prepared to accept it without the control of the manufacture of nuclear arms. They give it as their reason that the suspension will not check the arms race.
Of course, it is true that there are enough nuclear weapons in the world to-day for us to blow each other to smithereens, and it is perfectly true, there-

fore, to say that suspension of tests will not affect the issue. The suspension of tests will not prevent the Russians, the Americans, or ourselves from adding to the stockpile. That is also perfectly true. But the adding to the stockpile is going on, anyway, with or without an agreement, so we should be no worse off in that respect than we are now. But it would give the first check to the arms race, because without tests there can be no development of weapons, and that, I think, is one of the most important considerations that we should have before us when we consider this matter. If, on the other hand, we turn down the Russian proposal, the alternative is that the testing, the stockpiling and the manufacturing will go on. I should have thought that an agreement of this kind on tests, as proposed by Russia, is well worth accepting.
There is great danger in delaying the suspension of tests. The United States has suggested ten months as a preliminary period. The Russians have suggested two to three years. What has happened in only the last six months? There have been six tests by America and three by Britain. In the last eighteen months Russia has had 15 tests. The circle is growing. Great Britain has become an H-bomb Power. How many more H-bomb Powers will there be in the next few months if there is not a moratorium? Who are we to complain? We are hardly in a position to blackball any country for joining the H-bomb club. All the reasons advanced by the Prime Minister for our having the bomb apply equally to other countries.
I want to ask the Government, in all sincerity and honesty, whether they think that it will be easier than it is now to suspend H-bomb tests when more countries have the bomb. I think that perhaps the most important gain in accepting a suspension is that we should have for the first time a system of inspection and control. Inspection, after all, is the key to any agreement on disarmament and it is certain that until we have a system of inspection and control worked out and tried out it will be very difficult to establish the confidence necessary to go on to wider measures of disarmament. There is no reason why we should not go on talking until kingdom come, and if the arms race goes on as at present there is a risk that it might come sooner than we think.
Therefore, I appeal most earnestly to the Government to agree to this very limited Russian proposal to take this first vital step. I believe that if they do not the people of this country will call them to account for their neglect. I beg them, in the name of all humanity, to accept, at any rate, this first, partial step.

6.25 p.m.

Vice-Admiral John Hughes Hallett: I count myself extremely fortunate to be able to follow the hon. Lady the Member for Carmarthen (Lady Megan Lloyd George)in what may of us would regard as her second maiden speech. I know that hon. Members who, like myself, have come here comparatively recently and have never heard her before have been looking forward very much to this occasion. I have a personal reason for having looked forward to hearing her because one of my unforgettable memories as a young man was hearing her father speak from the Opposition benches, and when he went into action he did so to no mean tune.
The hon. Lady in the course of her speech said that the great deterrent was, in fact, the greatest argument for disarmament. I would go further and say that it also presents the greatest opportunity for it. Later on she raised the all important question of how close are the nations to agreement. That is a matter with which I shall hope to deal later.
Among various questions that the hon. Lady put to the Government, I thought that perhaps the most difficult one was when she asked what was an expert. I suggest that one of the difficulties in the disarmament problem lies in the fact that it is one of those problems in which practically everyone regards himself as an expert. Disarmament is perhaps the supreme example of a great problem—one of the great world problems in the last forty years—in which it is so very easy to lose sight of the wood for the trees. Indeed, the wood is a very poor metaphor. It would be better described as an enormous, confusing jungle in which some of the most distinguished contemporary statesmen have got lost and wandered for the rest of their days.
Without any malice and with great respect to their integrity and knowledge, I must say that as I listened to the

speeches of the right hon. Member for Derby, South (Mr. P. Noel-Baker)and the right hon. and learned Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. A. Henderson)I was not quite sure that they had not got a little bit lost themselves. I intend to run no risk of getting lost myself because I do not intend to follow the right hon. Gentlemen into the details of the present situation. I do not intend to discuss the mass of technicalities with which the White Paper necessarily deals. I want, rather, to try to stand back for a moment and look at the problem in greater perspective, because by so doing it can be shown that the policy now being pursued by Her Majesty's Government is, in the main, absolutely right and sound.
Perhaps I might for a moment dwell on the background of the problem as I see it. It is a matter of history that between the wars successive British Governments made every possible effort to secure disarmament, and remarkably little was achieved. But one great lesson emerged and that was that there is not one problem but three problems. We have the problem of disarmament itself. We have the problem of the harmonising and the stabilising of international relations, and by that I do not mean what I thought the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan)meant when he interrupted the Foreign Secretary this afternoon. I do not mean a sort of blank cheque or an agreement not to use force. I have always felt that the Kellogg Peace Pact was not worth the paper on which it was written. Those sorts of vague agreements count for nothing. I refer to the more precise agreements relating to international difficulties.

Mr. Bevan: I do not want to be misrepresented. That was not my position at all. I asked this question: what can be the relationship between the armed force possessed by the major Powers and political settlements by negotiation, if armed force is not kept in the background as a final sanction?

Vice-Admiral Hughes Hallett: I should have thought that the answer to that lies in the point which I am trying to make now. I would first mention the third co-related problem which is the establishment of an international force to keep the peace. I should have said that the great lesson to be learned from events


between the wars is that those three problems are so closely interlinked that no radical solution can be found to one of them unless the nations are both able and willing to tackle the other two. That was true then, and it is still true today.
We should remember that it is the overshadowing Russian threat to Western Europe which is the thing against which, rightly or wrongly, we are arming and are armed today. It is relevant to ask ourselves what is the political nature of that threat. Is its aim simply the establishment of world revolution, the forcible setting up of Communist regimes in what are now non-Communist countries, or is it, in the other extreme, as some people suggest, simply old-fashioned Russian imperialism dressed up in new clothes? For myself, I accept neither of those theories.
I have always been tremendously impressed by something which General Smuts, as he then was, said to me as far back as 1943, prophesying with great accuracy the state in which Europe would be after the war. He warned me against interpreting the Russian threat in terms of "isms." He suggested that it was something at once more simple and elementary, namely, the pressure of a people, backward through no fault of their own in material things, against the more advanced and wealthier civilisations of the West. If that is so, as I believe it to be, there is no form of political concession which the Western nations could make which could possibly go very far to reduce the tension in the world today. It is something which only time can alter. In the meantime, we must display fortitude, constancy and, above all, patience.
As regards the military threat, there can be no question at all either as to its reality or its nature. Ever since the day when America and Great Britain demobilised, it would have been possible for the Red Army, if left to itself, to overrun Western Europe in a matter not of months but of weeks. That this has not happened has been due, I am convinced, to the invention of nuclear weapons; and in that belief I am supported by the very large majority of informed people in the world today, After all, so long as America had a monopoly of the atomic bomb, it would have been madness for Russia or any other country to become involved in war with her. It is surely no

accident that the year 1948 saw not only the acquisition by Russia of the atomic bomb but also the beginning of a more threatening phase in Russian policy. However that may be, long before Russia could possibly have overtaken the lead which America had in nuclear affairs, a totally new situation was created by the invention of the hydrogen bomb.
I sometimes doubt whether the significance of the hydrogen bomb is yet fully appreciated. I noticed that the right hon. Member for Derby, South talked about a dangerous development—that is what I think he called it—in 1952. I am not at all sure that the invention of the hydrogen bomb has not left the world in a somewhat less dangerous position than it was when the atomic bomb existed by itself. After all, so long as nations were armed with bombs in the kiloton range, it was still conceivable that a great Power like Russia might think it worth her while to wage aggressive war in the belief that the prize was greater than the cost.

Mr. Sydney Silverman: What was the prize?

Vice-Admiral Hughes Hallett: Does the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman)wish to intervene sitting down? He asks what was the prize? I really do not think that it is necessary for me to be tempted into a long digression about possible territorial and other gains which a nation which conquers Europe and, indeed, the world might, perhaps, achieve.

Mr. Silverman: But is it not vital to the hon. and gallant Gentleman's most interesting argument'? Even without these weapons, and certainly with them, the price of war, even to a victor, must be devastatingly high. If, therefore, one is evaluating the risk that some nation may embark upon it, is it not worth while to examine what possible prize could be offered to be worth such a price?

Vice-Admiral Hughes Hallett: That may well be true, but it is, unfortunately, equally true that the hon. Gentleman and others were unable to convince, shall we say, Herr Hitler of the importance of that assessment.
The advent of the hydrogen bomb has altered the position, because we have now reached a stage in which war would undoubtedly be suicidal to a country, no


matter how large or, within reason, how great its superiority over its adversaries. The hydrogen bomb has ruled out any prospect of successful military aggression by Russia or by any other country. The subsequent acquisition of the bomb by Great Britain has made this doubly sure, and it has done a great deal more than that. It has made an effective Western defence possible within the economic means of the Western Powers. If, therefore, Russia had imagined that she could achieve world Communism merely by presenting a threat and forcing the Western nations thereby to maintain armaments ruinous in their scale, that hope has largely disappeared.
In the light of these facts, it has, of course, always been in the Russian interest to have a ban on nuclear weapons. Equally, it would be incredibly foolish, and futile as well, for Great Britain to agree to such a ban unconditionally. It would be foolish because, with the ban in force, the chief deterrent, as we see it, would have gone, and it would be futile because, even supposing the ban could be negotiated and be enforced, all stocks of nuclear weapons being destroyed and the factories levelled to the ground, one thing would still remain, that is, the knowledge of how to make the bomb.
Then suppose war came. It requires little imagination to picture the frantic, desperate, life and death race to see which nation could be the first to produce a second crop of bombs. I understand that in this country it might be expected to take only two years, starting from scratch, and in the case of great nations with large resources such as America or Russia, I dare say that the time would be substantially less.
Those are the reasons why I believe that the Government are fully justified in insisting upon a concurrent reduction in conventional arms down to a level which would make the waging of large-scale aggressive war virtually impracticable by the same time as the last of the nuclear weapons was banned and banished.
Personally, I would go further. Here I come back to the point raised by the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale. I would have said that before we got to that stage, it would also be prudent to insist upon at least some substantial

advance towards a German settlement. After all, Germany in her present position is the danger spot in the world today.
I will resist the temptation at this stage to digress and to talk about nuclear tests. To begin with, this subject, if raised in isolation, is apt to be a red herring. I would simply say that the White Paper serves a very useful purpose in presenting it in its proper perspective, its proper relation and its proper proportion to the problem of disarmament as a whole.
I wish rather to ask the much more important question, which was posed also by the hon. Lady the Member for Carmarthen of what are Russia's real intentions now and whether Russia will work seriously towards disarmament. By "disarmament" I do not mean partial disarmament. I entirely agree with my right hon. and learned Friend that there are good prospects, well worth following up, of achieving some partial degree of disarmament. I refer rather to a radical measure of disarmament such as the world has always wanted. Here, I must confess that I have become very pessimistic during the past two years.
I have become pessimistic for a number of reasons. In the first place, the Russian leaders know perfectly well that the democratic countries will not attack them. Therefore, failure to disarm cannot be said to endanger Russia in any way whatsoever.

Mr. S. Silverman: How does the hon. and gallant Member know that?

Vice-Admiral Hughes Hallett: I am convinced that the Russians know that and that anybody who understands the processes of democratic Government knows it equally well.

Mr. Silverman: It is the exact opposite of the truth.

Vice-Admiral Hughes Hallett: Then, again, the Russian Government have no public opinion with which to compete, which means that they can watch all these affairs in the world situation in a detached and objective manner. They have, unfortunately, recently seen what at least must seem to them some apparent weaknesses in Anglo-American relations, weaknesses which I dare say they hope they can develop. They have also seen the ease with which what I would call


hydrogen bomb hysteria can be generated in this country.
Therefore, I regretfully believe that on the major issue Russia is likely to stonewall. I believe that she will play for time and hope for one or more of three things to happen: either a renewal of violent agitation against tests if and when the time comes for other countries to test these weapons; widespread alarm among the American people if and when they come to believe that the United States itself is within effective range of thermonuclear weapons in a way that this country has been ever since these things were invented—and that hope may not be entirely unreasonable—or thirdly—in this. I hope, I shall not be misunderstood by hon. Members opposite—the Russians hope, perhaps, for a change of Government in this country. After all, the Labour Party has always had a pacifist wing. It has always had hon. Members with whose views, although we respect them, we disagree and who would be much easier to deal with in negotiating widespread measures of disarmament than those who are not 100 per cent. pacifist.
What is much more important, perhaps, than the prospects of deadlock is to ask whether there is anything we can do to bring the deadlock to an end. I believe that there is one line of approach which might yet be tried. Why should we not tackle the third problem which I have mentioned—that of creating an international force?
Hon. Members may have read the proposals to this end which were recently put forward by Federal Union. Although I am not a member of Federal Union, I was privileged to be associated with the drafting of those proposals and we tried to avoid some of the pitfalls which have checked progress in the past. We tried to allay fears that nations might feel for their sovereignty by making the force too small to engage national forces and the kind of force that would only go into troubled areas by invitation. We tried to obviate the risk of its being paralysed by political disagreement in moments of crisis and stultified by the indiscriminate use of the veto by delegating control to some non-political body which would be obliged to act within the framework of a previously negotiated international statute.
Time alone will show how far those proposals commend themselves to other nations. I know that I speak for all those engaged in preparing them in saying how greatly we were encouraged by the friendly reception which they received from the Foreign Secretary. Speaking purely for myself, I agree with the view of my right hon. and learned Friend that it would be a mistake for the British Government at the moment to sponsor those proposals, but to those who say that the force would be too small to be of any consequence and would be fenced in with too many restrictions to be of any use, my reply is that this is one of those matters in which we have to hasten slowly. It would be fatal to rush things. If it took fifty years to build up confidence in this concept of an international force, I would say that fifty years is a mere nothing in the passage of time when these great international issues are at stake.
Some of my friends who are not perhaps quite so keen on international things have said to me, "Your force looks very innocent, but it is the thin end of the wedge." Most certainly it is the thin end of an enormous wedge. a wedge of gold and one which might yet prise open the door and the gateway into the Dark Tower of international hatreds and fears and let in the forces of peace and reason.
To return to my main theme, I reiterate my confidence that the Government's broad approach to this problem is the right one. I would pay hon. and right hon. Members opposite the compliment of saying that were they in power today. I do not believe their policy would be so very different. One would not, however, imagine that from what is going on in the constituencies, where people who purport to speak for the Labour Party are addressing rallies, demanding the abolition of all nuclear weapons, accompanying delegations to see their Member of Parliament, demanding the abolition of all tests unconditionally and giving the impression to the electorate that if only the Government changed, the fear of nuclear war would be removed from the country overnight. I seriously submit that right hon. Members who sit on the Front Bench opposite should repudiate those ideas. I think they should be at pains to show that the differences


on this great issue between the two sides of the House are not really so very great.

Mr. S. Silverman: They are fundamental.

Vice-Admiral Hughes Hallett: The ability of any British Government or of any British Foreign Secretary to make this country's weight felt on a great controversial international issue of this nature depends upon the knowledge by the rest of the world that he is speaking, in the main, for the country as a whole. I believe most fervently that the Opposition should rise above the temptation to make a party issue of this matter, even though some votes may be gained by doing so, which I very much doubt. Those votes would be bought at the expense of Britain's influence on an issue which both sides of the House of Commons and all people of good will in this country have permanently at heart.

6.51 p.m.

Mr. G. A. Pargiter: I found some difficulty in following the logic of the argument of the hon. and gallant Member for Croydon, North-East (Vice-Admiral Hughes Hallett), who said that at one period Russia could easily have overrun the West and that the only deterrent to doing that was the fact that America had the atom bomb.
I would have thought that, had she had any intention of that kind, it would have been precisely the opposite, because she would have sought to have established herself—and it is admitted that she could have done—within a few weeks in Western Europe and have presented America with a fait accompli.
Could America then have bombed Western Europe with atom bombs? That, surely, is the argument, and I would have thought that that argument, and anything adduced in support of it, must fall on that very simple basis alone.
The fact is that at that time there was no question of the atom bomb being a deterrent as such as far as Russia in relation to Western Europe was concerned. We are always reading into this the bogy of what Russia intended to do, and on every occasion up to now, it has been proved false and always has remained unprovable. The whole case is built up on unprovable foundations. That seems to me to be the fallacy and the tragedy of the conditions with which

we find ourselves faced, and the arguments being adduced constantly from the benches opposite in support of a policy which is itself untenable.
We heard today from the Foreign Secretary a statement which, I think, was pedestrian, unimaginative, historically accurate, perhaps, but showing very little regard for the urgency of the present situation or hope for the future. I could not read into what he said the optimism which he sought to imply about the possibilities of agreement. In the first place, the right hon. and learned Gentleman confirmed—and this, to me, is one of the alarming things about the position—the statement by the Minister of Defence on 16th April, in which he said:
There will be no real safety in the world until there is disarmament. I think we are all agreed about that, but I think that most of us would agree that nuclear disarmament by itself would be disastrous…"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 16th April. 1957 Vol. 568, c. 1759.]
That was the Government's policy then, and that is the Government's policy today, as expressed by the Foreign Secretary.
That in itself is a disastrous approach to the problem with which we are faced. The problem is vital, because we have had the argument adduced that if we had the banning of nuclear weapons and the destruction of existing stocks of nuclear weapons, Russia would have an overwhelming advantage in conventional weapons, and, therefore, because of the overwhelming advantage which she would have, the West must retain stocks of nuclear weapons, and, if so, there could he no question of doing anything about the manufacture of nuclear weapons. That is the logic of the case. Someone must have the courage to cut through this argument.
We also heard the Foreign Secretary say, when dealing with the tremendous strides made in the manufacture of ordinary, conventional weapons, that it will be possible to destroy the world with conventional weapons just as effectively as with nuclear weapons. No one disputes that as a possibility, except that it would take a lot longer to do it, and that, in the process of doing it, it would probably ruin the country that began it more effectively than the others, because there is a measure of defence against conventional weapons. We could defend


ourselves very reasonably against conventional weapons, whereas defence against nuclear weapons, as is admitted by the Minister of Defence himself, is most unlikely or, at least, highly improbable.
Let us look at the position of Britain. If we are to be the advance base or advance defence ring of Western democracy, because that is what it amounts to, and if America is the main line of defence, because that is undoubtedly American policy, then, if nuclear weapons are continued and used, our interest in the matter would very soon be finished. It would be small satisfaction to the people of this country, if they were being wiped out, to have the certain knowledge that America would attack the Russians with nuclear weapons and wipe them out, also. We should not be there to see the effect of it.
In any case, it is morally a bad argument. If the use of weapons of this kind ought not to be permitted, if it is bad to use these weapons, if it is completely immoral to use weapons of this kind on the civilian populations, is it right to say, even if we are liable to be attacked by these weapons, that we have a right to use them in attacking another country?
If we stand on moral grounds, we have no case at all with regard to nuclear weapons. We have a right to defend ourselves in the ordinary way against any aggression which might occur against us, but the extent to which we impose destruction on other countries is a matter for the conscience of the people. They must decide whether they think they ought to do it in any circumstances.
Let us look at some of the latest statements that have been made. Our people are being lulled into a sense of false security by Government statements that it is now possible to produce a "clean" hydrogen bomb; in other words, the bomb will be more and more effective as an explosive, but that there will be no after effects, and, therefore, we need not worry ourselves about it. I think that the President of the United States went so far as to say that it would now be possible to attack military targets effectively, but without any after effects.
What are military targets in modern warfare? They are the cities of the enemy. They are always those targets where one seeks to destroy the will of the people to make war or to continue war. Therefore, it is no longer a question of attacking front line armies anywhere; that is not the policy to be pursued. The attack will inevitably be carried out, however it is carried out, against the cities of the nation to be attacked, so that I do not think that we have much to say with regard to whether we use "clean" or "unclean" hydrogen bombs, because the effect will be that the attacks will not he made against military targets.
The military target is now the morale of the people, and the best way to destroy the morale of the people is to go behind the enemy's lines. We proved that in the 1914–18 war, and we proved it again when we destroyed Japanese cities in the Second World War and ended the fighting. We destroyed two of her cities, and we would be bound to do the same thing again, because no country involved in war will not do that sort of thing.
I shall not be particularly popular on this side of the Committee, any more than I am on the other, in advocating what I believe to be absolutely essential at present, but someone has to take the lead. I do not believe that anything will come out of the existing debates on disarmament, because we shall hedge it round with so many restrictions of one sort or another that it will not be effective. But someone has to give a lead at some time, some day. I believe that Britain can give that lead, and I do not believe that from any emotional or pacifist point of view. It is Britain's duty now to say, "We will no longer manufacture nuclear weapons. We will not test them, or engage in any form of research in nuclear weapons. We will abolish them."
I believe that is the spirit in which we ought to go to the Disarmament Sub-Committee. Just imagine what sort of conditions would be created if there were a Foreign Secretary who went to the Disarmament Sub-Committee, or to a disarmament conference, and said, "My Government have decided that we shall no longer manufacture nuclear weapons and what stocks of them we have we will destroy." Would that not be a lead? Would it not be the right lead for the


world? Would it not be a better lead than simply agreement about having a control post here or a control post there? Would it not, moreover, be likely to achieve a good result in the last analysis from Britain's point of view?
Britain has the least to lose from such a proposal because, let us recollect, Britain is the front line and in any nuclear war Britain will be the first to be wiped out. If we have nuclear weapons, or if nuclear weapons are based in this country, then the certainty is absolute that we here shall be wiped out in the event of a nuclear war. That is incontrovertible. As I said a moment ago, the fact that there might be a counter-attack which would wipe out the enemy Power would be a small consolation to the people here who would be wiped out. Certainly, they would not know anything about the counter-attack, or its result.

Vice-Admiral Hughes Hallett: Why does the hon. Gentleman think that such a lead as he proposes we should take would be more effective apropos nuclear weapons than conventional? After all, we have just announced the virtual halving of our conventional forces, but there has been no rush on the part of other countries to announce corresponding reductions.

Mr. Pargiter: Because I believe that the people of the world generally are seized of the immense possibility for destruction of nuclear weapons, and are anxious to see those weapons abolished. I believe that if any one country, being in possession of such weapons itself, were to take the lead at this time, as I have suggested Britain should, the moral pressure which would be applied in consequence throughout the world would be such that no other country—neither Russia nor Amercia—could withstand the pressure to abolish those weapons.
It may be argued that if we were to do that it would leave Russia with overwhelming power in conventional arms. From the other side of the Committee we hear from time to time arguments, which seem inconceivable sometimes, about there being internal stresses in the Soviet Union, and about how, therefore, the Soviet Union is weakened because it has such difficulties. The impression which hon. Members on the other side of the Committee seem to have or would seem to wish to give is that the Soviet

Union will fall to pieces any time. Yet, at the same time, we are told about this massive power of the Soviet Union.
The contradiction does not seem to make any sense. If there are those internal stresses and strains in the Soviet Union that hon. Members opposite say there are, then the Soviet Union could not effectively support a war. There are people on the other side of the Committee who do not want to do anything about the abolition of nuclear weapons because of the problem of the conventional weapons. I accept that they sincerely believe that. They use the bogy of the overwhelming power of the Soviet Union in conventional weapons in support of their point of view about maintaining nuclear weapons.
However, I would ask the Government to reconsider this position at this stage, to reconsider the policy of making the reduction or abolition of nuclear weapons conditional upon limitations on conventional weapons. It is quite obvious that if America has a stock of nuclear weapons which outweighs the balance of power in conventional weapons that Russia may have, Russia will not agree to a reduction of conventional weapons; and that as long as nuclear weapons remain America will not agree to abolition of her stocks of nuclear weapons unless Russia accepts the abolition of conventional weapons or their reduction. So we have stalemate. Unless this country gives a lead more and more countries will go in for the manufacture of nuclear weapons, and then the outlook for the future will be grim indeed.
If Britain will give a lead, and say that she is not prepared merely to tag along behind other countries in detailed discussions which, however well meant, do not fundamentally alter the situation, it will be, I believe, to the benefit not only of this country but ensure the future of the world.

7.5 p.m.

Mr. I. J. Pitman: I will not follow the hon. Member for Southall (Mr. Pargiter)because I think that either the pacifist extremity is quite logical and applicable or the realist is quite applicable, and I think that he is half way in between, and that the interests of the people of Southall are closely bound up with the question not of giving a lead


but of ensuring that they are in a secure position or at any rate as secure a position as they can be in a world which is at present devoted to a balance of power based on the sovereign right of every nation to attack every other nation if it thinks that is the best way of it defending itself. That is the situation in which we are, but I do not wish to deal with that. I would rather go to more fundamental questions.
I would say that we in this Committee are making the mistake of equating disarmament with peace. We are even making the mistake of equating disarmament with security. Disarmament is neither peace nor is it even security, because implicit in disarmament and sovereignty is rearmament. We have to recognise that disarmament really is of value on two counts. It is of value for economy; and it is of value for the slower trigger, or the slow fuse, which it may put to a world conflagration which would otherwise break out very much more quickly. Those of us who remember the disarmament between the wars, in the 'thirties, and the terrific haste with which rearmament took place all over the world would, I claim, concede both points; first, the enormous value to the economy, for we were then as we are now spending fantastic sums on armaments; and, secondly, the length of time spent in preparation. I believe, too, that we will all concede equally the fact that sovereignty implies the right and the duty to rearm and if necessary to get into a war—as, indeed, we did get into a war. As I say, rearmament, because it is the counterpart of disarmament, is really the recognition that there is still persisting the possibility of war.
Do let us realise that with all these modern weapons we are no longer in a position in which the Foreign Secretary or the Minister of Defence could give us in this nation any security. What he can do is to achieve a relative insecurity. Not even America is secure. Not even Russia is secure. All that either can achieve by its armaments is a sense of even greater insecurity in the other nation, and that insecurity is brought about by all forms of armament. It is not only the nuclear. The right hon. Member for Derby, South (Mr. P. Noel-Baker)was quite right when he emphasised the chemical, biological and neurological aspects of war.
So let us get it quite clear in our own minds that we will not get security by disarmament. A treaty is nothing more than the black marks of ink on a white paper, and inherent in the balance of power and in the concept of sovereignty is the fact that if need is compelling it will be regarded as only ink on paper, so that if a nation really feels it must rearm it will rearm with all the consequences of that. What disarmament can do is to give only economy not security, and economy ought never to be as important as security.
We in this Committee ought not to overlook what the Prime Minister said when he was Minister of Defence and when he emphasised that agreement about these things must be comprehensive and cover the whole range of armaments, not only the nuclear but the conventional and, indeed, the biochemical and neurological and all the rest of them, and that there must be an authority to ensure any such disarmament. In other words, he was saying what I am now trying to say—that disarmament is not enough. We must build an authority which will see to it that that disarmament is a transfer of arms from those who would misuse them to those who will ensure that security is given to those who are handing over their arms.
Let us look at the growth of central authority and see what happened in all European countries. There were feudal armies and feudal castles, and it was not just the disarming of feudal private armies, it was the rise of a central authority that really gave security and enforced peace. When a burglar bursts into our property we dial 999, which is jolly effective. It is far more effective than keeping a sword downstairs. We might get beaten by the burglar, and anyhow the police are not going to get beaten. The police must be invincible. The important point that we have to recognise ultimately is that if there is to be this authority about which the Prime Minister was speaking it must be an invincible authority. It must be capable of giving greater security to the people who have renounced the sovereign right to protect themselves, the right to give themselves, as they think, security but in point of fact the other fellow insecurity.
It is therefore absolutely essential that that authority should have the monopoly


of any capacity to launch the weapons. I put that as even more important than their manufacture. When it comes to biological, chemical, or neurological stuff, it is the long-range weapon that gets the stuff there that is really much the more important thing to ensure is under such control.
When we hear "Who goes home?" we no longer draw our swords and protect each other. That is not because our constituents outside are any better than they were. It is because we enjoy new and better institutions. The English and the Scots, in the Scottish Grand Committee and elsewhere, do not have the bloody wars that they had long ago. It is not because the English or the Scots are better, it is because they have a new institution, not an English Government or a Scottish Government, but a new central authority, the British Government, and that principle of the creation of a new institution has to be carried into the field of security for nations.
We are not worse than our successors of many years to come will be, and they, no doubt, will have such a central authority. We are not worse in talking of arming, disarming and rearming in the way we do. It is just that we are lacking that central authority about which the Prime Minister spoke.
However, we have now in front of us the problem of the United Nations Emergency Force. I would say that in parallel with setting up working parties which will get us the economics of disarmament we should set up working parties to see how we can establish a permanent United Nations force, which may slowly grow and give us the realities we wish out of disarmament, which are security and peace. Those are the two things we want.
Clearly, we cannot accept the reliability of the General Assembly of the United Nations. We must recognise that we cannot accept as reliable even the Security Council. Both are nothing else hut the projection of the diplomacy of the nation itself into the United Nations. If the House of Commons were divided into Government and Opposition by representatives of Scotland and representatives of England, it would not do what Britain as a united Scotland and England wanted done. It would be just transferring those age-old battles between Scotland and England into a constitu-

tional form, which would lead to war just the same, and perhaps a more bitter one.
Therefore, we must set up for the control of disarmament a new element which is not a deputed representative of the Governments concerned. This is where the proposal of my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Croydon. North-West (Vice-Admiral Hughes Hallett)is so good, because it put forward for consideration a proposal for setting up a new body or military council which would not be in any way composed of deputies or representatives of the Governments concerned, but would be charged with the job of giving security and maintaining peace, by taking up the arms which the nations were laying down.
I hope that the Committee has been with me in thinking that it was worth while making this intervention to make sure that we are not deceiving ourselves into equating disarmament with peace and with security, when all that it comes to is to give us the secondary of economy and it can never, never achieve the primary which the world so greatly wants, that is, peace and security for ourselves, our children and our grandchildren.

7.15 p.m.

Mr. George Thomas: I am very glad to follow the hon. Member for Bath (Mr. Pitman), particularly since I agreed so much with a great deal of his peroration. I was glad to find that I was in harmony with the hon. Member at that point. I believe that the world is hungry for fraternity. I believe that today we have revealed that we are bringing to this momentous question of disarmament the same sterile ideas as we have brought to it through past years. It is perfectly clear that the old ways have failed us. The old modes of thinking have failed us. The militarist has failed us. We have followed the militarist down through the corridors of time and almost invariably he has led us to the battlefield and to disaster.
It is strange that nations never seem to learn that security does not lie in overwhelming strength and that the most nervous nations in the world today are not the small, disarmed or unarmed nations but the mightiest nations. The United States is far more nervous than Denmark or Finland, which are nearer to


the U.S.S.R. than is the United States. Today, the United States has over 50 per cent. of its economy linked to the production of weapons of war, and for the United States disarmament brings more problems than rearmament.
Unhappily, we are dealing with circumstances which make It clear that it is no longer just a struggle between the Soviet bloc and the Western bloc that is impeding the path of disarmament. I have a fear that there are those who have a vested interest in keeping going the present high rate of armament. I am not here as an apologist for the Soviet Union, as the Committee well knows, but whenever the Soviet Union accepts a point or a demand that we submit, we change our ground. We have been seen changing our ground in recent days. The Minister of Defence has said recently that we must have the deterrent. Mr. Khrushchev, speaking to Japanese editors, has used language almost identical to that of the Minister of Defence in arguing that the Soviet Union is entitled to have the H-bomb. Every argument that the United States and Great Britain advance for the manufacture of the hydrogen bomb and for storing it is an argument advanced by the Soviet Union itself.
They say they cannot give a unilateral lead for they would leave themselves defenceless. It was Mr. Khrushchev who said that he did not agree with certain Japanese leaders that the Soviet Union should unilaterally discontinue the tests. If the U.S.S.R. did so while other nuclear countries continued to test weapons, he pointed out, the Soviet Union would lag behind. Nothing would be achieved by such a Soviet action, he said, because sooner or later the U.S.S.R. would be forced to resume the tests and armaments would be stepped up on a still greater scale. Therefore, we find that the same argument against any unilateral action is advanced by the Soviet Union as is advanced in the House of Commons and also in Washington.
The hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Croydon, North-East (Vice-Admiral Hughes Hallett), who has had to leave the Committee, indicated that war is suicide. I submit to the Committee that no more shall we see any major war waged with conventional weapons alone. I think we had better

accept the fact that we have moved into the nuclear age, and that, if there is any war again, if it starts with conventional weapons it will end with nuclear weapons. Since we have a prime duty in this Committee to ensure the security of our people, we must acknowledge that there is no security as long as there is a threat of nuclear weapons. Somebody has to break through this miasma of fear which surrounds us and give a new lead.
Who could give a lead in disarmament better than this little island country? We possess—against my will—the hydrogen bomb. We have tested it in the teeth of clamouring from all over the world and of clamouring at home, in which I shared -in this House of Commons. We have proved that we have the weapon, and how much more secure are we as that our people can sleep in peace at night? We still have fear, despite our tests, despite the hydrogen bomb. Apparently we still have to increase our armaments and bear this inflationary burden, which is today our major domestic problem on the home front.
There is nothing more inflationary than the squandering of our resources on military strength which proves illusory, and which is not strength at all. So I suggest that the question of Great Britain giving a lead on the hydrogen bomb is one which we ought to be facing in this Committee today. It is a spectacular way in which we can give a lead. It will help to break through the old conventional thinking, for we have not yet readjusted our thinking in terms of the hydrogen bomb age.
I want to address to this question certain arguments on the morality of armaments. The hon. and gallant Member for Croydon, North-East said that there was one way we had not tried. I thought he was about to suggest the way that I shall suggest, but he had another way—Federal Union. I respect the sincerity of the hon. and gallant Member and of the hon. Member for Bath, but I say that we have not yet tried the Christian way. We make a great deal of the fact that we are seeking to win the world to our Christian way of life. We are losing the war in the battle of ideas; we are losing the Far East to the Soviet Union, because we are presenting two fronts to the world. We are posing as a


Christian nation and we are behaving as anything but a Christian nation when our fear is such that we believe our security depends on joining in the armaments race with the Soviet Union and the U.S.A.
I should like to see this country take a step forward at the Disarmament Sub-Committee by announcing that, whatever others did, we would pledge ourselves neither to manufacture any more, nor to store nor use, these nuclear weapons. I believe that they are offensive to the highest teachings we accept for our personal conduct, and therefore as a basis for society. If we give a lead in this direction, it cannot fail to have its effect in the realm of conventional weapons.
We are assured that our security at present rests upon the fact that if we were attacked we should be able to wipe out some of the cities of the nation which attacked us. This argument does not hold water. There is not one Member of the Committee who does not realise that this little country, if ever it is attacked with nuclear weapons, is finished before it can retaliate, and that the war would be over for our people. The security of our people lies, therefore, in major steps towards disarmament, and I hope that we shall break away from the old power bloc arguments, shifting ground all the time, resolving that whatever happens we shall keep on in the old military terms, that we shall keep our balance of power.
It has been our privilege in the past to wield a great influence in the world, out of proportion to our size. That has been largely because of the things for which we have stood. Today we have an opportunity to capture the imagination of the awakening coloured people of the world and of manifesting the sincerity of the faith which we profess to hold when we send our missionaries to other lands.
I earnestly hope that both Front Benches will realise that there is a growing clamour amongst the peoples for a lead on disarmament to be taken by some Government. From my point of view, no Government is better fitted for this action than Her Majesty's Government, holding the key position as she does between the East and the West.

7.19 p.m.

Mr. David Price: I have considerable sympathy for the general tenor of the remarks made by the hon.

Gentleman the Member for Cardiff, West (Mr. G. Thomas). I think, though, that he concentrated too much on the purely disarmament side and that the wider arguments deployed by my hon. Friend the Member for Bath (Mr. Pitman)need further consideration.
All of us who have endeavoured to follow the course of disarmament discussions, starting from 1945 through to present, must have felt at times a strong sense of discouragement—discouragement against the background of a world in a hurry. I feel sure, however, that little blame for the failure to achieve any tangible results lies upon Her Majesty's Government or upon their predecessors. When one reads the documents which are available one cannot help being impressed by the willingness that has constantly ben shown by representatives of both Governments as they have spoken in the name of the British people at these discussions.
It is worth recalling that in 1945 the most radical proposal yet made on the nuclear side was put forward under the name of the Baruch proposals. I would remind the Committee that the American proposal was for an international authority which would own all fissionable material and hold it in trust for all the nations of the world—fissionable material not only for military use, but for peaceful use.
I am not happy at the easy distinction which some hon. Members have been making between the military use and peaceful use of fissionable material. If hon. Members studied the advances in nuclear physics they would see that it is possible to have fissionable material prepared apparently for peaceful uses, and yet it would be possible, by means of simple military equipment and arrangements, to release it as radioactive dust which could have equally devastating effects upon the world. The original proposal by Baruch would cover any possibility of, as it were, cheating under schemes for dealing merely with the military use of fissionable material.
Since the proposals of 1945 we have had the Western proposals of May, 1952, and the Anglo-French plan of 1954, which was revised in 1956. Reading through the accounts of the discussions, one cannot help being impressed by the fact that we were up against constant


Russian opposition to effective disarmament. Some hon. Members may feel that that is a rather harsh judgment, but I call as my evidence some remarks by the present ruler of Russia, Mr. Khrushchev, who, if my newspaper has reported him correctly, said, on 7th July:
Dulles once claimed that the Soviet had tried for months to torpedo disarmament talks. Unfortunately, this imperialist statesman was practically right. Only it was not the Soviet which tried to torpedo the talks, but Molotov, Kaganovich and Shepilov.
When we have it from as good an authority as that, who are we in this Chamber to question the reasons why the talks were torpedoed? We hope that now these gentlemen have been removed from their positions representing the Soviet Government we shall be able to look more hopefully to the future. Whether they are managing nuclear power stations, we have not yet been informed.

Mr. S. Silverman: Is the hon. Gentleman accepting Khrushchev as an acceptable witness only when he says things with which he agrees, or does he accept all that Khrushchev says?

Mr. Price: The hon. Member knows very well that witnesses vary very considerably. The hon. Member often makes use of statements by people with whom he does not normally travel, if it helps his argument to do so. That is legitimate, and it is often done.

Mr. Silverman: The hon. Gentleman has not answered my question.

Mr. Price: I never answer the hon. Gentleman's questions.
When one reads through the discussions one has every reason to congratulate the Western statesmen—and, above all, those representing both Administrations that this country has had since the end of the war—upon their perseverance.
We have heard during the debate that our main aim must be general disarmament. The Minister of Defence, in a recent debate, told us that there would be no real safety in the world until there was disarmament. I do not think that any of us would disagree with that. However, I suggest that there are four fundamental factors which have to be dealt with satisfactorily before we can have general disarmament.
The first factor is that it must be comprehensive, covering conventional arms as well as nuclear arms. I would point out that we have already set an example in conventional disarmament in that our level of manpower is already below the first stage proposed in the Anglo-French plan.
The second fundamental factor is that there must be adequate methods of control and supervision. It is no use expecting countries to sign treaties unless they have certainty that they will be honoured by all. It is no good staying, "Let us trust each other." The reason why we have a high level of armaments is that we have not trusted each other, and there have been good reasons for our lack of trust. Consequently, we must have proper control and supervision. With great respect to my elders and betters, I do not see how that can be done outside some form of international order with some surrender of national sovereignty.
Thirdly, following from the establishment of adequate methods of control and supervision, there must be adequate sanctions available to whatever body is chosen to exercise control, in order to enforce compliance. We can imagine the state of affairs when a certain country—hon. Members can make up their minds whether they wish to imagine it as the United States or Russia—goes ahead and. as I suggested earlier, distorts the fissionable materials which it is making for its normal peaceful use and develops a form of weapon. The information will be likely to reach the control system, and it will become suspicious. The international authority must have some sanction behind it to stop that nation—

Mr. Julius Silverman: What sort of sanction?

Mr. Price: I should say the sanction already hinted at by my hon. Friend the Member for Bath—force. It must be an international force. I do not think we can hope to get disarmament in a complete and comprehensive sense without the establishment of some form of international police force.
I would remind the Committee what the Foreign Secretary said at the Eighth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in November, 1953:
In my country most people feel secure, for example, against the crime of robbery with


violence. We do not feel secure just because there is a law against it, or because judges have said it is a very wicked crime. Nor would we feel secure if the leading criminals were to announce that they did not intend to rob anybody violently in the future. The reason we feel secure is because we know that there is a fully competent police force, backed by public opinion, with the necessary powers and authority to prevent this crime…
That is the basis for sanctions and a proper system of control. Without sanctions we shall not get comprehensive disarmament. I will come presently to what I believe we can do in partial disarmament, but at the moment we are looking at our ultimate aim.
Fourthly, we must have political settlements. I would draw the attention of the Committee to a phrase used by the Pope in his famous Christmas broadcast in 1955:
Efforts towards peace must consist not only in measures aimed at restricting the possibility of waging war, but even more in preventing, or eliminating, or lessening with time, the quarrels between nations which might lead to war.
So one comes almost inescapably to the need for an international order, if these conditions are to be fulfilled.
When one starts to discuss an international order one raises the whole question of national sovereignty. I believe that the world is becoming too small. Modern science has removed the cushion of distance. It is no longer in the interests of our people to talk about national sovereignty in the narrow, nineteenth century sense of the word. Therefore, it seems to me that when we address ourselves to what it is possible to do at present, we must consider two parallel lines of action. One is to go ahead with the talks about partial disarmament between the great Powers; not because the smaller Powers are not entitled to take part, but because the great Powers are a reality in the world as we find it today. On the other hand, we must do everything possible to try to strengthen and build up international order and the rule of law throughout the world.
I find myself in agreement with a lot of what has already been said about partial disarmament. However, I wish to comment on the Russian proposal of the denunciation by the major Powers of the use of nuclear weapons. That to me seems unrealistic, for reasons which have already been given. I wish to ask my

right hon. Friend whether it would be possible to link together a degree of disarmament in conventional weapons with parallel moves towards disarmament in nuclear weapons. For example, there could be the first stage of a reduction in manpower to coincide with the giving up of nuclear tests—something on those lines.
Regarding the wider argument, advanced by a number of hon. Members, about this country giving a moral lead and about trust, I may be somewhat of a cynic but, both as a man who believes in original sin and as a scientist taught to look at human nature as it is, I am not prepared to trust people straight off unless they show reason why I should trust them; and particularly when there exists good evidence for not trusting them. It is no use pretending that there is trust when, clearly, there is not, as we know from our experience of the Russians—and no doubt the Russians would say the same from their experience of us. We must remember that the Russian rulers are Marxists and one cannot ignore Marxist preaching which holds that the only morality is the interest of the State as interpreted by the Russian rulers, by the Politburo, and that there is no objective immorality as the hon. Member for Cardiff, West and I would recognise the term.
I wish to draw attention to a very significant remark made by Thomas Merton, the Cistercian poet, who said:
Will you end wars by asking men to trust men who evidently cannot he trusted'? No, teach them to love and trust God: then they will be able to love the men they cannot trust and will dare to make peace with them, not trusting in them, but in God.
When one examines the character of the Russian leaders and recognises that they still adhere to the view that religion is an opium for the masses and give every indication of ignoring and villifying every tenent of the Christian religion—it seems to me that to trust them is going further than even a statesman could go. It may be asked of us as individuals that we should be martyrs, but I do not believe that as politicians and statesmen we are entitled to ask martyrdom of our people, although, as individuals, we may have the power ourselves personally to set that example.
To conclude my general views on what I think should be done now, I would say


that we should go ahead towards partial disarmament with the problem of conventional arms and nuclear weapons running parallel. With that we should try to strengthen international order. I believe that the idea of Federal Union put forward by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Croydon, North-East (Vice-Admiral Hughes Hallett)and my hon. Friend the Member for Bath and by other hon. Members, merits our serious attention. Here we have the chance to develop an international police force.
It may be very small, but everything starts from a small beginning. Let us nourish it and let us build it up and the time will come when we shall be able to hand over to a United Nations force many of the arms which, as sovereign nations, we are proposing to give up, so that in time we shall have a reliable international police force. I hope that it will be within my lifetime and that I shall see the day when national armies have completely disappeared and all that we are left with is an international police force which will have the trust of the peoples of the world in the same way as the Metropolitan Police Force has the confidence of the people of London.
Do not let us confuse the concept of peace with the absence of war. Peace is a positive concept. Our own peace programme cannot approve of an indiscriminate co-existence at all costs with everybody—certainly not at the cost of truth and justice. Before we can be satisfied that our disarmament proposals will result in peace, we must be prepared to deal with the many cases of injustice in the world. I see this as a great challenge. The mere giving up of armaments is not enough. What is needed is a positive conception and positive action, and this raises great problems.
It would be much easier to settle back in the little honeycombs of our sovereign States and let the bees suck the honey out of the little combs. But we have to face these great problems. If we do not, the honeycombs will be smashed in. I should not like it ever to be said of this or any other generation that the honeycombs were smashed because we had not the courage to face up to the great issues which are involved in establishing real peace in the world.

7.48 p.m.

Mr. Julius Silverman: I wish to make one or two comments on the speech of the hon. Member for Eastleigh (Mr. D. Price). The hon. Gentleman referred to a world authority, a world government. I can understand the point of view of people who believe in that idea, but I found the later remarks of the hon. Gentleman somewhat confusing. After all, the problem in the world today and the difficulty which faces these disarmament conferences is one of confidence. We cannot get world government or a world authority unless we have supreme confidence and until we have demolished the suspicions which divide the world today. Until we have done that any hope of world government must be deferred indefinitely.
I suggest to the hon. Gentleman that when he says, "Of course, we cannot trust one another", and that if he really believes that—

Mr. D. Price: I do.

Mr. Silverman: —he can drop his idea of world government. World government demands the most supreme form of trust. I think most hon. Members believe that world government is desirable, ultimately. It is part and parcel of the Charter, ultimately. The difficulty is that the Russians will not trust a world police force now, because they believe the policeman will be an American policeman; and Americans will not trust world government because they believe that the policeman will be a Russian, or perhaps an Indian. So long as we have this sort of suspicion and this sort of fear which divides the world today I am afraid the hon. Member must postpone his ideas of world government, and that will be for a very long time. We have to get down to the problem of confidence and the removal of fear.
The hon. Member referred to stage by stage agreement. Many of us sympathise with that. It is the idea of timing a certain stage of nuclear disarmament with a certain stage of conventional disarmament. That was the basis of the Franco-British proposal in 1954, but what happened? At that time the Russians disagreed with those proposals. The Americans were also going to disagree with those proposals, but, when they found the Russians disagreed, they


decided to agree with the French proposals. Then a strange thing happened. In May, 1955, the Russians adopted those proposals and put them forward as their own. immediately the British, French and Americans ran away from those proposals.

Mr. Bevan: We have never been told why.

Mr. Silverman: No, we have never been told why, as was pointed out by my right hon. Friend the Member for Derby, South (Mr. P. Noel-Baker). That makes one wonder to what extent these Governments are serious about the problem of disarmament. We have been told time and time again that the atom bomb is necessary as a deterrent against the Russians because of their enormous manpower and their great Army. Along came the Russians and said, "We will reduce this manpower to 1,500,000 for us, the same for America, the same for China, and smaller forces for Britain and France." That removes the threat of the Russian masses, about which we have been told ever since 1945; but what happened to that? It was rejected by the Western Powers—again we have never been told why.
What is quite amazing is the attitude of this country. We were told in the last White Paper on the subject that this country proposed unilaterally to reduce its conventional forces to 375,000 men, yet for some reason or another it stands by the Americans in refusing to accept this reduction of conventional weapons. Under those circumstances, the use of the hydrogen bomb as a counterbalance to conventional forces becomes entirely meaningless.
Let us face the facts about atomic weapons. We are still using outworn words which have no meaning today. We talk about defence and have debates on defence, but there is no such thing as defence today. Today, if there is aggression there is a war and the hydrogen bomb is exploded. It means the end, not only of the aggressor, but the end of humanity—certainly the end of this country. Defence used to have a meaning. It meant that one repelled the enemy. One might suffer damage and loss, but one repelled the enemy and survived. The object of defence was survival. Now

it is not defence, it is mutual destruction and suicide, yet we talk about it as defence.
We talk about security and say we must be very cautious about how we deal with this matter; we must not give away too much because we shall part with our security. What sort of security is this which threatens to destroy the whole of humanity? We are talking about our hydrogen bombs yet anything could go wrong. Who knows that it cannot go wrong? We call that security and the Government are completely complacent about the situation. We are facing a most dangerous situation in the history of humanity. Sometime, in some country, some madman may obtain control. Sometime fear may light the match, but Governments say, "We are secure. We have got the hydrogen bomb and it affords us security."
We talk about a deterrent. Is not it really nonsense to do so? When we have a deterrent against a criminal the criminal is punished—the criminal may be destroyed—but here what is threatened is not the punishment of the aggressor, but the destruction of society. To use the word "deterrent" is completely meaningless nonsense in the context of the world today. Again I say that the problem is one of establishing confidence. We do not trust the Russians, but please remember the Russians also do not trust us. The problem is how we can break that impasse.
Let us take one of the practical problems which have arisen in this disarmament conference. We have proposed that there should be a cessation of production of bombs from fissile materials. What do the Russians think about that? They say "That is all very well. You are proposing stopping production of further fissile material for use in bombs by March, 1959, nearly two years ahead. By the end of that period, large stocks of fissile material will have been accumulated on both sides, sufficient probably to destroy the world several times over. These provisions still allow a continuation of the production of bombs from that point and there is no provision whatever, except the most woolly one, about dealing with accumulated stocks." The disarmament agreement will allow for gradual destruction of those stocks.
The Russians say "That is all very well. You want to send in your inspectors to look at our factories and get blue prints of them. How on earth can we allow that if you are to retain this huge stock of hydrogen bombs?" I am not suggesting for a moment that that is the intention of the Western Powers, but here again we see this crisis of confidence. The Russians then say, "We want you to accompany this by a renunciation of the use of the hydrogen bomb on which the Western Powers rely." It is easy to understand this. The West replies, "It is all very well talking about renunciation of the use of the hydrogen bomb, but how do we know that you are not going to deceive us and cheat us?"
We have this crisis of confidence in which neither side trusts the other. We have suggested that one of the ways of breaking it is to enter a limited agreement on the suspension of nuclear tests. At any rate, it could form a basis for confidence.
We should then have tried out some control arrangements to see how they worked and to see whether both sides played the game, and we should have established confidence. But if we continue to attach one thing to another and to attach the ending of atomic bomb tests to a long, difficult and complicated procedure of stopping production and the control apparatus involved, together with a limitation on conventional arms and with certain other conditions which I understand that the Americans at present attach, then no progress will be made. I am told that certain unspecified political conditions have been attached to the reduction in armaments, conventional and otherwise, and I shall be glad to hear what is the attitude of the British Government. I shall be glad to hear that this is not so.

The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. David Ormsby-Gore): Not in the first stage.

Mr. Silverman: The first stage is very limited.

Mr. Ormsby-Gore: But the hon. Member is in favour of it.

Mr. Silverman: We are all in favour of it, but the point is that the first stage

is attached to all the other stages and they are all part of one package deal. That is why we say that we should isolate the first stage, because we could wipe out all these conditions which make the reaching of agreement very much more difficult.
We believe that the Government must get on with the job. I do not think that sufficient is being done. Moreover, I am not very happy about the suggestion that there was a larger measure of agreement than in fact was the case. Some of us were led to believe a few weeks ago that the situation was fairly bright and optimistic, at any rate in respect of a partial agreement. While a partial agreement would not be enough in itself, it would be something on which we could build.
There is not the slightest doubt that since then the position has deteriorated. Some of us would like to know why and would like to know what forces are behind the deterioration. Is it the Pentagon? It has even been said, and might well be repeated in the House, that one of the forces which has created difficulties and is behind the deterioration in the situation consists of the Governments of this country and France. We should be relieved to hear that this is not so. Let us bear in mind that it has been freely said in the American Press and throughout the world that it is not the America State Department which is the nigger in the woodpile but our own Government and the French Government, together with the Pentagon. That has been said so widely that I think it ought to be repeated in the House, because we want to know what are the comments of the British Government.
The Foreign Secretary said that one of the difficulties is that the Russians will not agree to control. I am afraid that this has been a stalking horse, and, frankly, I do not believe it. On 3rd April, 1956, a statement was made by Mr. Gromyko setting forward certain Soviet proposals. Let us see what he said about control. He said:
In all countries which are parties to the agreement, the control agency would have its permanent staff of inspectors, selected on an international basis who, within the bounds of the control functions they exercise, would have free access at any time to all objects of control. Such objects of control would be: military units; stores of military supplies and munitions; land, naval and air bases; plants producing conventional armaments and munitions.


Those are Mr. Gromyko's proposals which the Russians said they were prepared to accept, and I understand that they have not retreated from that position.

Mr. Richard Sharples: What does the hon. Member mean when he says that they are not "completely" in agreement?

Mr. Silverman: I did not use the word "completely". I said that the Russians had not retreated from that position. As far as I understand it, they occupy exactly the same position today.
If these proposals are in any respect unsatisfactory—because the Foreign Secretary made a great point of the fact that the Russians do not want control—may we be told at the end of the debate in what respect they are unsatisfactory? What are the concrete differences between the Russians and ourselves about control? What questions have the Soviet representatives been asked about their proposals for control in order to elucidate them? My information, which may be entirely wrong, is that there has been very little argument about control and that it is not the technical problems which have loomed large in the discussions but the problems of major principles. It is therefore somewhat misleading if it is suggested to the Committee that it is the Russian lack of desire to agree to controls which is holding up a general agreement. We are entitled to know what the position is.
I beg the Government to regard this matter as very serious. We have been asked to treat this as a non-party matter. If we could do so and discuss it as an affair of State, I should be very pleased, but I am afraid that there will be a party vote tonight. That cannot he helped, Many of us are not satisfied about what the Government are doing, not because they are a Conservative Government but because the lack of contribution to an effective agreement on disarmament goes far beyond a question of electoral advantage and threatens the existence of the world.

8.7 p.m.

Mr. Richard Sharples: I hope that the hon. Member for Birmingham, Aston (Mr. J. Silverman)will not expect me to follow him into all his arguments, but I must say that a large part of his speech resembled very closely

a speech, reported in a Soviet news agency hand-out, which had been made by Mr. Zorin on 8th July.

Mr. J. Silverman: I was mentioning the Russian objections to the British proposals. I am trying to point out that they raise certain objections upon grounds of confidence. It is not my business to argue whether they are justified. I am merely pointing out that there is a lack of confidence.

Mr. Sharples: Be that as it may, I hope to refer to some of the hon. Member's arguments later, but not straight away.
One point which occurred to me in reading the White Paper was that there is far more ground for hope today about disarmament than there has been for a very long time. I deprecate the comments of those hon. Members who have been speaking today about breaking the deadlock. I think that we are probably far nearer the end of the deadlock today, certainly in the first phase of disarmament, than we have been for a very long time. In the first phase it is now possible to see hope for quite a lot of progress. There are extremely good practical reasons for that. The first is that all nations, on both sides of the Iron Curtain, are beginning to see the economic difficulties which they create for themselves by maintaining these vast forces. That has become obvious, not least in this country, where we have come to realise the economic difficulties of keeping these forces in being.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: After a very long time.

Mr. Sharples: Particularly is that so about manpower. For years since the war millions of men from both sides of the Iron Curtain have been facing each other in Germany. Both sides are beginning to realise that that position cannot continue indefinitely without producing economic strains, and the like, with corresponding bad effects on the populations of the countries involved.
The nations are beginning to realise, secondly, that they cannot continue to devote their resources—particularly technical and scientific resources—to weapon development at the present rate. I remember that when I joined the Army in 1936, like all the defence forces, it was equipped with very much the same kind of weapons as had been in use in


the 1914 war. Many of them, such as the 18-pounder gun, were almost exactly the same. When one compares that with the vast changes that have taken place in weapons since 1945 one realises that there has been a complete revolution in this field which illustrates the amount of scientific research, resources and economic potential which has been devoted by all nations—all nations—to the development of weapons.
One of the things at which we have to aim is an agreement on the slowing down of the rate of weapon development. That is the first thing. Secondly, we have to agree upon a reduction of the amount of manpower that is tied up in the Services. There is a very real chance of agreement on both of those matters, because progress in those two directions is to the practical advantage of the nations on both sides of the Iron Curtain. We could use those two matters in order, in time, to establish confidence, and could then, perhaps, proceed to further steps.
I believe that there is a real chance of some fairly immediate progress in the reduction of conventional arms. The nations have now agreed the actual force totals—there is not very much disagreement there—but one thing about which I am not quite clear, probably because the discussions are now going on, relates to the amount of agreement there has been upon the setting up of an effective system of control and supervision. I think that it would be of great assistance to the House if my right hon. Friend, when replying to the debate, could, as far as he is able, make that position quite clear. Given that this is one of the points upon which, undoubtedly, negotiations are now going on, I think that we have the real possibility of some fairly far-reaching reductions in conventional arms.
One of the things that has to be known before we can get anywhere is the starting point. All nations, including Soviet Russia, should declare what conventional forces are in being at the present time. That would go far towards establishing confidence, and I cannot see why, with other nations declaring more or less their exact force totals, the Soviet Government should appear to be so reluctant to do so.
When one comes to the question of nuclear disarmament, I think that, pro-

vided we can go step by step with conventional disarmament, we certainly have more hope today than we have had for a long time. What has always bedevilled nuclear disarmament is the amount of propaganda and misconception surrounding it, which has very frequently been artificially created. There has been the "ban the bomb" campaign which has, throughout, really been unrelated to any facts or to any concrete proposals for an enforcement. In fact, I believe that I am right in saying that those sitting on the Front Bench opposite do not support that idea today, nor ever have done.
We have to face the fact that any war which is fought in the lifetime of any of us sitting here today will be fought, either at its beginning or at a later stage, with thermo-nuclear weapons. We cannot get away from that. Whether one goes so far as to curtail production of the bomb, or, in the end, so far as to destroy stocks or to pass resolutions saying that no one will use the things, the fact yet remains that people today know how to make these bombs, and one can certainly take it that in any war on the scale of the First or Second World Wars, weapons of that kind will be used.
That is why, in the long term, I believe that the first and guiding principle behind any of our proposals must be the ultimate elimination of war itself as an instrument of policy. Anything that cuts across that, or any short-term solution which will eventually put that idea out of court or makes the elimination of war more difficult, must be wrong and must be resisted, even though there may at times be a certain amount of popular appeal in the advocacy of some such short-term course.
Another matter which has been debated is the suspension of tests. I am not in any way opposed to an agreement on that, but I do not believe that, in itself, the suspension of tests leads to anything at all. Once knowing how to do it, we can perfectly well go on making the bomb. Once we have let the thing off—had our bang—we know perfectly well how to make it. The suspension of tests can be of use only if it leads to the suspension of production. If, on the other hand, there is a reasonable chance that the suspension of tests would bring into being the kind of control which would lead to the suspension of the production of fissile material, there is something to be gained from such suspension.

Mr. Denis Healey: Does not the hon. Gentleman agree with the argument which his Government have always advanced that it is necessary for Britain to have tests in order to produce weapons? If that is the case, would not the suspension of tests at least be a means of preventing fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth countries from ever producing these weapons?

Mr. Sharples: That may be so, but I can see the point of view of the fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth nations who have seen the Powers who have got the bombs piling them up in the meantime. That is why from their point of view it is essential that the suspension of tests should be linked to the restriction of the production of fissile material.
I have referred to the ultimate goal being the elimination of war itself, and it is to that end that we have got to work. One of the points that were brought up was the question of linking second stage disarmament proposals to a solution of political problems. My right hon. and learned Friend did not go into the problems in detail, for good reasons, but, speaking without the inhibitions necessary to one occupying the Front Bench, I would say that one of the problems must be that of Germany. We cannot get away from the fact that we must solve that problem. I would not say that that is a pre-condition of any disarmament proposal. It does not come into the category of a pre-condition. It is one of the basic facts of political life.
So long as Germany remains divided, there is bound to be an area of tension between East and West, and one of the hurdles which we have got to get over—and until we have done so one cannot see any real movement of comprehensive disarmament on either side—must be the solution of this problem. In that connection I would remind hon. Members of what Sir Anthony Eden said, that the worst solution of all would be a Germany sitting in the middle of Europe able to play off East against West.
When the whole story of these disarmament negotiations can be studied in its entirety, which cannot be done at the moment, the contribution of the British Government to what has been and will be done, and particularly when one thinks of the future arrangements—including

the setting up of working parties which were outlined by my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary this afternoon—perhaps the rôle which the British Government played throughout these disarmament talks and the initiative shown will be something of which every hon. Member, irrespective of the side on which he sits in the House, may well be proud.

8.24 p.m.

Mr. Denis Healey: I find myself in considerable agreement with two, at any rate, of the major points made by the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam (Mr. Sharples). I think that there is no doubt that the disarmament talks show more hope of reaching a successful conclusion than ever before. Secondly, I strongly agree with the hon. Gentleman that the essential problem with which we have to deal is the prevention of war as such.
It seems to me that not only the talks in the Disarmament Sub-Committee, but also a great deal of the talk in this Chamber today has been rather abstract and theoretical, because it has tried to isolate the problem of disarmament from the general problems of foreign policy and defence policy of which it is, in fact, a part. Essentially, it seems to me that disarmament is a problem of security which is one of the major aims of both defence and foreign policy.
If disarmament is seen in that context, I believe that the priorities which the Disarmament Sub-Committee has found itself choosing may turn out to be mistaken. The essentially urgent and important problem is not the control of the nuclear weapons of the great Powers, but the control of the conventional weapons of the small powers. That, in fact, is where progress is likely to start, if it starts at all.
In the past, countries have always sought security by military competition with their political adversary, and the aim of this military competition, or arms race, if one prefers to call it that, has been to put oneself in a position where, if that were a war, one could win it by defeating one's adversary.
It seems to me that the development of new weapons like the hydrogen bomb and the long-range rocket has totally


changed the situation, with very profound consequences in foreign policy, defence policy and disarmament. The fact that either side in a cold war can now totally destroy the other means that victory in war is a meaningless aim, because victory can only be achieved at the cost of suicide. But that, of course, has its good side. It means that neither side in the cold war is now likely to aim at the total military defeat of the other, since it knows that that is certain to bring total annihilation to itself.
I think there is no doubt that for this reason, because of the so-called atomic stalemate, the danger that either side in the cold war, or any of the great nuclear Powers, will deliberately start an atomic war against one of its enemies can be almost totally excluded. The only danger of such an atomic holocaust today arises not through the deliberate aggression of an atomic Power on another atomic Power, but through an outbreak of local conventional war in an area which may not seem at first to be vital to either of the atomic Powers, and yet which neither of the atomic Powers is capable of preventing or controlling. We have, indeed, in the last twelve months seen three examples of such a local outbreak—Suez, Hungary and even today, one could say, in Oman.
The real problem of security today, the immediate and urgent problem, is not the controlling of the atomic weapons of the great Powers but the controlling of conventional weapons of the smaller Powers and thus ensuring that a spark is never struck which could ignite the thermonuclear powder.
I believe, therefore, that the problem which the great Powers must face in the disarmament talks is the problem of trying to agree on the common, collective control of the areas of tension. In fact, security in the atomic age can be achieved not by mutual competition in arms, but by mutual control of arms. The disarmament talks, during the last six months, have been the first beginnings of a new millenium in the history of world politics in this sense; and, of course, as the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam said, the soaring, astronomic cost of new weapons makes it even more desirable to achieve some mutual collective control of military force in the world.
I can well understand how countries which are in the areas of tension, and which do not themselves possess atomic weapons, fear a new Yalta, an agreement between Russia and the United States at their expense. I do not deny that the elements of such a danger exist, but what I would say is that the smaller countries in the danger areas must try to use their bargaining power to compel the great Powers to accept controls as they themselves accept them. That is what is happening in the example given by the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam, the refusal of the smaller Powers to accept a ban on hydrogen bomb tests unless it was tied to a cut-off in production.
Even so, I do not believe that it is realistic to expect the great atomic Powers to accept control over their immense military capacity unless they have first satisfied themselves, in practice, that the proposed control is likely to be effective and that there are effective sanctions against the evasion of any control system which is developed. That is why I believe that any major step towards disarmament and towards this new concept of a security which is genuinely collective and not competitive must begin with a regional scheme for the collective limitation and control of armaments in the major areas of tension, which are, at the moment, undoubtedly, the Middle East and Central Europe.
It seems to me that the proposal for inspection in Europe against a surprise attack is the first toe, as it were, of the first foot which can make progress. I hope that the proposal for aerial inspection against surprise attack in Europe will lead inevitably to a collective agreement for the limitation and control of armaments, at least in this test area.
There are two great problems to be faced. First, there are certain major political difficulties in the areas of tension; that is why they are areas of tension. Countries which feel themselves dissatisfied with the status quo do not want to submit to any control until they have changed it. That is the problem in Germany. The other difficulty, I suggest, is that it is not easy for those responsible for organising competitive security through N.A.T.O. to recognise that collective security through disarmament is not an alternative or rival to their policy, but is simply another


strategy which they themselves should adopt.
Disarmament in Europe is not an alternative to N.A.T.O., but an alternative for N.A.T.O. If I may, I should like, for a few moments, to explain why I think that a proposal for the regional control of armaments in Europe is the only thing which can solve the strategic problems which N.A.T.O. has been facing for the last six years.
It has become very obvious, particularly since the Government's White Paper on Defence, that N.A.T.O. does not, in fact, have a defence strategy in Europe which makes political sense. The concept of a shield which will be capable of preventing the Red Army from occupying Western Europe makes too great demands on the manpower of the Western Alliance. The concept of a trip-wire which would unleash the total thermo-nuclear holocaust makes too many demands on the willpower of the Alliance. The Alliance, and the members of it, are still floundering about trying to find some way in which they might use their military force to deter or halt an act of military aggression at a cost which was not prohibitive. I believe that the only framework within which this problem can be solved is a framework for the collective reduction and control of armaments in the danger zone.
The threat of suicide through the indiscriminate use of the hydrogen bomb is not an effective answer to Soviet superiority in conventional forces, when the Soviets have the same power to destroy us or equivalent power as we have to destroy them. N.A.T.O. has, therefore, everything to gain by seeking to reduce the level of conventional forces in Central Europe to a point at which conventional aggression could be dealt with by the small forces of countries defending the frontiers which are crossed.
That is why I and many of my hon. Friends strongly support the proposal first put forward—I agree, in a different political context—by Sir Anthony Eden in 1955 and more recently by my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition—the so-called Gaitskell plan—of trying to negotiate with the Soviet Union a new security system in Europe which involves the reciprocal withdrawal of the N.A.T.O. and Soviet forces to certain points east and west of the Iron Curtain.
I concede that there are arguments in theory against that proposal, but I do not concede that they are valid in practice, because the assumptions on which these theoretical arguments are based have never been fulfilled by the Western Alliance. We are not, in fact, capable of defending the existing line along the Iron Curtain. It is, I suggest, infinitely better that should agression occur, we should start the battle on the Soviet frontier than a line running through the middle of Germany. That is what is involved by the proposal for the mutual withdrawal of forces in the centre of Europe.
I agree with anybody who says that that would face us with terrible military problems. How would we employ military sanctions against the violator of a neutralised zone in Central Europe? That is exactly the same problem as we face today in N.A.T.O. How are we to react against a violator of the present status quo in Central Europe? I believe that there is an answer to this, though it is certainly a controversial issue.
At any rate, whether we can agree on what the answer is, we must agree that the existing N.A.T.O. system is profoundly unsatisfactory from a strategic viewpoint and could only be improved, not made worse, by the establishment of a zone for the collective limitation and control of armaments in Central Europe. I believe that some such proposal would provide the only possible framework in which the political problems of which the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam has been speaking could be solved.
It is inconceivable that either the Soviet Union or the West would agree to a change in the political status quo in Central Europe unless they were assured that it did not involve a change in the military status quo to their disadvantage. It is only by first agreeing on a collective system for security in Central Europe that we can create the conditions in which Russia—or, for that matter, the West—would allow the peoples concerned peacefully to change the existing situation.
The liberty of the satellite countries and the unity of the German people depend alike on the success of a collective security system for the control and limitation of armaments in Central Europe. I hope that the Government,


who have so far failed, with their allies, to put forward any proposal at the Disarmament Sub-Committee, in spite of several proposals in this direction by the Soviet Union, will take their courage in both hands, realise that they have to fight a battle for humanity and for peace, and not only for the ruling party in the German elections, and try to produce progress before the Sub-Committee ceases its meetings.

8.39 p.m.

Mr. Nigel Nicolson: The hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey)began his speech with the paradox that the real problem we have to face is not the control of the nuclear weapons of the large Powers, but the control of the conventional weapons of the smaller Powers. He went on to argue that so terrible is the nuclear weapon that it has completely changed our earlier concept that it is necessary to have a balance of one force against another.
I wonder if that is altogether true. I wonder if it does not still remain the premise from which we should start—that the only way in which we can be certain to prevent the outbreak of a war is by making it absolutely clear to the potential aggressor before he starts that he will not win it if he tries. I also wonder if it is is not still as true as ever that the balance of power and the keeping of peace depend upon the possession by both rival groups in the world of a more or less equal weight of weapons, of whatever type they may be.
I think that the old maxims still remain valid, but even if the hon. Gentleman was correct, and if the real problem with which we have to cope is the danger of the outbreak of small wars, as in the case of Suez, Oman and Hungary, we should still be left with the central problem, with which I understand the Disarmament Sub-Committee is concerned, of how gradually to reduce the deterrent—the H bomb—in the hands of each of the rival Powers at a rate which would leave each of them confident that it would not be suddenly overwhelmed by the other.
In his opening speech, the right hon. Member for Derby, South (Mr. P. Noel-Baker)was a little critical of the way in which the results, the working papers

and the verbatim reports, of this Sub-Committee's conferences are presented to the world and in particular to the House of Commons. I wonder whether it could be done any differently? Clearly, discussion upon a subject of this nature must be conducted with a certain amount of secrecy. I believe it to be a rule applicable to all diplomatic practice that one should arrive at open covenants as secretly as possible. The days when we believed that open diplomacy was desirable have now begun to pass, and we see again the value of not being obliged to negotiate in front of a microphone, to put down one's cards face upwards and to stand over them with a gun.
What we want, and what we are seeing in the practice of the Disarmament Sub-Committee, is negotiation in sufficient privacy to leave each side the opportunity to withdraw or modify the attitudes which it has first taken up, and I do not think that there is any general complaint among the public or, indeed, in this Committee that we have not been given sufficient information about the progress of the talks. The constantly shifting positions of the different delegations are an advantage. That may confuse the public and make the White Paper a very complicated document, but I think it is an advantage that in this field each of the major Powers seems to have been prepared to come week after week with some new idea and some attempt to meet the positions taken up by the other side. That to me is an indication that there is a genuine wish among all the parties to the conference that it should succeed.
There is no feeling that any of the five Powers would remain content with deadlock, as, for instance, we appear to be content with the deadlock over the future of Germany. There is no such suggestion in the disarmament field. All five Powers start with the belief that it is the great paradox of this century, and one which we all want to resolve, that here are five great nations and many smaller ones amassing weapons of war at a crippling cost to their Treasuries, weapons of war which they all wish to throw away unused into the sea. That is the first assumption.
The second assumption is that we distrust each other. There are many hon. Members who have spoken in the debate


and who have referred to distrust as though it were a disadvantage. I propose to develop the paradoxical argument that on the contrary it is a very great advantage. We start with the frank admission that we want to see what is going on behind the other side of one another's boundaries before we make any firm agreement. If we started with the more optimistic or the more tactful declaration that we believed that the others were just as peace loving as ourselves, disarmament would not get anywhere at all. What they are trying to do at Lancaster House is to work out in practical detail the methods by which we can give expression to our distrust and then work out further methods by which we may overcome it.
The third assumption which has been made, in my opinion inevitably the right one, is that the only question that really matters in armament and disarmament are the proportions. It cannot really make a great deal of difference to the balance of world power whether each group holds forty hydrogen bombs each or twenty hydrogen bombs each. All that really matters is that when an agreement is reached to reduce the forty to twenty, neither of the two groups should be holding ten more secretly in reserve.
The fourth assumption, which, I think, is shared by all hon. Members, is that it is only sensible to start with the easiest forms of disarmament. We have not two sorts of armaments, the conventional and the nuclear, but three. Curiously enough, except for a reference in the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Derby, South the third has not been mentioned in this debate at all—and I think I have heard every word of it. The third form of warfare is the chemical and biological form of warfare. I do not know, and Can gain no clue from the White Paper whether this form is even being discussed by the United Nations Sub-Committee. It may be—and, naturally, that is my hope—that each of the Powers has come to an understanding that it will not develop weapons of that sort. If so, the world should hear that fact shouted from every house top. What the right hon. Gentleman said leads me to believe that unfortunately that is not true and that behind the scenes the development of this most pernicious, perhaps, of all forms

of weapon is continuing apace. Whichever is the truth, whether some understanding has been arrived at to drop this form of warfare or whether the experiments in producing microbes and gas are continuing, surely it is something about which a pronouncement should be made.

Dr. Barnett Stross: Does the hon. Gentleman remember—this confirms, I think, his suspicion—that General Groves said, three or four years ago, that given a proper use of one ounce of botulism poison he could guarantee to kill 80 million people?

Mr. Nicolson: That is something of the same sort which the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Derby, South quoted in his speech. I am simply saying that I should like to know more about this, and asking why it is that in all the documents and speeches about the problem there is scarcely any reference made to that third form of warfare.
I turn to the other two. Clearly, conventional armaments lend themselves more easily to international agreement. To begin with, we are all in the process of reducing our conventional armaments at the moment. It has often been mentioned in the debate and I need not elaborate the point. Secondly, it is the very form of armaments—troops, guns and supply trains—which is most accessible to control and most difficult to conceal from a proper supervisory system. Thirdly, the White Paper, and my right hon. and learned Friend's opening speech, made it very clear that we are on the point of reaching agreement upon this subject.
The hon. Member for Birmingham, Aston (Mr. J. Silverman)was very gloomy, but paragraph 10 of the Report on the Disarmament Talks, 1957, the most hopeful part of the whole White Paper, states that the Soviet Government have agreed in considerable detail—and no doubt the original documents go into more detail—that there is to be a reduction in conventional forces to levels specifically laid down, and the weapons with which they are to be equipped are to be listed with some form of international organisation. Furthermore, there is, according to the White Paper, agreement about setting up control posts and supervisory organs within each of our countries.
That is a very remarkable advance. If that is the only point of agreement so far reached, it would seem to me that the Sub-Committee has had more success than any of its predecessors. Cannot we begin to build upon what has been achieved? Cannot we now tidy up the details which the right hon. Member for Derby, South specified—details concerning exactly what is meant by "manpower", the relationship of the budget to the armed force, and the relationship between supplies and the spearhead of any army? Questions like these, which we can leave to the experts, are matters which, given agreement on principle which is already achieved, are surely capable of solution.
I was very glad to hear my right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary say once again that sub-committees of the Sub-Committee have already been set up to deal with that specific problem. If we were to achieve a controlling body of that nature, we should present to the world an example of a voluntary surrender of national sovereignty such as the world has never before seen. It would be a laboratory experiment in the conventional field for what we would hope later to achieve in the nuclear field.
We would all agree in the debate that there would be no use whatever in a simple renunciation by the five Powers, or the three nuclear Powers, not to use the nuclear bomb. Such a declaration would only arouse unfounded hopes among the democratic peoples. We could put no trust whatever in the unsupported statements of Communist Powers and, quite probably, they would put no trust in ours. But when we come to the problem of the tests, I think we have a chance to make exactly the same sort of beginnings as we are obviously able to make with conventional forces. Each of the three nuclear Powers has just completed its latest series of tests.
I am asking for no secrets to be revealed, and I know none, but to a layman like myself it appears that after the completion of this summer series of tests by the United States, Soviet Russia and ourselves, we must each have perfected the latest model of the nuclear weapon. Is it not an advantage that we should simultaneously have reached one and the same Point, and are we not now pre-

sented with an opportunity which may not occur again?
What use are we making of that opportunity? There can be no dispute that the first two of the three proposals put forward by the Government in paragraph 11 of the White Paper are indisputable. They propose as the least step we can take that there should be advance registration of tests. They also propose that a group of experts should be called together to consider possible methods of limitation and control of tests. If the Russians reject either of those proposals we shall have a measure of their future intentions.
Where I am more doubtful is on the third of the three points, where we are told that cessation of tests will only follow the prohibition of production of fissionable material. My right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary said today that the main object of that proviso was the hope that we might be able to combine an agreement to stop tests with an agreement to produce no more fissionable material. Obviously if we were able to reach a decision on both those points, the whole world would have gained a great advantage, and I believe that we should press this argument to the end.
But as a private Member I ask myself a question, to which I certainly do not expect an answer from the Front Bench today. What should we do if all our efforts in that direction fail? If we fail to get Russian agreement to link the two, should we then abandon the entire project, or should we say to them, "All right, we will agree with you to stop the tests without linking this to any other consideration"? In that case, after our efforts in the wider respect have failed, and only if they do fail, I think we should agree. It seems to me that to refuse to agree at that late stage would give Soviet Russia a powerful propaganda weapon.
The Russians have already made, for them, a considerable advance in finally agreeing that there should be some system of control of the tests. If we took that point alone, took them at their word and created some kind of control system for the very limited problem of nuclear tests, we should have created the first instrument for disarmament. So far there is no instrument at all.
When a river is in spate and threatens to overwhelm the villages and towns on its banks, the engineers wait for the


moment, first, when the water ceases to rise and then when it drops by one inch. We are waiting for that moment now. We are waiting for the flood of armaments to cease to rise, and when we see that it has ceased to rise and has begun to drop, we shall know that the back of the problem has been broken.
I believe that if we follow up, both in the conventional and in nuclear fields, some of the very hopeful portents contained in the White Paper, the world will know that the five Powers mainly responsible have been able to agree upon the first step, and the first step is the one that counts most.

9.0 p.m.

Mr. Aneurin Bevan: I do not think that anyone in any part of the Committee has any cause for complaint that we have asked that this subject should be discussed today. In fact, there may be some ground for complaint that we did not ask for the discussion long before this, but we were anxious that the Government should be given every opportunity of making progress in the disarmament talks and that the talks should take on a more definite form so that we might have a useful debate.
We have found the period of waiting extremely irritating, first because nothing clear was coming from the Sub-Committee. I entirely disagree with the hon. Member for Bournemouth, East and Christchurch (Mr. N. Nicolson)when he says that he believes that the discussion should be held in secret. That is an unattainable objective—just as neither the Conservative Party nor the Labour Party appears to be able to meet in secret. There is in this subject an intense interest, for very much is involved in it. I think it would have been very much better if the discussions—I refer to the discussions about principles and not about the implementations of principles—had taken place in the open so that many suspicions might not have arisen at all.
Hon. Members opposite must face the fact that the fear has grown up, in the last few weeks in particular, that Her Majesty's Government have been mainly responsible for preventing an agreement. I am not saying that is correct, but there is no doubt at all that newspaper reports in the United States and in this country have created the impression that there have been difficulties caused by us in the

discussions. I hope that the speech which is to follow mine will disperse some of those suspicions.
This debate, I am afraid, will be regarded by many people outside as being somewhat unreal. Ordinary men and women are becoming impatient of all of us when we are dealing with this problem. The fact is—let us face it—that most of the speeches that are made on both sides of the Committee on this subject make no sense at all to ordinary men and women. We may engage in a great deal of virtuosity and make recondite speeches about the influence of mutual fear, but the fact is that the ends which are served by national defence and the means adopted for defence are so far apart from each other today as to add up to no sense at all. No one really believes that weapons which are weapons of mutual suicide are any longer means of national self-defence. We can talk about the subject as much as we like, but that is how the ordinary man and woman look at it, and that is true of the Conservative rank and file as well as of the Socialist rank and file. It just makes no sense.
The other day I heard a railwayman say that, having tried to follow the discussions about the subject on the radio, he had been reduced to the situation that he would now rather be defeated in a conventional war than victorious in a nuclear war, because, he said, "I should be alive maybe to endure the one, but I should not be alive to rejoice over the other." If we abandoned flatulent generalisations about the wide differences that separate the Soviet system from our own, most hon. Members would privately agree with that opinion. There cannot be any differences about social systems so profound that we are prepared to run the risk of wiping out the whole of human society over them.
That also is a little simple truth, and I defy any hon. Member to deny it. After all, the primary condition for arguing about different social systems is that one should be alive to argue about them. But if the argument results in the extinction of all social systems, it seems rather absurd to be worrying about which particular one one is going to live under. Yet that is the position to which we have been reduced, and it is the position on the Government side of the Committee as well as on this. In fact, we are in the


position of having evolved means that no longer serve the ends that we all of us cherish. That happens to be, unfortunately, the logic of the situation and it is from that point of view that I want to examine the Government's case.
I am not going to spend my time, because at the end of a debate it is impossible, going into the merits of any particular form of disarmament. There are so many of them; they are extremely complicated and technical and this is not the place to discuss them. But what we can discuss with, I hope, some usefulness is what may be described as the Government's disarmament strategy. I have been trying to understand it, and if I do not understand it yet it is probably my own fault. The Foreign Secretary made an excellent speech today, but I was not much clearer at the end of it than I was at the beginning. I know it was my fault, but I will try to explain the causes of my bewilderment.
Of course, there has always been the argument about disarmament, the old classic argument as to whether you try to get rid of the quarrel first and the arms afterwards or the arms first and the quarrel afterwards. This is the old classic French view, that men will not throw away their arms if they are afraid; that one must first of all get rid of the fear before they will give up the arms. Our situation is unique because of the fact that fear arises as much from the nature of the arms themselves as from the causes of international quarrels. So that here we have the duplication of the old primordial fears, We have the fear of the weapon and the fear of the potential aggressor, and both those have to be dealt with. But if we try to deal with both together, we create an absolutely impossible situation. If we try to link political settlements with disarmament all we get is a condition of mutual frustration. Yet that is precisely what the Prime Minister did in his reply to Marshal Bulganin.
I read that reply carefully. It was extremely skilfully done. The language is perfect, even if the principles are rotten. What did the right hon. Gentleman say in that reply? He said that disarmament could not be carried very far unless it was accompanied by political settlements. I tried to find out what he meant by that.

Dr. Adenauer is quite clear about what he meant by it and so are other commentators. The Times, for example, the following day was quite clear about what the right hon. Gentleman meant by it—that after the first phase had been agreed, no further stages of disarmament should be undertaken until there has been agreement about German reunification in freedom. And Dr. Adenauer said at Bonn on 1st June that he expected that the London negotiations on disarmament would drag on for a year or two. In the meantime the Germans would have to wait patiently to see whether Russia was so far interested in reducing international tension as to agree to a united Germany. Are we, then, to understand from the Government—I want a clear answer about this—that if the first stage is reached and got over no further steps are to be taken towards disarmament unless Germany is reunited and free to join the Western Alliance?
It is a plain question. It is a very serious question. Remember, as Western Germany is being rearmed it passes the initiative about disarmament from us to Western Germany. She has not rearmed to the extent that she has guaranteed to do, but when that rearmament takes place, if the mood of Dr. Adenauer is to be relied upon, presumably German-Russian quarrels must be settled before we can proceed upon any other stages of disarmament. So, if the Prime Minister is to be believed, if this is his strategy, he proposes to pass all further stages in disarmament to the initiative of Western Germany. Does he believe that? That is what he says in effect.
That is a very serious thing. It brings us back once more to the old problem that Russia will not agree to the reunification of Germany if Germany is free to add to the strength of the Western Alliance. It means, therefore, that a deadlock is being created about Germany which deadlocks the disarmament conference as a whole. If that be not the case, then no one has answered it yet, because the Prime Minister was specific in his statement. He said, for example, that we could not go on reducing the arms of the Western Alliance unless Germany is reunited, although he does not seem to realise that that sentence misstates the position because, presumably, the extent of Western disarmament would march


with the disarmament of Russia. Therefore, the relative positions would be the same.
It is not true to say that the Western Alliance would be weakened, because no one here is arguing for unilateral disarmament. What we are arguing for is that there should be as much disarmament as can be mutually agreed and that that should be pursued even though it may not be accompanied by political settlements. We cannot for the life of us see what relationship there can be between political settlements and disarmament unless the arms are in the background as a sanction to be used if the settlements are not reached.
This really must be answered, and it has not been answered yet. No one can seriously suggest that anybody in this Committee, on either side, is prepared—I put it bluntly—to risk a single British life in order to bring about the reunification of Germany, but what we are anxious to do is to try to promote the circumstances in Europe in which Germans can be peacefully reunited. We cannot for the life of us see how it is possible for negotiation to begin about the reunification of Germany, with arms in the background, as though saying to the Russians, "Unless you agree to the rearmament of Germany we propose to commit suicide." Obviously we could not use the bomb. The bomb is no longer an instrument of diplomacy. It may be a deterrent, but it is not something with which one can influence the negotiations, because one cannot say, "Unless you agree, I will commit suicide."
The bomb, therefore, is no longer a lever in negotiations. There seems, therefore, to be no sense at all in not proceeding to subsequent disarmament merely on account of the fact that we cannot reach political settlements. We hope very earnestly that if we can have agreement on some stages of disarmament, a favourable climate of opinion will be created for successful negotiations about political settlements. We also hold that the two processes should go forward simultaneously and that there should be attempts at political settlements simultaneously with discussions about disarmament. We consider that they should not be organically linked, because if they are linked failure in the one is likely to produce failure in the other.
We should therefore like the Government to change their attitude in that respect. We in the Labour Party have said in other places that in our opinion there is not the slightest reason why we should not initiate discussions with the Russians about a European security system, and we cannot understand why the various overtures which have been made from the Russian side have not been met on our side. They could be probed. We could find out what Mr. Khrushchev means by some of his utterances. It may be that he means nothing at all except a rhetorical outburst, but let us find out.
We have been informed that the Russians are prepared to consider withdrawal from the Eastern satellite nations if there can be agreement between us, France, Germany and America about neutralising Germany and having inspection systems in Europe. Hon. Members opposite talk about the tragedy of Hungary, but what contribution are we making to end the tragedy? If there is something in what the Russians are saying, and I believe there is something in what they are saying, let us find out.
The situation is fundamentally altered. The satellite nations are no longer a buffer. They were created as a cordon sanitaire around the Soviet Union. There is no longer a cordon sanitaire. We cannot speak about land buffers or cushions, or however we describe them, in the world today, when we have guided missiles and bombers which can ignore them. They are concepts which belong to the days of mass marching armies. They are no longer relevant, and the Russians know that as well as we do. Why, therefore, have we not tried to find out what the Russians mean? Why have we not taken the initiative?
It may be, as I said earlier, that there is not very much in the Russian offer, but I beg and pray that the initiative be taken to probe their intentions before the initiative passes from here to Germany. Once the Germans are powerful, once they are armed, once they are strong, they will put the reunification of Germany on the international agenda, and it may be that they will put the rectification of frontiers on the agenda, and we shall then find ourselves with problems more stubborn than they are today.
It ought to be a source of comfort to hon. Members opposite that there are many millions of Germans who believe as we do about that. They are anxious that they should reunify their country in peace, and they are anxious that there should be no opportunity whatsoever for those forces to be unleashed in Germany that have brought disaster upon Europe twice in our lifetime. Why have not the Government taken the initiative there? Political settlements—yes—we all want them. Why have not the Government pursued them? Why have they been so passive in the matter?
Then we come to the question of stages. I agree with what was said by the hon. Member for Bournemouth, East and Christchurch. If we cannot get agreement about the ending of the production of a fissionable military material and a cessation of bomb tests together, why should we not take what we can get? Why should we not start with the common agreement? I think that the whole political climate might be changed if these hideous experiments stopped by agreement. It was admitted by the right hon. and learned Gentleman this afternoon that this is a stage that is easily controllable; that we can have inspection systems and posts, about which there is general agreement, which could easily detect any violation of the understanding.
We do not consider that it is a satisfactory answer to talk about limitation and registration. We must agree with Mr. Khrushchev when he says that registration by Great Britain is unnecessary because we have to give advance notice in any case when we are making the tests. Therefore, we are giving nothing at all there. The Russians are able to make their tests inside their own territory, but we have to inform the world beforehand that we are to make ours.
And what is the meaning of limitation? Are we to have a ration of tests? We have not heard anything about that. How many each are we to have? Are we each to have our own opportunity of poisoning the atmosphere, and are we to quarrel about how much we inject into the atmosphere? What is meant by limitation? Three a year? Six a year? Four each? Ten each? What is it? What is the meaning of limitation? If, in the mean-

time, we can reach agreement with the Americans, with the Canadians, the French and the Russians about a cessation of tests, is it not worth having?
Later on, and not too far later on, we should have to propose the other stages, because, obviously, as has been remarked in the debate, nations that have not yet had their tests at all will not be prepared to stand by whilst those nations that have the bomb are able to go on making the material. That is quite clear. Therefore, there is an argument—a legitimate argument—about the length of time. Some say that it should be a short time so that those who are making the bomb shall not have the advantage over those not able to make it. Others advocate a longer time in order to give an opportunity for the first stage to operate properly and to pacify fears.
This is not the question of principle, but the purely empirical question as to how long the period shall be, but what we say—and certainly Great Britain should say it—is that if there is a chance of stopping these experiments now we ought to take it with open hands. Then we ought to go on, of course, as early as possible to the next most easily controllable stage. In other words, we should proceed from the most controllable to the least controllable.
We understand that the next stage which is more easily controllable than subsequent stages is the inspection of the making of new fissionable military material. I think that hon. Members ought to try to present to their imaginations what the situation may be if these inspection posts are established, if they are working honourably, if, for the first time, the great Powers are reaching and carrying out agreements. Members ought to try to project their minds into the emotional situation that might be created by that. After all, it is our duty to try to move away from disaster, and if we can only move by short steps let us take the short steps. The longer ones may be easier. We have gone on in this way far too long.
Therefore, we have not heard from the Government today anything at all that gives us reason for satisfaction. We heard from the right hon. and learned Gentleman that he thinks partial agreement is in sight. Well, so is the Recess. These discussions have been going on for a very long time and we are anxious that


we should get some concrete measures established as soon as possible.
I said earlier in my speech that ordinary men and women are getting into a state of despair. It is not only the burden of arms that is already quite crushing. What I think is undermining the spirit of man at the present time is the fact that the fates that look like overtaking him are fates of his own construction. In classical antiquity in the past, man was always able to keep a fairly robust spirit against his destiny because he was overtaken by forces beyond his own control and he had the consolations of religion and philosophy to sustain him.
The spectre that is weighing upon the human spirit today and causing such a sense of inner despair is that the perils that we are faced with are of our own creation. They lie inside man himself. There is no peace for him. There is no serenity in the world until he himself can become the master of the things he himself has created.

Viscount Hinchingbrooke: What about original sin?

Mr. Bevan: I hope that the noble Lord the Member for Dorset, South (Viscount Hinchingbrooke)will contain his customary frivolity. It is very difficult to push "five bob" ideas into half-crown minds. I am sorry that I was so rough, but we get these interruptions from the noble Lord at this time of night.
We have had a very serious debate which has been contributed to at the proper level in all parts of the Committee. We most earnestly and sincerely hope that the Government will not compel us to divide on this issue, but unless we can get satisfaction on those two questions, upon the linking of the stages of disarmament one with the other and on de-linking political settlements from disarmament, we are bound to divide.

9.29 p.m.

The Minister of Defence (Mr. Duncan Sandys): We on this side of the Committee welcome this debate. I think it has come up to the level of the importance of the subject which we have been discussing. There is, I feel, no subject which is more important at this juncture in world affairs than the subject of disarmament, and I do not think there is

any hon. Member in this Committee who does not share that view.
The right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan)has raised a number of points during the course of a lively speech, as his speeches always are, and I will try to deal with as many of them as I can during the course of my reply. In the opening part of his speech earlier today, the right hon. Member for Derby, South (Mr. P. Noel-Baker)rightly drew attention to the heavy and growing expenditure on defence—

Mr. P. Noel-Baker: On research.

Mr. Sandys: —and, in particular, on research and development. As usual, he gave us a very informative and well-documented speech on the whole subject. He drew attention to the great relief which would be secured if there could be some real measure of disarmament. I believe that no country in the world would benefit more than Britain from disarmament, particularly on the economic side. Our whole standard of living depends upon our ability to balance our overseas trade and payments, and there is no doubt that our task would be immeasurably easier if, at the same time, we were not spending close on £1,500 million a year on defence, locking up about 700,000 men in the Services, together with about another 600,000 civilians supporting them in industry, administration and services of various kinds. That is the burden which we are bearing and which could, not wholly, but to a large extent, be lifted from us if genuine, confident disarmament could be achieved.
By our new defence policy, we are planning over the next five years, to halve our military manpower and greatly reduce the demands of defence upon civilian employment; but, even when all these changes have been completed, there is no doubt that we shall still be employing far more than we can really afford of our manpower and industrial resources upon unproductive military effort. Apart from anything else, therefore, we have a pressing economic incentive to reach agreement on disarmament.
However desirable disarmament may be, on economic and other grounds, we must remember that it is not an end in itself. The end which we are pursuing is peace, and we must be realistic about


it. We must not overlook the fact that, in recent years, peace has been precariously, but nonetheless effectively, maintained through a combination of force and fear. It may be an unpleasant fact, but it is the fact. Such a basis is unhealthy and, quite rightly, we want to replace it by the more secure foundation of mutual confidence. We all agree, I think, that disarmament is the essential condition for rebuilding confidence. We certainly cannot expect very much confidence so long as both sides continue to maintain gigantic military machines pointed at one another and to produce ever more fearful weapons of annihilation.
The right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale and, earlier, the right hon. and learned Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. A. Henderson)raised the question of the link between disarmament and the settlement of political issues. It is unrealistic, I think, to imagine that any final and comprehensive agreement on disarmament will be possible without the settlement of, at any rate, the main political issues which are at the root of international distrust.

Mr. Bevan: That was not what I said. What I asked was whether, after the first stage had been accomplished, no further stage would be attempted in disarmament unless there was political agreement over Germany.

Mr. Sandys: I was attempting to answer the right hon. and learned Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton, who raised the broad question of the relationship between disarmament and the settlement of political issues which are at the root of international distrust.
Everyone, I think, now has, perhaps regretfully, come to recognise that disarmament cannot be achieved by a single step. We have to proceed by stages, by processes of partial disarmament. We believe, and I think we have good hope to believe, that the countries concerned will be prepared to agree, at least in the first stage and, perhaps, in a second stage—one cannot always foresee many steps ahead—to an initial measure of disarmament without attaching political strings to it.
The right hon. Gentleman asked "What about later on?" I think he agrees that it is possible. We have a right

to hope that in the initial stage it may be possible to get started on disarmament without raising all the fearful difficulties of these grave political issues which, we know, exist, which poison the international atmosphere and which, sooner or later, must be settled.
I do not believe it would be helpful to try—I am certainly not attempting it tonight—to lay down in advance precisely at what stage in the process of disarmament we feel that it will be necessary to bring up these difficult political issues. [Interruption.] I am saying that I am hopeful. I am very hopeful that in the initial stage it will not be necessary to couple and to mix up these political issues with the issue of disarmament.

Mr. Bevan: The insertion of the settlement of political differences at subsequent stages was put in by the Government, of which the right hon. Gentleman is a member. Why have they been put in at all? Why should they not have been pursued on their own account, and why should we not proceed with disarmament as far as we can go?

Mr. Sandys: The right hon. Gentleman should address his mind to the latest position, which is really the joint statement of 2nd July, the last annex in the White Paper. That definitely contemplates—and we believe that we shall succeed—achieving an initial measure of disarmament without having to settle all these awkward questions such as the unification of Germany.

Mr. Bevan: I am referring to the White Paper which states that these reductions would
be dependent on progress in settling major political problems
as well as on the development of an effective control system. Does the right hon. Gentleman insist upon standing by that?

Mr. Sandys: I do not think that that applies to the first step which is proposed in Annex 4, which is the joint statement of our plan for trying to break the deadlock and trying to make some first progress. I do not think that the right hon. Gentleman is serving the cause which I believe he devoutly cares for by trying to throw a spanner into the works at this stage.
In the initial stages of disarmament, it is, I believe, the military and not the political problems which are going to prove the most difficult. I refer to the vital importance of maintaining at each stage the delicate and critical balance of the forces by which peace at present is being preserved. In his speech today, the right hon. Member for Derby, South did not, I think, sufficiently stress the importance of keeping conventional disarmament in pace with nuclear disarmament. On the other hand, his deficiencies were to a large extent made good by the hon. Lady the Member for Carmarthen (Lady Megan Lloyd George).
I regret the change in her complexion—I refer to her political complexion—but, none the less, I am sure that all of us were glad to have heard a speech once more from her in the House of Commons. She rightly pointed out, and adduced facts and figures in support of her argument, the crushing superiority of the Russian conventional forces. The Soviet Union has over 4 million men under arms and over 200 active divisions, and a substantial proportion of these are facing westwards. That, of course, takes no account of the forces of the satellite countries or of China.
Though straight comparisons are not always possible, it is well worth bearing in mind that in the vital Central European front, N.A.T.O. is at present able to deploy less than 20 divisions, but behind N.A.T.O. stands the massive nuclear power of the United States and the growing atomic contribution of Great Britain.

Mr. Harold Davies: God help us.

Mr. Sandys: The hon. Member for Leek (Mr. Harold Davies)may say, "God help us", but the peace which he enjoys today, whether he likes it or not, is very largely, if not wholly, dependent upon this nuclear power. This alone provides the counter-poise to Russia's superior strength in conventional arms and military manpower. It is quite natural that people should be appalled at the fearfulness of the H-bomb and want to abolish it, but we should not forget that in the strange world in which we live it constitutes our principal source of safety.
This was graphically described by the right hon. Member for Derby, South, not

today, but in a speech which he made two years ago, in which he was criticising the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale for advocating the abandonment of the nuclear deterrent. This is what the right hon. Gentleman said in a speech in Derby:
Mr. Bevan's policy would be an open invitation to the Communists to conquer Europe, sweep forward to the Channel ports, and then destroy our cities by thousands of super V-2's with non-nuclear warheads. In such a war, nuclear weapons would, in the end, be used, but we should have sacrified the whole purpose for which they have been made—of preventing criminals from starting war.
Then, the right hon. Gentleman asked:
For what other reason did the Labour Government make the atomic bomb? Why should we increase the risk by throwing this deterrent power away?

Mr. P. Noel-Baker: As that quotation has already been given in this Chamber twice by the Foreign Secretary, including his speech today, perhaps the right hon. Gentleman has been able to look up the rest of what I said, namely, that we had never stood for unilateral disarmament but that we thought those weapons ought to be abolished by international agreement, and that the Government had been criminally to blame since 1951 for not trying to do it.

Mr. Sandys: That speech may have been quoted before. All I can say is that the Committee seemed to enjoy it again. As for the right hon. Gentleman being against unilateral action, I am surprised he says that so shortly after the Labour Party recommended unilateral suspension of tests by Great Britain.
I come now to the specific question of nuclear tests, about which so much has been said. The Russians have proposed that tests should be suspended for two years independently of anything else, and the party opposite has made a similar proposal, though it has not so far, I believe, specified the period for suspension. The hon. Lady the Member for Carmarthen and other hon. Members have also made this point. One of the main arguments which the hon. Lady advanced—and she dwelt at length upon this subject—was that this suspension of tests independently of other things would stop fourth countries from becoming nuclear Powers. That was one of her main arguments.
I do not believe that is at all certain. Our own experience has shown that nuclear physics has become such a precise science that it may well be possible to design a bomb which goes off correctly the first time. Acceptance of the Russian proposal to suspend tests for two years without stopping the manufacture of fissile material would not really very much affect any fourth country. They would, I believe, go straight ahead with their research and development. In any case, very few of them would be ready for testing within two years.
If we really wish to stop fourth Powers entering nuclear weapon production we must do much more than suspend the tests. The right hon. Gentleman appeared to despair in the first stage of getting agreement among the fourth Powers. We must do a great deal more than suspend tests. We must above all arrive at an agreement for stopping the manufacture of fissile material, and that is precisely what we and the other Governments are jointly proposing.
There is another substantial point of difference between the Labour Party's proposals and those of the Government, to which I should like to refer. The party opposite advocates that in the second stage there should be a ban on the manufacture of further nuclear weapons. We do not believe that that is an enforceable proposition in practice. It would be extremely difficult to track down the manufacture of nuclear weapons made of fissile material already produced and distributed before the system of control was introduced.
On the other hand, the plants which make fissile materials are comparatively few in number and it should be possible, within reasonable limits, to check the quantity of fissile material which they produce and the use to which it is put. That is why we have thought it more realistic to propose the banning of the production not of completed weapons but of the fissile material required for weapon purposes. [Interruption.] I am glad that there appears to be no disagreement with me about this on the benches opposite, but I thought it was important to point this out. The more we can find a common basis of agreement the more we shall be pleased.
The success of any scheme of nuclear disarmament depends upon the feasibility of effective inspection. That point was forcibly made by the right hon. and learned Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton, who referred among other matters to the futility of the Kellogg Pact and things of that kind. If the conditions were not such as could be verified by inspection, neither side would be confident that the other was carrying out the agreement. This, we believe, would create suspicion and encourage evasion.
On the subject of inspection, the right hon. Member for Derby, South asked how far Britain would be prepared to open her doors to inspection and control. I am very glad indeed of this opportunity to say, without qualification and without reservation, that there is no gate, no door, and no cupboard which we should not be willing to open to international inspection if all other countries are prepared to do the same. I was asked a small point about what an expert was. I have looked it up. He is one "known for his special knowledge or skill, one who is adept or clever."
In addition to these general considerations, the military aspect of the problem affects Britain in a very special way and I want to say something about that. So long as the nuclear weapons are not abolished as part of a general disarmament agreement, we consider it essential that Britain should possess an element of nuclear deterrent power of her own, including a moderate stock of megaton weapons. The rate at which we can produce these weapons depends upon two factors. First, it depends upon the rate of production of fissile material. Secondly, it depends upon the amount of fissile material which we have to put into each weapon.
The output of fissile material is fairly limited and cannot be greatly increased without the construction of new plant, which is a lengthy business. Therefore, it is of importance to us from the military standpoint—and I stress this because this is evidence of the sacrifice that we are making in subscribing to these proposals—to reduce to the minimum the fissile content of these weapons. But the early stoppage of nuclear tests makes this more difficult. So far, we have had only one series of megaton tests, but thanks to the brilliance of our scientists it has provided


enough information to enable us to manufacture megaton warheads for aircraft bombs and ballistic rockets. However, I am assured that with comparatively few further tests we should be able to cut down very appreciably the amount of fissile material required for these weapons, and this would enable us to complete correspondingly sooner the minimum stockpile we consider necessary,
If the banning of tests were to form part of a general agreement for comprehensive disarmament under which nuclear weapons would be progressively reduced over a reasonably short period, all this, of course, would not matter at all. However, it is my duty to point out to the Committee what would be our position if the process of disarmament on the nuclear side were to go no further than the stoppage of tests coupled with the stoppage of the manufacture of fissile material for weapons. The effect would be to freeze the position as it is, to the very great disadvantage of Great Britain.
The Russians would retain the large number of nuclear weapons which they have already made. The United States would likewise keep the much vaster stockpile which they have built up. We on the other hand—I think it is right to point out this fact—would be graves penalised, since the stoppage of testing and production at this moment would prevent us from fully exploiting the megaton capacity we now possess. This means that we should continue to be largely dependent upon the United States for the nuclear weapons we needed. This applies not only to weapons for the deterrent but also to weapons for defence, since the guided missiles we are developing for anti-aircraft and anti-rocket defence ultimately will require nuclear warheads.
We have always regarded it as unacceptable to be dependent upon any

other country, however friendly, for these vital elements in our armour. The party opposite has adopted the same line and on this point we have not changed our opinion. Nevertheless, we have felt that the acceptance at long last by the Soviet Government of the principle of inspection was a most significant development to which an appropriate response must be made. We have felt to some extent that an act of faith was called for, and it is in that spirit that we subscribed to the joint statement of 2nd July which is set out in the White Paper.

In it the United States, Canada, France and ourselves have proposed that tests should be temporarily suspended, and that production of fissile material for weapons should cease after effective control has been established. These measures on the nuclear side would be accompanied by the first stage in conventional disarmament, together with the setting-up of an inspection system.

We have taken this important initiative in the profound hope that it will not stand by itself but that it will open the way, by stages, for the progressive scaling down of both conventional forces and nuclear weapons. If further discussions show that this hope is well founded and that there is a genuine prospect of real progress, with all that this means and could mean for future peace and security, then Britain will be ready to play her full part and bear her fair share of the risks involved.

Mr. Bevan: I beg to move, That Item Class II, Vote I (Foreign Service)be reduced by £5.

Mr. Geoffrey Hirst: Party before country.

Question put:—

The Committee divided: Ayes 262, Noes 322.

Division No. 174.]
AYES
[9.59 p.m.


Ainsley, J. W.
Beswick, Frank
Brown, Thomas (Ince)


Albu, A. H.
Bevan, Rt. Hon. A. (Ebbw Vale)
Burke, W. A.


Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)
Blackburn, F.
Butler, Herbert (Hackney, C.)


Allen, Arthur (Bosworth)
Blenkinsop, A.
Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)


Allen, Scholefield (Crewe)
Blyton, W. R.
Callaghan, L. J.


Anderson, Frank
Boardman, H.
Carmichael, J.


Awbery, S. S.
Bottomley, Rt. Hon. A. G.
Castle, Mrs. B. A.


Bacon, Miss Alice
Bowden, H. W. (Leicester, S.W.)
Champion, A. J.


Baird, J.
Bowles, F. G.
Chapman, W. D.


Balfour, A.
Boyd, T. C.
Chetwynd, G. R.


Bellenger, Rt. Hon. F. J.
Braddock, Mrs. Elizabeth
Clunie, J.


Bence, C. R. (Dunbartonshire, E.)
Brockway, A. F.
Coldrick, W.


Benn, Hn. Wedgwood (Bristol, S.E.)
Broughton, Dr. A. D. D.
Collick, P. H. (Birkenhead)


Benson, G.
Brown, Rt. Hon. George (Belper)
Collins, V. J. (Shoreditch &amp; Finsbury)




Corbet, Mrs. Freda
Jeger, Mrs. Lena (Holbn &amp; St. Pnco, S.)
Reeves, J.


Cove, W. G.
Johnson, James (Rugby)
Reid, William


Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)
Johnston, Douglas (Paisley)
Rhodes, H.


Cronin, J. D.
Jones, Rt. Hon. A. Creech (Wakefield)
Robens, Rt. Hon. A.


Crossman, R. H. S.
Jones, David (The Hartlepools)
Roberts, Albert (Normanton)


Cullen, Mrs. A.
Jones, Elwyn (West Ham, S.)
Roberts, Goronwy (Caernarvon)


Dalton, Rt. Hon. H.
Jones, Jack (Rotherham)
Robinson, Kenneth (St. Pancas, N.)


Darling, George (Hillsborough)
Jones, J. Idwal (Wrexham)
Rogers, George (Kensington, N.)


Davies, Rt. Hn. Clement (Montgomery)
Jones, T. W. (Merioneth)
Ross, William


Davies, Ernest (Enfield, E.)
Kenyon, C.
Royle, C.


Davies, Harold (Leek)
Key, Rt. Hon. C. W.
Shawcross, Rt. Hon. Sir Hartley


Davies, Stephen (Merthyr)
Lawson, G. M.
Shinwell, Rt. Hon. E.


Deer, G.
Ledger, R. J.
Short, E. W.


de Freitas, Geoffrey
Lee, Frederick (Newton)
Silverman, Julius (Aston)


Delargy, H. J.
Lee, Miss Jennie (Cannock)
Silverman, Sydney (Nelson)


Dodds, N. N.
Lever, Harold (Cheetham)
Simmons, C. J. (Brierley Hill)


Donnelly, D, L.
Lewis, Arthur
Skeffington, A. M.


Dugdale, Rt. Hn. John (W. Brmwoh)
Lindgren, G. S.
Slater, Mrs. H. (Stoke, N.)


Dye, S.
Lipton, Marcus
Slater, J. (Sedgefield)


Edelman, M.
Logan, D. G.
Smith, Ellis (Stoke, S.)


Edwards, Rt. Hon. John (Brighouse)
Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson
Snow, J. W.


Edwards, Rt. Hon. Ness (Caerphilly)
MacColl, J. E.
Sorensen, R. W.


Edwards, Robert (Bilston)
MacDermot, Niall
Soskice, Rt. Hon. Sir Frank


Edwards, W. J. (Stepney)
McInnes, J.
Sparks, J, A,


Evans, Albert (Islington, S.W.)
McKay, John (Wallsend)
Steele, T.


Fernyhough, E.
MacPherson, Malcolm (Stirling)
Stewart, Michael (Fulham)


Fienburgh, W.
Mahon, Simon
Stonehouse, John


Finch, H. J.
Mallalieu, E. L. (Brigg)
Stones, W. (Consett)


Fletcher, Eric
Mallalieu, J. P. W. (Huddersfd, E.)
Strachey, Rt. Hon. J.


Forman, J. C.
Mann, Mrs. Jean
Strauss, Rt. Hon. George (Vauxhall)


Fraser, Thomas (Hamilton)
Marquand, Rt. Hon. H. A.
Stross, Dr. Barnett (Stoke-on-Trent, C.)


Gaitskell, Rt. Hon. H. T. N.
Mason, Roy
Summerskill, Rt. Hon. E.


George, Lady Megan Lloyd (Car'then)
Mayhew, C. P.
Swingler, S. T.


Gibson, C. W.
Mellish, R. J.
Sylvester, G. O.


Gooch, E. G.
Messer, Sir F.
Taylor, Bernard (Mansfield)


Gordon Walker, Rt. Hon. P. C.
Mikardo, Ian
Taylor, John (West Lothian)


Greenwood, Anthony
Mitchison, G. R.
Thomas, George (Cardiff)


Grenfell, Rt. Hon. D. R.
Monslow, W.
Thomas, Iorwerth (Rhondda, W.)


Grey, C. F.
Moody, A. S.
Thomson, George (Dundee, E.)


Griffiths, David (Rother Valley)
Morris, Percy (Swansea, W.)
Thornton, E.


Griffiths, Rt. Hon. James (Llanelly)
Morrison, Rt. Hn. Herbert (Lewis'm, S.)
Timmons, J.


Griffiths, William (Exchange)
Mort, D. L.
Tomney F.


Grimond, J.
Moss, R.
Ungoed-Thomas, Sir Lynn


Hale, Leslie
Moyle, A.
Usborne, H. C.


Hall, Rt. Hn. Glenvil (Colne Valley)
Mulley, F. W.
Viant, S. P.


Hamilton, W. W.
Noel-Baker, Rt. Hon. P. (Derby, S.)
Wade, D. W.


Hannan, W.
O'Brien, Sir Thomas
Watkins, T. E.


Harrison, J. (Nottingham, N.)
Oliver, G. H.
Wells, Percy (Faversham)


Hastings, S.
Oram, A. E.
Wells, William (Walsall, N.)


Hayman, F. H.
Orbach, M.
West, D. G.


Healey, Denis
Oswald, T.
Wheeldon, W. E.


Henderson, Rt. Hn. A. (Rwly Regis)
Owen, W. J.
White, Mrs. Eirene (E. Flint)


Herbison, Miss M.
Padley, W. E.
White, Henry (Derbyshire, N.E.)


Hewitson, Capt. M.
Paget, R. T.
Wigg, George


Hobson, C. R. (Keighley)
Paling, Rt. Hon. W. (Dearne Valley)
Wilcock, Group Capt. C. A. B.


Holman, P.
Paling, Will T. (Dewsbury)
Wilkins, W. A.


Holmes, Horace
Palmer, A, M. F.
Willey, Frederick


Holt, A. F.
Pannell, Charles (Leeds, W.)
Williams, David (Neath)


Houghton, Douglas
Pargiter, G. A.
Williams, Rev. Llywelyn (Ab'tillery)


Howell, Charles (Perry Barr)
Parker, J.
Williams, Ronald (Wigan)



Parkin, B. T.
Williams, Rt. Hon. T. (Don Valley)


Hoy, J. H.
Paton, John
Williams, W. R. (Openshaw)


Hubbard, T. F.
Peart, T. F.
Williams, W. T. (Barons Court)


Hughes, Cledwyn (Anglesey)
Pentland, N.
Willis, Eustace (Edinburgh, E.)


Hughes, Emrys (S. Ayrshire)
Plummer, Sir Leslie
Wilson, Rt. Hon. Harold (Huyton)


Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)
Prentice, R. E.
Winterbottom, Richard


Hunter, A. E.
Price, J. T. (Westhoughton)
Woodburn, Rt. Hon. A.


Hynd, H. (Accrington)
Price, Philips (Gloucestershire, W.)
Woof, R. E.


Hynd, J. B. (Attercliffe)
Probert, A. R.
Yates, V. (Ladywood)


Irvine, A. J. (Edge Hill)
Proctor, W. T.
Younger, Rt. Hon. K.


Irving, Sydney (Dartford)
Pryde, D. J.
Zilliacus, K.


Isaacs, Rt. Hon. G. A.
Pursey, Cmdr. H.



Janner, B.
Randall, H. E.
TELLERS FOR THE AYES:


Jay, Rt. Hon. D. P. T.
Rankin, John
Mr. Popplewell and Mr. Pearson.


Jeger, George (Goole)
Redhead, E. C





NOES


Agnew, Sir Peter
Amory, Rt. Hn. Heathcoat (Tiverton)
Atkins, H. E.


Aitken, W. T.
Arbuthnot, John
Baldock, Lt.-Cmdr. J. M.


Allan, R. A. (Paddington, S.)
Armstrong, C. W.
Baldwin, A. E.


Alport, C. J. M.
Ashton, H.
Balniel, Lord


Amery, Julian (Preston, N.)
Astor, Hon. J. J.
Barber, Anthony







Barlow, Sir John
Glyn, Col. R.
Lindsay, Martin (Solihull)


Barter, John
Godber, J. B.
Linstead, Sir H. N.


Baxter, Sir Beverley
Gomme-Duncan, Col. Sir Alan
Llewellyn, D. T.


Beamish, Maj. Tufton
Goodhart, Philip
Lloyd. Rt. Hon. G. (Sutton Coldfield)


Bell, Philip (Bolton, E.)
Gough, C. F. H.
Lloyd, Maj. Sir Guy (Renfrew, E.)


Bell, Ronald (Bucks, S.)
Gower, H. R.
Lloyd, Rt Hon. Selwyn (Wirral)


Bennett, F. M. (Torquay)
Graham, Sir Fergus
Longden, Gilbert


Bennett, Or. Reginald
Grant, W. (Woodside)
Low, Rt. Hon. A. R. W.


Bevins, J. R. (Toxteth)
Grant-Ferris, Wg Cdr. R. (Nantwich)
Lucas, Sir Jocelyn (Portsmouth, S.)


Bidgood, J. C.
Green, A.
Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh


Biggs-Davison, J. A.
Gresham Cooke, R.
McAdden, S. J,


Birch, Rt. Hon. Nigel
Grimston, Hon. John (St. Albans)
Macdonald, Sir Peter


Bishop, F. P.
Grimston, Sir Robert (Westbury)
Mackeson, Brig. Sir Harry


Black, C. W.
Grosvenor, Lt.-Col. R. G.
McKibbin, A. J.


Body, R. F.
Gurden, Harold
Mackie, J. H. (Galloway)


Bossom, Sir Alfred
Hall, John (Wycombe)
McLaughlin, Mrs. P.


Boyle, Sir Edward
Hare, Rt. Hon. J. H.
Maclay, Rt. Hon. John


Braine, B. R.
Harris, Reader (Heston)
Maclean, Fitzroy (Lancaster)


Braithwaite, Sir Albert (Harrow, W.)
Harrison, A. B. C. (Maldon)
McLean, Neil (Inverness)


Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col. W. H.
Harrison, Col. J. H. (Eye)
Macleod, Rt. Hn. Iain (Enfield, W.)


Brooman-White, R. C.
Harvey, Sir Arthur (Macclesfd)
MacLeod, John (Ross &amp; Cromarty)


Browne, J. Nixon (Craigton)
Harvey, Ian (Harrow, E.)
Macmillan, Rt. Hn. Harold (Bromley)


Bryan, P.
Harvey, John (Walthamstow, E.)
Macmillan, Maurice (Halifax)


Bullus, Wing Commander E. E.
Harvie-Watt, Sir George
Macpherson, Niall (Dumfries)


Burden, F. F. A.
Hay, John
Maddan, Martin


Butcher, Sir Herbert
Head, Rt. Hon. A. H.
Maitland, Cdr. J. F. W. (Horncastle)


Butler, Rt. Hn. R. A. (Saffron Walden)
Heald, Rt. Hon. Sir Lionel
Maitland, Hon. Patrick (Lanark)


Campbell, Sir David
Henderson, John (Cathcart)
Manningham-Buller, Rt. Hn. Sir R.


Carr, Robert
Henderson-Stewart, Sir James
Markham, Major Sir Frank


Cary, Sir Robert
Hesketh, R. F.
Marlowe, A. A. H.


Channon, Sir Henry
Hicks-Beach, Maj. W. W.
Marples, Rt. Hon. A. E.


Chichester-Clark, R.
Hill, Rt. Hon. Charles (Luton)
Marshall, Douglas


Churchill, Rt. Hon. Sir Winston
Hill, Mrs. E. (Wythenshawe)
Mathew, R.


Clarke, Brig. Terence (Portsmth, W.)
Hill, John (S. Norfolk)
Maude, Angus


Cole, Norman
Hinchingbrooke, Viscount
Maudling, Rt. Hon. R.


Conant, Major Sir Roger
Hirst, Geoffrey
Mawby, R. L.


Cooke, Robert
Hobson, John (Warwick &amp; Leam'gt'n)
Maydon, Lt.-Comdr. S. L. C.


Cooper, A. E.
Holland-Martin, C. J.
Medlicott, Sir Frank


Cooper-Key, E. M.
Hope, Lord John
Milligan, Rt. Hon. W. R.


Cordeaux, Lt.-Col. J. K.
Hornby, R. P.
Molson, Rt. Hon. Hugh


Corfield, Capt. F. V.
Hornsby-Smith, Miss M. P.
Moore, Sir Thomas


Craddock, Beresford (Spelthorns)
Horobin, Sir Ian
Morrison, John (Salisbury)


Crosthwaite-Eyre, Col. O. E.
Horsbrugh, Rt. Hon. Dame Florence
Mott-Radclyffe, Sir Charles


Crowder, Sir John (Finchley)
Howard, Gerald (Cambridgeshire)
Nabarro, G. D. N.


Crowder, Petre (Ruislip—Northwood)
Howard, Hon. Greville (St. Ives)
Nairn, D. L. S.


Cunningham, Knox
Howard, John (Test)
Neave, Airey


Currie, G. B. H.
Hudson, W. R. A. (Hull, N.)
Nicholls, Harmar


Dance, J. C. G.
Hughes Hallett, Vice-Admiral J.
Nicholson, Godfrey (Farnham)


Davidson, Viscountess
Hughes-Young, M. H. C.
Nicolson, N. (B'n'm'th, E. &amp; Chr'ch)


D'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry
Hulbert, Sir Norman
Noble, Comdr. Rt. Hon. Allan


Deedes, W. F.
Hurd, A. R.
Nugent, G. R. H.


Digby, Simon Wingfield
Hutchison, Michael Clark(E'b'gh, S).
O'Neill, Hn. Phelim (Co.Antrim, N.)


Dodds-Parker, A. D.
Hutchison, Sir James (Scotstoun)
Ormsby-Gore, Rt. Hon. W. D.


Donaldson, Cmdr. C. E. McA.
Hyde, Montgomery
Orr, Capt. L. P. S.


Doughty, C. J. A.
Hylton-Foster, Rt. Hon. Sir Harry
Orr-Ewing, Charles Ian (Hendon, N.)


Drayson, G. B.
Iremonger, T. L.
Orr-Ewing, Sir Ian (Weston-S-Mare)


du Cann, E. D. L.
Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)
Osborne, C.


Dugdale, Rt. Hn. Sir T. (Richmond)
Jenkins, Robert (Dulwich)
Page, R. G.


Duthie, W. S.
Jennings, J. C. (Burton)
Panned, N. A. (Kirkdale)


Eccles, Rt. Hon. Sir David
Jennings, Sir Roland (Hallam)
Partridge, E.


Eden, J. B. (Bournemouth, West)
Johnson, Dr. Donald (Carlisle)
Peyton, J. W. W.


Elliot, Rt. Hon. W. E. (Kelvingrove)
Johnson, Eric (Blackley)
Pickthorn, K. W. M,


Elliott, R. W. (N'castle upon Tyne, N.)
Johnson, Howard (Kemptown)
Pike, Miss Mervyn


Emmet, Hon. Mrs. Evelyn
Jones, Rt. Hon. Aubrey (Hall Green)
Pilkington, Capt. R. A.


Errington, Sir Eric
Joseph, Sir Keith
Pitman, I. J.


Erroll, F. J.
Joynson-Hicks, Hon. Sir Lancelot
Pott, H. P.


Farey-Jones, F. W.
Kaberry, D.
Powell, J. Enoch


Fell, A.
Kerby, Capt. H. B.
Price, David (Eastleigh)


Finlay, Graeme
Kerr, Sir Hamilton
Prior-Palmer, Brig. O. L.


Fisher, Nigel
Kershaw, J. A.
Profumo, J. D.


Fletcher-Cooke, C.
Kimball, M.
Raikes, Sir Victor


Forrest, G.
Kirk, P. M.
Ramsden, J. E.


Fort, R.
Lagden, G. W.
Rawlinson, Peter


Foster, John
Lambert, Hon. G.
Redmayne, M.


Fraser, Hon. Hugh (Stone)
Lambton, Viscount
Remnant, Hon. P.


Fraser, Sir Ian (M'cmbe &amp; Lonsdale)
Lancaster, Col. C. G.
Renton, D. L. M.


Freeth, Denzil
Langford-Holt, J. A.
Ridsdale, J. E.


Galbraith, Hon, T. G. D.
Leather, E. H. C.
Rippon, A. G. F.


Gammans, Lady
Leavey, J. A.
Robertson, Sir David


Garner-Evans, E. H.
Leburn, W. G.
Robinson, Sir Roland (Blackpool, S.)


George, J. C. (Pollok)
Legge-Bourke, Maj. E. A. H.
Robson Brown, Sir William


Gibson-Watt, D.
Legh, Hon. Peter (Petersfield)
Rodgers, John (Sevenoaks)


Glover, D.
Lennox-Boyd, Rt. Hon. A. T.
Roper, Sir Harold







Ropner, Col. Sir Leonard
Stuart, Rt. Hon. James (Moray)
Vaughan-Morgan, J. K.


Russell, R. S.
Studholme, Sir Henry
Vickers, Miss Joan


Sandys, Rt. Hon. D.
Summers, Sir Spencer
Wakefield, Edward (Derbyshire, W.)


Schofield, Lt.-Col. W.
Sumner, W. D. M. (Orpington)
Wakefield Sir Wavell (St. M'lebone)


Scott-Miller, Cmdr. R.
Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)
Walker-Smith, Rt. Hon. Derek


Sharples, R. C.
Taylor, William (Bradford, N.)
Wall, Major Patrick


Shepherd, William
Teeling, W.
Ward, Rt. Hon. G. R. (Worcester)


Simon, J. E. S. (Middlesbrough, W.)
Temple John M.
Ward, Dame Irene (Tynemouth)


Smithers, Peter (Winchester)
Thomas, Leslie (Canterbury)
Waterhouse, Capt. Rt. Hon. C.


Smyth, Brig. Sir John (Norwood)
Thomas P. J. M. (Conway)
Watkinson, Rt. Hon. Harold


Soames, Christopher.
Thompson, Kenneth (Walton)
Webbe, Sir H.


Spearman, Sir Alexander
Thompson, Lt.-Cdr.R.(Croydon, S.)
Whitelaw, W. S. I.


Speir, R. M.
Thorneycroft Rt. Hon. P.
Williams, Paul (Sunderland, S.)


Spens, Rt. Hn. Sir P. (Kens'gt'n, S.)
Thornton-Kemsley, C. N.
Williams, R. Dudley (Exeter)


Stanley, Capt. Hon. Richard
Tiley, A. (Bradford, W.)
Wills, G. (Bridgwater)


Stevens, Geoffrey
Tilney, John (Wavertree)
Wood, Hon. R.


Steward, Harold (Stockport, S.)
Turner, H. F. L.
Woollam, John Victor


Steward, Sir William(Woolwich, W.)
Turton, Rt. Hon. R. H.
Yates, William (The Wrekin)


Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir Malcolm
Tweedsmuir, Lady



Storey, S.
Vane, W. M. F.
TELLERS FOR THE NOES:




Mr. Heath and Mr. Oakshott.

Original Question again proposed.

Sir Henry Studholme: Sir Henry Studholme (Tavistock)rose—

It being after Ten o'clock, The CHAIRMAN left the Chair to report Progress and ask leave to sit again.

Committee report Progress; to sit again Tomorrow.

Orders of the Day — AFFILIATION PROCEEDINGS BILL [Lords]

Read a Second time.

Bill committed to a Committee of the whole House.—[Mr. Wills.]

Committee Tomorrow.

Orders of the Day — HOUSING BILL [Lords]

Read a Second time.

Bill committed to a Committee of the whole House.—[Mr. Wills.]

Committee Tomorrow.

Orders of the Day — INDEPENDENT SCHOOLS (REGISTRATION)

10.12 p.m.

Mr. Michael Stewart: I beg to move.
That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, praying that the Independent Schools Registration Regulations, 1957 (S.I., 1957, No. 929), dated 28th May, 1957, a copy of which was laid before this House on 3rd June, he annulled.
If it is convenient, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, perhaps we might be allowed to debate this Prayer concurrently with the next one, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Lanarkshire, North (Miss Herbison):
That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, praying that the Registration of Independent Schools (Scotland)Regulations, 1957 (S.I., 1957, No. 1058), dated 19th June, 1957, a copy of which was laid before this House on 27th June, be annulled.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Major Sir William Anstruther-Gray): I think that would be for the convenience of the House.

Mr. Stewart: I should say straight away that we do not move these Prayers in any spirit of hostility to the object of the Regulations, but because the reform which they introduce, for which we on this side of the House have pressed a long time, is too important to be passed over in silence. As I understand the position, these Statutory Instruments, taken together with another which the Minister subsequently issued, will apply to all those independent schools which are not at present recognised by the Ministry of Education as efficient, the recognised schools being excluded from the operation of the Regulations by the Instrument which the Minister has subsequently issued.
The schools which are unrecognised, therefore, by virtue of these Regulations will first become provisionally registered. The first question I should like to address to the Minister is whether, when an unrecognised school fills in the form which it is required by these Regulations to complete, provisional registration will be given to it automatically merely as a result of providing the information asked for in these Regulations or will the Minister reserve to himself the right, if at first blush it appears from the information provided that the school is obviously unsuitable, to refuse even provisional registration?
It may be, for example, that he might discover an independent school with children covering a considerable age range and with no member of the staff who had anything which could be regarded as proper qualifications for teaching. If that happened, would provisional registration still be given?
If we move on from the stage of provisional registration, once the schools are provisionally registered it is presumably the Ministry's intention to carry out, over a fairly long period, inspection of them and in the light of that inspection to decide whether the provisional registration can be confirmed it and if it is confirmed they will become registered schools. The next questions which I would put to the hon. Member, therefore, are: what estimate has he made of the size of the inspectorate which will be required if these Regulations are to be put into force and can he give us even an approximate date by which the bulk of the schools concerned in these Regulations will either have been registered or will have been told that their provisional registration cannot be confirmed?
In a letter issued by the Ministry to independent schools, the Minister implies that at present he can give no such date. It is now a few weeks since he sent out that letter, and I wonder whether he can be a little more precise or at least can say that he is satisfied that the size of his inspectorate is such that these Regulations will be more than a piece of paper and will result in the genuine inspection and the enforcing of proper standards in private independent schools.
I turn, next, to the information required in the Regulations. It is very brief, but perhaps that is not unreasonable, since

in the first instance only provisional registration is in question. The form asks the name and the address of the proprietor or responsible body of the school, the number and ages of the pupils and the particulars, including educational qualifications, of the staff. I think the hon. Member will agree that that is the bare minimum for which one could ask.
There are two further points on which I should like to press the Minister. Is it not important quite early in the process of inspection and registration to obtain particulars, which are not asked for in this form, about the premises? In the letter which has been sent to independent schools special stress has been laid on fire precautions in the premises being such that there is no danger of casualty by fire, but it may well he found that premises could be satisfactory in that respect and yet could be profoundly unsuitable for carrying on the work of a school. Since the Minister has decided in his Regulations not to ask for any particulars about the premises, could he tell us what steps will be taken to see that these schools not only have a proper staff but are carrying on their work in premises in which it can reasonably be carried on?
For example, as I think will be found to be the case, a number of these schools have pupils of a fairly wide age range. Are there sufficient rooms in the building to enable those children to be taught in a number of classes large enough to be appropriate to the age range of the pupils in the school?
The hon. Gentleman may feel that the other question which I would ask him on this point is a little outside his province. Has he considered what requirements he ought to make with regard to the curriculum of the schools? In English education, it is normally assumed that the curriculum of schools is not the Minister's province but is a matter for the teaching profession and, to a certain extent, for the local education authority—although we all know that the people who have the largest say in it are the universities which set the examinations.
These schools have no local authority that is in any way responsible for them. Some of the functions that would normally be performed by a local authority will, presumably, have to be performed direct by the Minister, and I feel that he


should take some steps to satisfy himself, when we are told, for example, that a school has a number of pupils in the higher age range, that the curriculum provided is of a sufficient variety to meet their needs.
Proceeding now to the point in time when the Minister will have carried out the inspection of a great many schools and will be considering whether or not to confirm provisional registrations, I would ask him what sort of standards he has in mind. We are very much in the dark over this. These schools, I believe, range from the very good to the very bad indeed. There will be wide range of efficiency and quality.
What sort of standards is he to require? If he is to require them in all cases to be as good as the schools of the local authority in the same area, I think that there are quite a number of schools whose provisional registration, he will not be able to confirm. At any rate, I think it is safe to say that he is bound to find a certain number of schools in respect of which, after inspection, he will have to say that he cannot confirm provisional registration.
This is quite a large problem. It is estimated that there are between 3,000 and 4,000 of these schools, and that they educate about 200,000 pupils. Can the Minister say whether he expects that, as a result of the possible closing down of schools which he cannot conscientiously register, any considerable burden of educating the children will be imposed on the local authorities? Is it possible for local authorities to begin now to take precautions against that possibility? I realise that that is not an easy question to answer, because we are still very much in the dark as to what the attempt to register will disclose.
Lastly, I want to refer to a matter which some time ago acquired a good deal of publicity, to which I am anxious not to give too much weight, but which should not be passed over altogether. There have, occasionally, been gross scandals in some schools in this group; of their having on their staff—or having even as their proprietors and headmasters—people totally unsuitable, both educationally and morally, to be running a school at all. Can the Minister say how he will use the procedure of registration

to stamp out even the possibility of scandal of that kind?
It does not happen very often, but on the few occasions when it does happen the effect on the public mind is, quite rightly, considerable. It seems to be a curious thing that, in this country, if a person has been convicted of a felony he cannot run a public-house, but I believe that there is no legal bar to his becoming headmaster of a private school. I do not know whether the Minister is considering doing what was suggested to him some time ago and taking an opportunity to introduce legislation to deal with that. Failing that, is there any way in which this procedure of registration can be used? I must admit that I do not find that an easy question to answer.
In the letter issued to schools, special stress is laid on teachers who are unsuitable on medical grounds. We are told that the Minister excludes from teaching in local education authority schools, as unsuitable on medical grounds, those who are suffering, or have suffered from pulmonary tuberculosis, epilepsy or mental disorder. The Minister requires the exclusion of such teachers from maintained schools until they can furnish proper evidence of their recovery. One hopes that a similar rule will become operative in the independent schools.
Has the Minister considered whether it would be desirable or appropriate to have any similar machinery to exclude people who, by their past criminal record, are obviously unsuitable to be schoolmasters? One is a little repelled at the idea of asking the proprietor of a school to state on a piece of paper whether or not any of his staff have been in prison before. We are all quite prepared to say "Yes" or "No" to that question when we are trying to get a licence to drive a motor car or for certain other purposes, but one feels that it might perhaps be insulting to the profession as a whole if that question were put. If the Minister takes that view, can he suggest any other way in which one could make scandals of this kind not only rarer than they are but possibly completely nonexistent?
Those are the points which it seems to me it was right to raise. I know that my hon. Friend the Member for Lanarkshire, North will want to ask questions about this same problem in a Scottish setting.

10.26 p.m.

Miss Margaret Herbison: I beg to second the Motion.
I wish to ask a number of questions which I hope the Joint Under-Secretary of State for Scotland will answer. In our debate on the Education Estimates I raised this question and the Joint Under-Secretary of State, when he was winding up that debate, said that he would either write to me or perhaps we could discuss it. It seems to me that this is our chance to discuss the matter tonight.
My first question is this. Why in Scotland have we waited so long before operating the provisions of Section 109 of the Education (Scotland)Act, 1946? The Under-Secretary will now be aware, if he was not aware previously, that a decision was taken in 1951 by the then Secretary of State that we should begin to operate this provision and indeed make regulations so that this provision could operate. It is six years since 1951. During that time these independent schools in Scotland could have been registered. The Under-Secretary ought to tell us tonight why, after the Election in 1951, the Secretary of State decided not to do so.
Was it because the numbers of our schools were so great and our inspectorate so small that he felt he could not do it? I can assure him that the late Hector McNeil and I examined that point very carefully before we reached our decision and we came to the conclusion that we were ready at that time to put into operation in Scotland the provisions of Section 109.
We on this side of the House are most anxious that every child in Scotland should get the best education possible, and it may be—I put it no higher than that—that since 1951 there are certain children in independent schools in Scotland who have not been getting the best education which they ought to have had and which they might have been getting before this had the Secretary of State perhaps in November, 1951, not decided to postpone the registration of independent schools. If there were no shortage of inspectors, surely it is an indictment on the Secretary of State that because of the much greater number of these schools in England, the Ministry

of Education was unable to operate Section 109 and we in Scotland have had to wait until the Ministry of Education was ready to do this work in England.
Will the Under-Secretary tell us how many of these schools he estimates there are in Scotland, and how long it will take his inspectorate to inspect them? I understand from Section 109 of the Act that registration, in the first instance, is provisional, and I should, therefore, like to have it stated as clearly as possible tonight how long it will take the inspectorate to examine these schools in Scotland.
It is provided in the Regulations that the proprietor of a school must make application. Is the Department of Education in Scotland in a position to know of every single independent school in the country? If it is, then the question I am about to ask need not be answered; but if we do not know of the existence of every such school in Scotland, then how shall we be sure that they will come under the provisions of the Regulations? In Section 109, it is provided that, six months after the coming into force of the Regulations, there shall be a penalty, on any proprietor who does not make application but there may be small schools about which nothing is known, and I should like the hon. Gentleman to tell us whether the Department of Education has information about every independent school in Scotland.
In connection with the decision to make registration final, that is, that the schools should be accepted, my hon. Friend the Member for Fulham (Mr. M. Stewart)has asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Education a number of questions, and I want to ask some others. First, will there have to be, in these independent schools, the same standard of accommodation for pupils? Will there be, for instance, the same standard maintained in the provision of laboratories for science subjects? Will there be the same standard of sanitary arrangements, which are of the greatest importance? Will it be expected and, indeed, demanded of these schools, before final registration, that the class rooms at least conform to what is expected in schools of local education authorities?
There is another very important matter which ought to be taken into account most seriously when a decision is being made as to whether or not registration will be accepted as final, namely, the standard of education provided in the schools. If the inspectorate in Scotland finds that the standard of education is lower than that demanded of the schools run by our local education authorities, what will be the attitude of the Secretary of State? Will he give any school falling short in that way an opportunity to bring itself up to the level expected of a local education authority school? Will he, for instance, give it a certain time within which to do so, and, after that, if the proprietors have failed to do it, will he then make a decision that the school cannot be registered and will have to go out of existence?
What will be the attitude of the inspectorate on the content of education, apart from the standard? Will the inspectorate apply to these schools the same values as were applied to the schools of local education authorities? I am not asking that there should be rigidity of content in education. Very often, the best type of independent school carries out experiments in education. I am a great believer in carrying out experiments in education, but in doing that one must be very careful that the experiments are worth while and that the children do not suffer. That is why tonight I want a specific answer, from whichever Minister replies, on the attitude that the inspectorate will take concerning the content of education in these schools.
I felt, as did my former right hon. Friend the late Hector McNeil, that it was of the greatest importance that the Department of Education should safeguard the educational interests of every child in Scotland, whether in a local education authority or an independent school. These Regulations are belated. I am glad that finally they have been produced by the Secretary of State, and I hope that we will be able to have an answer to these questions.

10.36 p.m.

Mr. John Eden: I have listened with great interest to the two speeches which have been made from the Opposition Front Bench. I have an interest in two independent schools and some of the points made by the hon.

Member for Fulham (Mr. M. Stewart)and by the hon. Lady the Member for Lanarkshire, North (Miss Herbison)have spurred me to say one or two things which I had not intended to say.
The first thing I should like to make quite clear is that I should imagine that most independent schools, by their very nature, are anxious to give the best education they can for the children that come to their schools. It is wrong to start from the assumption that because there may well be in existence one or two schools, or even a number of schools, which might by anybody's standard be classified as subnormal, every independent school is not worthy of being allowed to continue as such.
I should first like to make that general defence of independent schools, because if the process of registration of the schools is effectively carried out, it might, judging by some of the points made by the hon. Member for Fulham, mark out those schools which everyone is anxious should not continue to bring a bad reflection on the whole of the educational system, whether private or local authority.
The two hon. Members opposite have referred in particular to the premises and the curricula of independent schools and they have spoken also of teaching. One of the greatest difficulties facing independent schools is how to get teachers of the highest standard. The reason is partly that a large number of the schools are boarding establishments, and when there are so many jobs available which do not entail the care of children after teaching hours it is not unnatural that qualified teachers should seek employment in those schools rather more readily than in schools of the boarding type in which this extra work is required.
The question of premises raises an important point. I do not know what my hon. Friend will say in reply—or, indeed, which of my two hon. Friends will reply—but I strongly disagree with what the hon. Members opposite have been hinting at. It is that the standard of premises of all independent schools, registered or otherwise, should be judged entirely by the standard of local authority schools. The standard obtained by local authority schools is extremely high. They provide magnificent class rooms, magnificent physical training facilities, play rooms,


dining rooms, assembly halls, and playgrounds more often than not, and other sporting facilities such as the average private school can never compete with.
The local authority has a fairly limitless purse on which to draw in order to assist in the financing of its establishments. I think it is first-class that the local authorities should do this and I must admit that I am extremely envious of the sort of schools which they can produce. But I would urge my hon. Friend net to take the standard of local authority schools as the sole standard by which all educational establishments should be judged, because by no means the best education comes out of the finest building.

Mr. Frederick Peart: Surely the children at these independent schools are free to go to local authority schools.

Mr. Eden: I quite accept that point. My point was not whether the children were free to go here or there. The hon. Gentleman will agree that the local authorities are already hard put to it to meet the educational requirements of all the children, quite apart from placing extra burdens upon them.
On the question of the premises, I would urge my hon. Friend to bear in mind the fact that great stretches of magnificent glass windows, parquet flooring and magnificent halls, eminently worth while though they are for those who can afford them, are not necessarily the most valuable standards by which to judge the quality of the education that independent schools can give.
This naturally brings me to the subject of the curriculum, the standard of education given. This is a subject which I believe could be debated at considerable length. What is meant by education? Who is to judge whether or not a child has received education? Is some Ministerial official, who may or may not have a wide experience in these matters, to be the sole arbiter of whether or not a child has received adequate education? No mention was made by hon. Members Opposite of the parents' choice in these matters. The hon. Member for Workington (Mr. Peart)intervened a few moments ago to point out that children can move from one school to another if they so wish, but it is surely due to

the parents' choice rather than that of the children that children are sent to independent schools.
Parents must obviously choose to send their children to an independent school for a number of reasons. I should like to think that the most important of those reasons was the standard of education with which the independent school will provide the child. Therefore, I would urge hon. Members opposite when they are obviously anxious to protect the interests of the children to recognise the fact that parents have a responsibility in this respect and that they are exercising that responsibility by paying for their children's education.
Finally, I would urge upon my hon. Friend, whilst he is anxious as we all are to make this registration scheme work effectively, to do nothing which would in any way interfere with the main strength of the schools to which we are referring, namely, their independence. If we once try to make them an extension of the State system or a poor relation of the local authority's fine educational services we shall destroy a very valuable part of the educational services in the country.
Let there be no mistake about it. Independent schools, though they have not the direct authority of the State behind them, do provide valuable services. I believe that most valuable service in education is being provided by them for the very reason that they are independent.

10.45 p.m.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Education (Sir Edward Boyle): I would echo the words of the hon. Gentleman the Member for Fulham (Mr. M. Stewart), that the subject we are discussing tonight is too important to pass over in silence. I therefore hope that the House will forgive me if I reply to the debate at slightly greater length than is usual for responses to Motions of this kind.
I shall also try to answer what the hon. Lady the Member for Lanarkshire, North (Miss Herbison)said. If I do not satisfactorily answer her, the Joint Under-Secretary of State for Scotland will enter the debate himself, but I thought it might, perhaps, be convenient if I replied to both the speeches which


have been made from the Opposition Front Bench.
I begin with the background to these Regulations. The possibility of securing that children attending independent schools should receive adequate education under suitable conditions was fully considered by the Departmental Committee on Private Schools which was appointed as long ago as 1930. None of that Committee's recommendations could be put into effect before the war, but similar provisions were written into Part III of the 1944 Act; but the immediate post-war situation was not favourable to the operation of Part III.
In 1949, the late Mr. George Tomlinson stated, in Circular 196, that it would not be possible to bring Part III into operation until the building position and the supply of teachers had improved sufficiently for it to be possible for schools to remedy within the period of time which would have to be specified, under Section 71 of the 1944 Act, whatever shortcomings in premises and staffing might be found. By 1954, the building position and the supply of teachers were both considerably better and in July, 1954, my right hon. Friend the Member for Moss Side (Dame Florence Horsbrugh)announced the intention of the Government to bring Part III into force in 1957.
The immediate reason for making this announcement in 1954 was the wave of public uneasiness at that time about unsuitable teachers, in particular, morally unsuitable teachers, who were being found in independent schools. I shall have a word to say about teachers at the end of my remarks.
Much has already been done to prepare for the introduction of Part III and under the Ministry's Circular 196 practically every known independent school has received at least one visit from one of Her Majesty's Inspectors. In many cases a formal report has followed the visit. In recent months we have made every effort at the Ministry to acquaint proprietors with the measure of their responsibility and the possible consequences to their schools when Part III comes into operation. A lengthy explanatory memorandum was sent to all proprietors in March last year. Copies of the Independent Schools Registration

Regulations were sent them about a week ago. On 4th July they were sent a letter from which the hon. Gentleman the Member for Fulham quoted, with a form of application inviting them to apply to register their schools as soon as possible after 30th September next. So we have done our best to prepare for bringing Part III of the Act into force.

Miss Herbison: The hon. Gentleman has told us what has been done in England and Wales.

Sir E. Boyle: I shall deal with Scotland, too. I shall certainly deal with the steps taken after 1951. I have a note of that.
The Act imposes the duty on the Registrar of Independent Schools to register any independent school of which the proprietor makes application for the purpose in the prescribed manner and furnishes the prescribed particulars.
But in Section 70 of the Education Act, 1944, there is this proviso:
the registration of any school shall be provisional only until the Minister, after the school has been inspected on his behalf under the provisions a Part IV of this Act, gives notice to the proprietor that the registration is final.
Furthermore, Section 70 (3)makes it an offence to do any act calculated to lead to the belief that the school is a registered school while it is only provisionally registered.
Provisional registration follows automatically on sending in a form and there is no procedure for a sort of prima facie disqualification of the school. But there are very strong penalties in the Act attached to any attempt to suggest that a provisionally registered school is in any way formally registered. The bite in Part III will come at a later stage when, after the school has been inspected on his behalf, my noble Friend decides either to confirm registration or to serve notice of complaint on the proprietor that he finds the school objectionable.
He can do that on any of the following grounds—

"(a)that the school premises or any parts thereof are unsuitable for a school;
(b)that the accommodation provided at the school premises is inadequate or unsuitable having regard to the number, ages, and sex of the pupils attending the school;
(c)that efficient and suitable instruction is not being provided…


(d)that the proprietor of the school or any teacher employed therein is not a proper person to be the proprietor of an independent school or to be a teacher in any school, as the case may be."

The consequences which may flow from the Minister's decision that a school is objectionable may be serious indeed. We must face that. The consequences could even mean the loss of the proprietor's livelihood.
In certain circumstances, I think that the House would agree that this could well be just, but it ought not to happen simply because of an inference drawn from particulars supplied on the form of application for registration. Until the Minister has served a formal notice of complaint, the Act does not provide for the proprietor to exercise his right of appeal to the Independent Schools Tribunal; but he will have that right of appeal, and my noble Friend's opinion is that that right should be at all times thoroughly safeguarded.
We, therefore, confine the particulars asked for in the application for registration mainly to those which it is sensible for Her Majesty's inspectors to have before any one of them visits a school on the Minister's behalf. The particulars are the address of the school, the names of those responsible for it and the numbers and ages of the children at the school. The only other particulars asked for are in respect of the teaching staffs. We want these particulars so that the Ministry can check the names against its list of teachers already declared by the Ministry to be unsuitable on grounds of misconduct. One of my less agreeable duties at the Ministry is to examine these cases of misconduct on behalf of my noble Friend. Whether a teacher is a qualified teacher, in the sense of being competent at his job, obviously cannot be deduced from information supplied on a form. This can be judged only by someone who sees the teacher at work.
I come next to the question of the length of the registration process, and I will say a few words about the inspectorate. Because nearly every known independent school has already been inspected under the terms of Circular 196, the Department has a pretty good idea of what the task before it is likely to be. I will give figures for Scotland separately in a few moments. In England and Wales there are about 4,700 independent

schools. About 1,400 of these are already recognised by my noble Friend as efficient under Rules 16. His Department has full information about them. Consequently, they have been exempted from the process of registration and will be deemed to be already registered. Since the Minister has already expressed his positive satisfaction with these schools, it is highly unlikely that they could possibly cause him to serve any notice of complaint.
Our estimate is that at least 90 per cent. of the remaining 3,300 or so independent schools are thought to be sufficiently good in the standard of their premises, accommodation and teaching for my noble Friend not to have any reason to find them objectionable. Indeed, my noble Friend hopes that many of them will seek recognition under Rules 16 so that they may receive the mark of his positive satisfaction.
That leaves a residue of about 200 schools whose circumstances will require fairly lengthy consideration. It is our view that some, though by no means all, of these 200 schools may give rise to a cause of complaint.

Mr. Peart: Can the hon. Gentleman be more precise? What is the reason for the estimate of 90 per cent.? What is the source of the information? Is it previous reports?

Sir E. Boyle: It is reports that we already have. Obviously, the figures cannot be precise. This is the estimate that we make in the light of the reports that we have already had from inspectors who have been inspecting schools under the terms of Circular 196. It will take some time to deal with these cases, but we believe that the major process of registration will be finished by the summer of next year. In Scotland we think it will be finished by the end of March next.

Mr. F. H. Hayman: Can the Parliamentary Secretary give some idea of the general type of the 200 schools which he feels are unsatisfactory?

Sir E. Boyle: No, Sir. That would be asking too much. It would not be fair to the schools themselves to indulge in any generalisations. I want to be cautious about this. The most I am


prepared to say tonight is that some of the residue of 200 schools, though by no means all, may turn out to be unsatisfactory and my noble Friend may have to serve a notice of complaint; but any further generalisations about the schools would be unfair.
I want now to say a word about the inspectorate, about which the hon. Member for Fulham asked me. The introduction of Part III will be by no means the only source of additional responsibility for inspectors in the near future. For example, in connection with the growth of technical education and in connection with such matters as the change-over to a three-year course in training colleges, the inspectorate will have a very important contribution to make.
The point I want to make is that I believe growth in responsibility has been shown by both teachers and schools since the war and, as a result the real value and importance of the inspectorate lies more and more in its advisory functions. It needs these days to give less time to some of its more routine duties, particularly formal visits leading to a full inspection report, and it has become clear that an appreciable saving in manpower in the inspectorate can be made and that we can adjust its duties to new developments without impairing its advisory value. Under the new organisation of the inspectorate I have every hope that that will prove to be so more and more in years to come.
The decision has, therefore, been taken to carry out inspections under Part III without actually recruiting additional inspectors for the purpose. I can assure the hon. Gentleman that we have taken very considerable thought before making that decision. I would remind the House that the inspections will admittedly entail a good deal of consequential work, but the most exacting part of the operation will be compressed mainly into the relatively short period during which the register is being compiled. This work, in its main bulk, will be of a once-for-all kind.
I have looked into this carefully in the light of the letter which the hon. Gentleman was kind enough to send me and I believe that the inspectors will be able to take this extra work in their stride by giving it reasonable priority during this

period without neglecting other important sides of their work. Many of the schools to be inspected under Part III are already known to the inspectors. The most difficult cases will be dealt with by a small team which has been making a special study of Part Ill from the inspectorate's point of view. This small section will give a large part of its time to the work during next year, and I do not think the weight falling on the rest of the inspectorate will prove to be unduly heavy.
I come now to the highly important question of standards and here I think it important for the House to be realistic. I thought that my hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth, West (Mr. J. Eden)spoke helpfully on this matter. We cannot be too precise and too categorical in advance. After all, independent schools range very widely, from small schools catering for a dozen or so small children to fairly large boarding schools taking children throughout most of the compulsory school age range. They are housed in all kinds of premises very few of which were built specifically as schools in the first place.
It is not practicable to lay down standards and, indeed, my noble Friend is not empowered to lay down precise standards of the kind laid down in the Ministry's building regulations for maintained schools. To give an example, regulations for maintained schools require that a class room for 40 primary children should have a minimum area of 520 square feet, that is to say 13 square feet per child. When one is building a new school that is a perfectly sensible and proper requirement, but if we tried to apply similar standards to a class of children meeting in the drawing room of a large Victorian house, it would not make very much sense.
One has to know the shape of the room, the size and disposition of the windows, the degree of ventilation and height, and so on. All our old schools have rooms which would be open to be condemned by modern standards. I am thinking of some of the older schools in the country and I cannot believe that Lower School at Eton College would be regarded as a particularly enlightened school room by modern standards, although I think it would be a great pity to suggest that no children should be taught there. I attribute my own in


different eyesight to having studied the Greek Testament for School Certificate in a badly lighted room.
One has to know whether the child is using a sensible desk or working at furniture not really resigned for school use. Similar considerations apply to other aspects of the school and I put it to the House that there is no question at all of my noble Friend applying, as it were, an unfair standard of leniency to independent schools. If an independent school is to be complained about, it will not be because it has failed to meet one particular standard in one detailed aspect, but because taking into account the premises, the accommodation and the teaching staff and what they are doing, it has manifestly failed to provide adequate or suitable instruction.
There again, judgment can be formed only on the spot on the merits of each individual case. My noble Friend will be guided in his reports by inspectors specially chosen for their knowledge of independent schools. I would make the point that in no case will the decision to serve a notice rest on the advice of one single inspector. Ultimately, of course, standards will emerge from the decisions of the independent schools tribunals on cases brought before them. I agree that the curriculum is important; for example, how many subjects a master has to teach and whether certain subjects are available. But I think it would be wrong for the House to be categorical on the matter in advance.
My noble Friend hopes that most schools will welcome constructive criticism from the inspectorate and carry out essential improvements without there being any need to raise a formal notice of complaint. It is in the highest degree unlikely that so many schools will be closed that the children displaced will throw a noticeably heavy burden on the local education authorities. In fact, I think it possible that the Minister will need to seek the complete closure of only quite a small number of schools and there is every reason to think that local education authorities will be able to give such small degree of help as may be needed.
Before I deal with Scotland, I want to say a word about teachers. I am glad that the hon. Member for Fulham

said that he was keen to put this in due proportion. Before the introduction of Part III was announced there was, of course, a danger that teachers declared unsuitable for service in maintained and grant-aided schools would increasingly try to find refuge in the independent schools. Some unsavoury cases have come to light. In the last three years, however, we have carried out a thorough checking process on a voluntary basis. Practically every known independent school has sent in at least one complete return of its teaching staff and nearly all have sent in three returns, and, as expected, the results have shown that most schools are above criticism in respect of unsuitable teachers.
In the 1954–55 check, 31 teachers were found whose names were on the Ministry's list of unsuitable teachers, and only in a very few cases was it necessary to exert any pressure at all to get the proprietor to take appropriate action. Nine more teachers of this kind were found in 1955–56 and another eight in 1956–57. We thought very hard about this problem, because, as my hon. Friend said, one or two bad cases give a wholly disproportionate picture to the country, but I believe that the figures which I have given reveal that the problem is down to insignificant proportions.
After September of this year, when Part III comes into force, we shall have the necessary legal power, subject to their right of appeal to the tribunal, to deal with both unsuitable teachers and unsuitable proprietors. I think it is important to realise, however, that no device for dealing with them can produce absolutely 100 per cent. safety, if only because there will always be the problem of the person whose first act of misconduct occurs when he is a teacher or a proprietor.
Under the Regulations, a proprietor will be required each January to furnish details of changes, and in this way we shall he able to make an annual check on the entry of undesirable teachers into the independent schools. I do not think that it would be reasonable or practicable to try to undertake more than this. Perhaps it is worth remembering that any change in proprietorship, which might well be a source of greater danger to the pupils and parents, will have to be notified at once.
I come, finally, to Scotland. I thought that it might be convenient for the House if I replied to Scottish questions, too, but my hon. Friend the Joint Under-Secretary of State for Scotland will fill in any gaps, if it seems that there are some. There is not very much difference in effect between the Scottish registration Regulations and the English Regulations. In the form of application for registration the Scots are asking for slightly more detail. For example, they wish to know whether any part of the premises is situated away from the main part, whereas England would expect the inspector to find that out for himself.
Again, the Scots wish to know the exact legal status of the governing body where the proprietor is an incorporated or an unincorporated body. Again, they also wish to know the full names and addresses of the members directly responsible for the management of the school. There is no great significance in this, but it may be of satisfaction to you, Mr. Speaker, to know that the Scots are dealing in slightly greater detail than the English with these matters, and perhaps as they are dealing with only 160 schools as compared with 3,300, they can reasonably handle rather more detail than can we in England and Wales.
It is, of course, true that pressure for the introduction of Part V of the Education (Scotland)Act, 1946, began earlier than the corresponding pressure for the introduction of Part III of the 1944 Act, and some of the circumstances were slightly different. As the hon. Lady said, at a Press Conference in October, 1951 the late Mr. Hector McNeil announced his intention of bringing Part V of the Act into operation. On the other hand, whenever there is an Election in the offing a good deal of legislation is talked about. There was, however, a particular reason why at that time Mr. McNeil should have made that statement, because there had recently been reports about an independent school in Glasgow—I will not give its name—which was conducted in a private house and in which the sanitary arrangements were very inadequate and the only teachers were two unmarried sisters, both of them over seventy.
The hon. Lady, the Member for Lanarkshire, North and Mr. McNeil both took a serious view of this, but in the months

immediately following the announcement visits of inspection showed that these independent schools—there were between 10 and 20 of them which had had their attention drawn to shortcomings in premises or staffing—were already taking steps to make these good, as far as they could at the time. In those circumstances, and in view of the difficulty at that time of securing labour and materials for improvements to buildings, my right hon. Friend the Member for Moray and Nairn (Mr. J. Stuart)decided that any further improvements required should continue to be secured by administrative action.
I think it is only fair to remember that 1951 was a time when there were a good many shortages of raw materials, when building licences were down to an extremely low figure and when it was not very easy to make an advance. Looking back, I think that would have been the height of the economic crisis in 1951, and it would have been difficult to bring Part V of the Act into operation.

Miss Herbison: The hon. Gentleman has told us that there were only 160 of these schools in Scotland, and then he gave us a figure of about 10 which were pretty well below standard. I am sorry, but he has not yet given me any adequate reason why action was not taken in Scotland.

Sir E. Boyle: I did go on to say that the small number of schools concerned which had their attention drawn to these shortcomings were already taking such steps as they could to get matters put right. Furthermore, later inspections have indicated that this improvement has been maintained and, in fact, the very unsatisfactory school in Glasgow did itself close of its own accord.
Some years later, in 1954, when there was public concern about the employment of unsuitable persons as teachers in independent schools, both the Scots and the English as a precautionary measure asked all independent schools to furnish particulars regularly of persons employed on their staff. The schools have readily agreed to do this and indeed have gone on regularly doing so every year.
I am sorry to have detained the House so long on these Regulations. I would end by saying that I listened with great interest to my hon. Friend the Member


for Bournemouth, West on the importance of independent schools remaining independent. There is no question at all here on the one hand of the Minister trying to interfere in such a way as to upset the independence of these schools. On the other hand, it seems equally clear to me that in our modern society we have got to see that unsatisfactory independent schools do not continue.
If I can end on a personal note, I always remember when I was young, a visitor from abroad asking my father what he thought was the oddest British institution, and my father said that he thought the oddest institution was the fact that my father or I could go to the hon. Lady if we so wished and say "I think we will start a school" and nobody at that time would take the slightest notice or wish to inquire at all. I think it is quite right that that state of affairs should no longer continue.
We should have registration under Part III of the Act and my noble Friend should be satisfied that these schools are functioning in a proper way. We have got to find the happy medium on the one hand between excessive fussiness about administrative detail, between trying to be too categorical where we cannot be categorical, and on the other hand letting matters slide. I have no doubt that if we administer these Regulations properly we can do that.

Mr. M. Stewart: I thank the hon. Gentleman for his full and interesting reply and beg to ask leave to withdraw the Motion.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Does the hon. Lady the Member for Lanarkshire, North (Miss Herbison)wish to move the second Motion on the Order Paper?

Miss Herbison: No, thank you, Mr. Deputy-Speaker.

Orders of the Day — EMPLOYMENT, PLYMOUTH

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Hughes-Young.]

11.15 p.m.

Miss Joan Vickers: I am grateful to have this opportunity of putting before my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary the question of employment in Plymouth. It is, I think, appropriate that this short discussion should follow the debate on disarmament. This great city, with its well-known history of service to the nation, suffered perhaps more than any other in this country in the last war. It is now being rebuilt, but there are fears that its new glory may be built on sand and not on rock unless some definite action is taken in the very near future to safeguard employment.
I am not thinking merely of the next ten or twenty years, but of the position which might arise for those children being born today. The recent Navy Estimates announced a cut of £11 millions; the debate on the Defence White Paper, and further talks in connection with disarmament, have made the question of employment in Plymouth a matter for general concern.
While current employment is less than that of 1949, it approximates, in total, to that of 1955 and 1956, the reduction of women's unemployment being offset by the worsening in the position for men. In fact, the percentage rate of unemployment for May last in greater Plymouth was 2·5 per cent., compared with 1·7 per cent. for the South-West of England. and only 1·5 per cent. for greater Britain.
In addition, we have the problem of ex-Service men, many of who make Plymouth their home. The figures of the unemployed among those—that is, those who have been Regulars—are 14 officers, and 31 other ranks, and five women. That is a total of 50, and although that may not seem a large figure, the position may become more serious when further cuts in the Services can be expected.
The present employment position is as follows. The Admiralty and other Service establishments employ about 25,000, out of a total population of 218,000, and a total employed population of 82,721. The other day I put a Question to the Civil


Lord of the Admiralty and was told that although there are more than 19,000 employed in the Royal Dockyard, only about 8,000 are established. The others could be given notice at any time; at least, that, technically, is the position, although I am not suggesting that they would. We would like to ascertain something more about this position, since it means that many of the workers in Plymouth feel a great sense of insecurity.
In Birmingham, for example, there are more jobs than people to undertake them. In fact, I believe there are about 12,000 Jamaicans helping to fill vacancies in that city and the surrounding area. In Plymouth, the next largest employers are the distributive trades, which employ 12,073 persons, and should the numbers employed by the Admiralty be cut, this next group would automatically suffer.
The building trade follows as the next largest employer, with 9,123, but builders and contractors reduced their number of employees by 389 between the middle of 1955 and 1956; although, strangely enough, the percentage in the building and contracting trades, as well as in the distributive trades, continues to run well above the national average. From a comparison with the industry groups elsewhere, this points to the need for a better balance of the city's industry. Furthermore, there is a slackening in the tempo of the building trades now. There has been an embargo this summer in Plymouth, on overtime working, beyond five hours.
The main trades which we have in Plymouth, with the numbers employed in them, are as follows. In agriculture, fishery and forestry, which still take some workers even in the City of Plymouth, there is a total of 1,239 employed. Mining and allied products employ 448. The chemical and allied trades take quite a number, 2,301. We have a small number employed in work on precision instruments, and in textiles and clothing we employ 1,788, mostly women. In the food, drink and tobacco industries, there are 3,233 employed.
We need industries other than the ones we have now. The principal industries in Plymouth now are Tecalemit, Bush Radio, and Berkertex. Each of these is a vulnerable industry, because each depends upon other economic conditions.

The first depends on the motor industry; the second has already been hit by hire-purchase restrictions; and the third, which is a dress-making concern, is always likely to be hit in difficult times. When there is unemployment, people spend more on food for their families, and not on extra clothes.
There are several new projects in the city which are scheduled to start in the near future, but, unfortunately, they do not seem to be able to employ a great many people. We are now fortunate to have C. & J. Clark, who are to make shoes, James Cook, a small factory making shirts, extensions to Tecalemit, Farley's Foods, Brown & Sharpe, making precision instruments, and Western Motors Holdings and Clatworthys have started to employ a few extra people.
I quite realise that my hon. Friend cannot answer for the Admiralty, but I presume that he will be in touch with the Admiralty, through his Department, concerning our special difficulty in Plymouth. I hope that he will keep in touch with his hon. Friend the Civil Lord about it.
The main reason for my concern is that recently, in Her Majesty's dockyard. there was quite suddenly the discharge of 58 men and 34 women. They were mostly from the civil engineering departments, and these were 11 carpenters, 25 painters, 9 masons, and 2 plumbers. I am glad to say that, following representations which I made to the Civil Lord. 11 others were taken back, but there are still others, particularly 13 who are over 65, who are finding it extremely difficult to find employment. Since 1956, 100 people have become redundant.
Ail this makes people very nervous for their future. There is a good opening still for industry in Plymouth. I know that it is 211 miles from London, which means that industrialists have a long journey, but we have quite good trains. Also, we have an excellent harbour, which could, I believe, be developed far more. There is the Cattedown, Sutton Pool, Mill Bay, Stonehouse Pool and Hamaoze.
Plymouth has always had very good industrial relations, and has some extremely good workers there, probably a higher percentage of skilled workers than most other towns in Britain. Also, they work very hard, and have a good


record for having few strikes. I am sure that my hon. Friend will be glad to hear that, despite low earnings, we have a higher average for National Savings than the country as a whole, our figure being 15s. 8d. a head compared with the average of 11s. for the general population.
Apart from the problems I have mentioned, there are two main categories which have difficulties in obtaining employment. First, it is very hard to find work for people over the age of 65. When people are living longer and are more active, it is depressing for them when they reach an age at which they have to leave their work, but feel capable of carrying on.
There is, furthermore, the difficulty of the future of young people. Plymouth has been a city with a long record of apprenticeships, both for the Royal Navy and in the dockyard. Parents are beginning to wonder what they can do with their sons and daughters, to what type of work they can put them, or whether, to use a West Country expression, it is necessary for them "to go up the line" to find work.
In two years' time, because of what has been known as the bulge in the birth rate, with the extra numbers of children now passing through school, many more young people will be coming on to the labour market. I shall be grateful if my hon. Friend will take an early opportunity to discuss this matter with his right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade and point out the great need for a change of industry in the area. I would also like him to press his hon. Friend the Civil Lord to get the Nihill Report published as soon as possible. It might arrest many of our difficulties and prevent people from feeling as nervous as they are at the present situation.
The employment question is becoming even more urgent, because the Avon dam project, which employs a large number of people from the Plymouth area, is nearly completed. The uncertainty, too, concerning the future of the dockyard and how many employees may be put off also worries a great many families. We have, as my hon. Friend will agree—he has been very good in coming to Plymouth to see the situation for himself, and I thank him—very good sites on which to build further factories. I

shall be grateful, therefore, if his Department, together with other Departments, will do all that they can to encourage further industry to come in future.
I also suggest that my hon. Friend might try to persuade the Admiralty at least to keep on some of the workpeople by not putting out such a lot of its work to contract. I asked a Question the other day and was told that 17 contracts were put out to private contractors. By not putting the work out to private contract, we could provide more work, as well as relieving my hon. Friend's Department of the work of placing these people elsewhere.
The citizens of the City of Plymouth have helped their country in many ways in the past and now, if given the chance, they can help again by working this time for the export trade, which the country badly needs, and in which, I am quite certain, they are willing to do their share if given the opportunity. I thank my hon. Friend for the courteous manner in which he has listened to me and I look forward to his reply.

11.28 p.m.

Mr. F. H. Hayman: I support the plea of the hon. Lady the Member for Devonport (Miss Vickers)that consideration should be given to the great and important City of Plymouth, which has risen like a phoenix out of the ashes since the war and produced one of the finest city centres in the world. I can echo what the hon. Lady has said, that there are fears of unemployment not only in Plymouth, but in the South-West generally, and particularly in West Cornwall, where the redundancies which are arising from disarmament are causing great anxiety.
I stress the point made by the hon. Lady that the Parliamentary Secretary might bear in mind the principles of the Distribution of Industry Act, so that the South-West will not be forgotten when new factories are to be built and new industries come into being. Some of us who come from the West Country through the environs of London are rather shocked at the amount of new factory building going on all around London when the West Country is being starved.

11.30 p.m.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Labour (Mr. Robert Carr): I know that my hon. Friend the Member for Devonport (Miss Vickers)has spent


the day at sea in one of Her Majesty's ships. I do not know whether the voyage was long enough for her to gain her sea legs, but, obviously, it was not rough enough to weaken her ability or characteristic pertinacity in bringing forward the problems and needs of her constituency. I am glad that my hon. Friend has given me the chance of saying something about the employment position in the Plymouth and Devonport area.
As my hon. Friend said, I had the pleasure of visiting Plymouth and Devon-port earlier in the summer and of hearing the views of many local people as well as of my Department's officials in the area. Therefore, I feel that I know something about the position at first hand and have, perhaps, a clearer picture in my mind of what is involved, both in terms of fact and feeling, than it is possible to get merely by studying figures and written reports.
It is true that ever since the war unemployment in Plymouth has been above the national average rate, usually by about 1 per cent. of the insured population. By the same token Plymouth, unlike many parts of the country, has consistently had more people unemployed than vacant jobs waiting to be filled.
Therefore, we recognise that Plymouth has an employment problem which cannot be regarded as solved, even though one should also remember that, with the exception of a few isolated months, the level of employment in Plymouth has been well within any accepted definition of what constitutes full employment.
While I thought it right to make the point in order to keep the position in perspective, I am not for one moment seeking to convey any impression of complacent satisfaction. On the contrary, as I have said, we do not regard Plymouth's employment problem as being fully solved, and I recognise that the imposition of substantial defence cuts must at the present time create a special feeling of anxious uncertainty.
Let me examine briefly the recent trends of employment and here let me make clear that in speaking about employment figures for Plymouth I am using not just the figures for the Plymouth Employment Exchange, but the combined totals for the four exchanges of Plymouth. Devonport, Saltash and Torpoint.
At the beginning of this year unemployment was higher than usual, and in February reached the level of 3·2 per cent. However, I am glad to say that it has fallen progressively since then, and the latest figure for June is 2·1 per cent., which is slightly less than it was at the same date in 1956, and is, in fact, the lowest June rate for any previous year with the single exception of 1951 when it was 2 per cent.
Unlike the country as a whole, Plymouth has less unemployed than a year ago. Therefore, the current situation in Plymouth is satisfactory in relation to the past record, but within the total figure for unemployment there are one or two trends to which I should like to draw attention and to which my hon. Friend referred.
What has caused most concern in the past has been the restricted opportunities of employment for women. In 1956—the last date for which figures are available—women and girls formed only 30 per cent. of the insured population, as against a national average of 35 per cent. For several years the female unemployment rate has been close to 4 or 5 per cent., but recently there has been a marked improvement. The rate of unemployment among women and girls in June this year was down to 2·6 per cent. compared with 3·7 per cent. only twelve months ago, and this is the lowest rate recorded on the present basis of insurance.
As my hon. Friend said, it is this improvement in the employment situation for women and girls which is responsible for the overall improvement in the unemployment rate for the district. As far as men are concerned there has unfortunately, as my hon. Friend said, been some increase in unemployment compared with one and two years ago. The June rate of male unemployment was 1·9 per cent. compared with 1·5 per cent. in June, 1956, and 1·3 per cent. in June, 1955.
To try to discover the cause of this the Ministry has recently made an analysis of the industries in which these unemployed men and boys last had jobs. This analysis shows that the increase has been due not to any specific redundancy, but to a general slackening of activity, and the industry most affected is the


building trade, in which unemployment has occurred amongst unskilled workers. I emphasise that it has been among the unskilled workers because, in contrast, the shortage of building craftsmen is more acute than it was a year ago, so that today there are about six vacancies for every building craftsman unemployed, compared with fewer than three vacancies at the same time last year.
Perhaps there is a lesson to be learned from this fact not only in relation to Plymouth and to the building trade, but in relation to almost every industry and almost all parts of the country, because the same story is repeated over and over again, namely, an acute shortage of skilled workers even in places where the overall supply of labour is greater than the number of vacancies available.
During the next few years Britain must greatly increase the number of people it trains to become skilled workers. That is necessary in the interests of the national economy and in the interests of providing good and regular employment for all our people. It so happens that in the next few years we have a unique opportunity of doing this because of the great increase, no less than 50 per cent., in the number of boys and girls who will he leaving their schools and seeking employment.
I know that in Plymouth opportunities for apprenticeship are relatively good compared on a percentage basis with opportunities in other parts of the country and I know that the Local Youth Employment Committee has been taking a strong initiative in trying to get these opportunities increased. Therefore, what I have been saying during this last moment or two has certainly not been meant in any way in criticism of industry in Plymouth. It is simply that I want to take this and every opportunity which presents itself of driving home the vital importance of increasing our opportunities for training so that we fulfil the duty which we owe to the rising number of boys and girls who will be looking for jobs, and so that we provide our industries with the skilled people they need and correct the present unbalance in the supply of skilled and unskilled labour.
I turn from the actual employment figures to a brief consideration of the underlying characteristics of the employment situation in the Plymouth area. Of

course, the most notable feature, as my hon. Friend said, is the dependence on Admiralty employment. The Royal Naval Dockyard at Devonport employs well over one-third of the male working population. I fully appreciate that where defence work bulks so large in the local economy as it does in Plymouth there is bound to be particular anxiety about what the future may hold. I also realise there is bound to be considerable impatience that the decisions should be made, so that one can see how the defence cuts will be implemented and know to what extent Plymouth and Devonport may be affected by them.
I cannot give my hon. Friend and her constituents any fresh news tonight. As my hon. Friend the Civil Lord of the Admiralty said in a debate a month or so ago, the assessment of the dockyard capacity which will be needed for the future is not a simple matter. I can assure my hon. Friend that decisions will be taken as soon as possible and that they will be taken in full consultation with the Ministry of Labour, so that any cuts which have to be made will fall, so far as choice is possible, where redundancies present the least difficulty. I can certainly give my hon. Friend the assurance for which she asked, that I will keep in touch with the Civil Lord on this and on the other aspects of the employment situation which she has mentioned.
It is because the Admiralty is so overwhelmingly the largest employer in Plymouth and Devonport that the provision of new industries and new employers is, as my hon. Friend has said, such an important matter. Indeed, as she also pointed out, the importance of this factor is further emphasised when one looks at the higher than average dependence in Plymouth on the distribution and services industries. I can assure my hon. Friend that I and my Department are well aware of the strong local concern about this, to which she has referred not only tonight but on a number of occasions when she has come to see me to discuss the position.
I assure my hon. Friend that the Government have been by no means inactive in brining the possibilities of the Plymouth area to the notice of firms seeking sites for new projects. We shall continue to be active in this matter in the future. Already, between 5,000 and 6,000 people are employed at firms which have come


to Plymouth since the war, and we can expect that another 1,300 or so additional jobs will become available in the next few years.
I realise that this will not be sufficient to abolish unemployment in the area—particularly in view of the number of boys and girls who will be leaving school during this period—and I know that people rightly worry about the future as well as about the present. Therefore, although the Government cannot direct manufacturers to Plymouth they will continue to inform firms concerned with new projects about the plentiful supply of labour to be found in Plymouth and the area's other advantages. I will undertake that the position is kept clearly before my right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade.
The success of these efforts of persuasion by the Government will depend to a great extent on the welcome and the facilities offered to prospective employers when they go to Plymouth to make inquiries. Almost every firm contemplating setting up in a new area will go and have a look at a number of alternative places. Its final choice will be influenced largely by the facilities it finds in each one. Speed in development is often the important factor in the economics of a new project. Therefore, when a firm comes to an area, it expects to be shown a choice of sites for its factory, and to know definitely that it can have one quickly. It also wants to have full and definite information about the provision of basic services, such as water and power

supplies, and housing for its key employees.
My final words to Plymouth, therefore, would be, "Make sure that you are fully competitive with other areas in offering these facilities to any prospective employer." I assure my hon. Friend that, although it is impossible to answer tonight all the points that she has raised, they will be kept in mind and that, as far as I can, I shall do what she has asked of me.

11.43 p.m.

Sir Henry Studholme: I am very pleased that my hon. Friend the Member for Devonport (Miss Vickers)has raised this matter on the Adjournment, because I know how very assiduous she is in her care for the interests of Plymouth people. My hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Labour has shown by what he has said that he is well aware of the employment needs of Plymouth, and I am quite certain that the Government will bear those needs constantly in mind.
I was particularly interested in what the Parliamentary Secretary said about the need for skilled labour. The training of young people for skilled labour is certainly one of our greatest needs. I know that the Government are doing everything they can to encourage this training. In it lies one of our greatest hopes for prosperity in the future.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at sixteen minutes to Twelve o'clock.